The secession of south Sudan remains the only viable
option
“With the failure of the experiment of one country with
two systems, the unwillingness of the NCP to abolish the police state
and the south’s continuous feeling of vulnerability thus spending 40% of
its budget on building its arsenal at the expense of basic
infrastructure and food production, the CPA’s call for making the unity
of the Sudan attractive has been completely replaced by the South’s urge
for Independence.”
By: Dr. Justin
Ambago Ramba, MD. UK
NOV 7/2009,
SSN; The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed between the
Sudanese the National Congress Party of President Al Bashir representing
the North and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A)
representing the South, was in fact nothing more than one of the so many
stations in the Sudanese politics which is dominated in a great portion
by power struggles between the centre and the margin (periphery). Though
it is now staggering like a drunken person to use the description of the
Sudanese’s First Vice President and President of the semi-autonomous
south Sudan Salva Kiir Mayardit, it is still holding with the support it
gets from the USA government.
But in reality
as a result of the new civil war in the western province of Darfur, the
CPA had on many occasions failed to produce the expected impact on the
general political situation in the country as the changes which were
supposed to follow the peace agreement were in many occasions over
shadowed by this new conflict and its international ramifications. As
such it became clear to the Sudanese as well as the international
community that the decay that affected the CPA in its first 4 years was
in fact due to the preoccupation of the Sudanese policy makers and their
counterparts in the international arena with the genocide that was
carried out in Darfur as the Khartoum government chose to resort to this
irresponsible scorch earth policy in its attempt to suppress the new
rebellion.
However the
single important factor that actually made the CPA to encounter
reluctance in its implementation by the signatories remains to be the
antagonizing visions of the two parties to the agreement. The Islamist
NCP is in no any way ready to step down from any of its objectives of
clinging to power, dominating the major decision making process, holding
firmly to its fundamental Islamic orientation that only pays lip
services to any inclusiveness and the much promised democratic
transformation, as they (Islamists) will never ever accept to establish
a secular system of rule.
The SPLM on
the other hand is also holding firm to its ideology of bringing about a
New United Secular Sudan. However unfortunately sooner than later the
two partners became engaged in rows over the implementation of almost
every single item they agreed on at Naivasha in 2005. And as this very
agreement was mainly brokered by the USA administration under former
President George W Bush, its implementation has all through depended at
large on continuous USA pressures. This is quite disturbing as it shows
that the Sudanese themselves are not keen in any way to implement the
peace agreement the way it should be. And this is much so the position
of the dominant NCP where it has resorted to playing a policy of
frustrating its partner more than any thing else. Going by the record of
their behaviour even before signing the CPA, it could be seen that the
NCP is a party that can not make genuine consensus but rather agrees to
any step only with the primary intension of buying time once it comes
under international pressure.
As such the
real survival of the Islamic fundamentalists rule in any part of the
Sudan depends largely on keeping south Sudan within a united Sudan, only
to be used as a means of rallying support behind NCP in the name of
defending Islam and the perceived right of the Sudanese Arabs to
continue ruling over their fellow Africans. Unfortunately things are
always not as planned and the discontent in many parts of the north
itself is becoming even more of a challenge to the ruling clique of
Khartoum no less than the one posed by the South.
Yet the
greatest paradox remains in the fact that both the NCP and the SPLM have
reached a point that they continuously need the American intervention in
almost every step of implementing the remaining issues of the CPA and
sometimes even on the smooth from day to day maintenance of their
partnership. So is it not implying that the Sudan may have to have the
US especial envoy as a permanent advisor and a political broker at the
Sudanese Presidency in order to mediate between the two sides till the
south secedes or for ever if the Sudan remains united?
The secession
of the South which has become imminent is still seen in other part of
the Sudan with much scepticism especially so amongst the marginalized
people of the political north (Darfur, the Nuba Mountains, the Ingassana,
and the Beja). The impression here is that, at the present moment the
South seems to provide the hope of championing the cause of the
marginalized people of the Sudan, a position which should be taken with
a pinch of salt given the true background of the protracted wars fought
in southern Sudan for the last five decades. But I hope that the other
marginalized people of the Sudan need also to be very realistic with
themselves knowing very well that southern Sudan has reached a stage
that politically it is no longer compatible with any parts of the
political north especially so when most of these regions participated in
the Islamic Holy War (Jihad) that was declared by the rulers of Khartoum
against the non Muslims of the South.
This final
test of having one country and two systems which was meant to maintain
the unity of the Sudan has apparently failed as it has become even a
source of a grave unrest in south Sudan. The majority of the south
Sudanese politicians now believe that the North has a hand in
destabilizing the south by encouraging the inter-tribal fights
especially in Upper Nile and Jonglei States with the ultimate intension
of painting a negative picture of the GoSS to the international
community. However should this be true then for sure it has dealt the
last blow to any trust that was left between the two former foes.
And as long as
the Sudan remains a united country, the Muslim governments in the North
will continue to exploit the religious sentiments of its citizens
whether marginalised or in the centre of power to create uneasiness with
the South in the name of either spreading or protecting Islam. This was
the situation that existed for the better part of the period from the
independence of the Sudan (1956) till today, where the marginalized
people of the north are being used as fodder to feed the North/South
conflicts and thus guaranteeing the tight grip on power by the northern
riverians Arab elites especially those with origins in the Northern and
the Central Regions of the Sudan. While these helpless marginalized
people got nothing in return except for more marginalization which has
at times turned into frank campaigns of genocides as is the case now in
Darfur.
It is hoped
that with the secession of the South, the people from the marginalized
areas of the North will turn to focus more efficiently in settling their
grudges with Khartoum without any distraction from the South. While this
policy of marginalization which is a common anomaly in the Sudanese
politics, is already showing its ugly face even in southern Sudan. And
hopefully the people of the South following secession should also be in
position to address this anomaly after removing the chronically ill
relationship with the North from the political equation.
This is
because right now there are a lot of corruption, lawlessness,
generalized insecurity, inter-tribal conflicts and impunity in the
South that southerners remain hesitant to talk about, leave alone
attempting to tackle it as the political priority in most instances is
now directed towards issues pertaining to the tenacious relationship
with the North to the extend that some people have continuously insisted
that southerners should stop criticizing the poor performance of the
government of south Sudan (GoSS) at this particular time as that would
playing directly into the hands of the northern NCP. However the
silence on these issues can also prove to be counter productive.
Anyway
whatever we say about the present partnership between the two dominant
parties in the Sudan, we know that in the absence of a continuous US
intervention the CPA would cease to exist. Also the SPLM’s expectations
of a New United Secular Sudan has failed the test which suggests that
the Sudanese in practise are more prone to end up with two separate
states come 2011. This brings us to the natural conclusion that the
noises being made in Khartoum by our fellow northerners whenever they
hear of calls for the secession of the South, utterly remains to be
seen as a mere act of hypocrisy while in reality they are the ones who
sow the seeds of the anticipated secession.
Dr. Justin
Ambago Ramba, MB, BCh, DRH, MD. Secretary General of the United South
Sudan Party (USSP). The party that stands for the independence of South
Sudan. Can be reached at either
justinramba@doctors.org.uk or
justinramba@aol.co.uk
NB: those who read this article also visited
www.nilebuffalo.com and blog http//ussp-news.blogspot.com