• The IGAD Security Arrangements Agreement — really a framework only — repeatedly acknowledges only two military forces on the ground in southern Sudan. Further, it makes clear that “no armed group allied to either party shall be allowed to operate outside the two forces”. Provision is made for members of the unacknowledged armed groups in the south to be absorbed into the army, prison, police, and wildlife services. 

• The Security Arrangements Agreement therefore first denies the existence of other armed groups in the south, but nonetheless says they have to be absorbed into the two recognised groups, and then ends by insisting that the question of their status has to be addressed. 

• The window of opportunity opened up by the euphoria of the southern Sudanese at the prospect of peace, and their strong support for reconciliation, has closed. Indeed, in the six months since the signing of the Security Arrangements Agreement much of the goodwill has dissipated, positions have hardened and clearly there are sections of the GoS, SPLM/A, and the SSDF now actively opposed to reconciliation between the SPLM/A and the SSDF.

• A highly effective military instrument for the government in time of war, the SSDF is a problematic and potentially dangerous group as the Sudan peace process moves forward. Armed, angry at being left out of the peace process, and fearful that decisions are being made that will affect its interests, the SSDF poses a major challenge to both the peace process and to the success of the proposed six-year transitional period.

South Sudan Democratic Forces

The Southern Co-ordinating Council serves as a focal point for the Khartoum-based southern politicians and its current chairman, Dr Riek Gai, has attempted to continue the pattern of Riek Machar, who was both the political leader of the Council and the military leader of the SSDF. Curiously, however, Riek Gai is a member of the ruling National Congress Party. UDSF, the political wing of the SSDF, its members serve as ministers in the Co-ordinating Council, and a number of people associated with the SSDF have been appointed as wallis (governors) and commissioners for the ten southern states. These appointments by Riek Gai make clear the government’s attempt to exert greater control over the military forces, and perhaps strengthen them for the political battles with the SPLM/A. While Riek Gai and his followers see him as a leader of the south, the SPLM/A has claimed that all such officials are instruments of the government, and that therefore it wants to deal with them only as members of the GoS. It is significant that while the SPLM/A is held to be a Dinka dominated organisation, the Southern Coordinating Council has always been headed by a Nuer with an Equatorian deputy, the present incumbent is Major-General Kelement Wani, leader of the Mundari section of the SSDF, and like Riek Gai a member of the ruling National Congress Party).

Paulino Matiep is the chief of staff of the SSDF, and holds great power over almost every facet of the lives of the inhabitants of the Bentiu–Mayoum–Mankin areas of WUN. He also exerts at least some influence over the Nuer in the traditional spheres of Upper Nile. However, his title is largely symbolic: Paulino’s direct control is limited to his home area of the Bul Nuer, and even that has sometimes been challenged by ambitious local commanders.

Assisting Paulino in the SSDF are a number of deputies and a Military High Command made up of 11 people. The deputies include Commander (recently appointed major-general) Gordon Kong, who serves as the deputy chief of staff for operations; Major-General Ismael Konyi, who is responsible for logistics; Commander Emanuel Ambrose, who oversees administration; Commander Elio Benson Otome, who controls intelligence; Commander John Machmadit, who covers mobilization and political orientation; Commander Atel Benjamin Bill, who serves as head of Recruitment and Training; and Commander Simon Gatwich Dual, who is responsible for the national mobile force. Overlapping these positions is the SSDF’s Military High Command, which is again led by Paulino. Its members include Gordon Kong, Ismael Konyi, El Tom Anour, Simon Gatwich Dual, Martin Terensio Kenyi, John Machmadit, Atel Benjamin, Emanuel Ambrose, Gabriel Tangi- Nyang and Elio Benson.

This ‘central command’ is in turn divided according to the three zones that make up southern Sudan — Equatoria, Upper Nile, and Bahr El Ghazal. El Tom Anour serves as the commander of the Bahr El Ghazal Military Area, with Mou Mou Deng acting as his deputy. Martin Terensio has been the overall commander of SSDF forces in Equatoria until recently, with Emanuel Ambrose as his deputy, and Gabriel Tang is the general commander of Upper Nile, with Thon Amum Kerjok filling the position of deputy. Below the regions, the SSDF is divided into zones (of which there are ten), sectors, sub-sectors, and so on. It must be stressed, however, that these structures express intent rather than any reflection of the actual situation. In practice real power is shared by the local commanders, who are under the direction of the Military Intelligence of the GoS.

The United Democratic Front (UDF)

Led by Peter Sule, the group believed that the government had in effect rejected the Khartoum Agreement and that the party should take up a position in the opposition. The Peter Sule wing  formally broke with the UDSF in late 2003, and re-established itself as the United Democratic Front (UDF).

Probably the largest is the South Sudan Unity Movement (SSUM), under the personal authority of Paulino Matiep, with James Gatduel as Paulino’s first deputy but this role has been largely assumed by Tayib Gatluak. Again, Peter Gadet was Paulino’s most active commander until his defection in May 2003. Gadet’s forces have been much reduced in numbers, and are largely restricted to the Wangkai area of WUN.

Beyond SSUM, but still within the fractious Unity State, is the South Sudan Independent Movement (SSIM, retaining the name given to his organization by Riek Machar) of Tito Biel and James Leah. Paulino’s role as commander-in-chief of the SSDF includes the SSIM, but Tito and James have long been

openly disdainful of him. In late June 2003, SSIM and SSUM forces fought in and around Bentiu. In late 2003 both Tito and James defected to the SPLM/A, and currently Peter Dor Monyjour appears to be in control of what remains of the SSIM. Forces under Gadet and other former commanders of Paulino have also carved out parcels of territory in WUN. Mayiek Machar, a Dinka, has gained the support of a small group of followers in the Panriarng area, and crucially the logistical assistance of Military Intelligence.

To the east in the Nasir area are the Nuer forces of Gordon Kong, again nominally under Paulino. However, Gordon dates back to Anyanya II. The group acknowledge Paulino and Gordon but (with the co-operation of Military Intelligence) have a substantial amount of autonomy. An Ngok Dinka component of the SSDF, formed with the support of the GoS in mid-2003 after a group of SPLA fighters had defected, is located to the west in Abyei.

Though not the largest, probably the most politically effective group within the SSDF is that of the Equatoria Defence Force (EDF), which operates in the area around Juba and Torit. This group is made up predominantly of fighters from Latuku and Lokoya, but includes Acholi, Mahdi, Loluba, Bari and Zande. It dates back to the mid-1980s, when a largely defensive organisation began to take shape to provide protection against the civil disobedience practised by SPLM/A forces operating in the area. Like all of the other components of the SSDF, a majority of its members are former SPLM/A fighters. Before it was fully established, this group developed relations with the GoS, and by the early 1990s it was receiving some military supplies. It joined Riek Machar in 1991 after he broke from the SPLM/A because of his commitment to self-determination for south Sudan. Another reason was probably that his forces were predominantly Nuer, and the Equatorians had difficult relations with the Dinka. (However, from the perspective of the leaders of the EDF, the Nuer also mistreated the local people.) The EDF was officially founded in October 1995, with the proclaimed aims of defending the local inhabitants and demonstrating commitment to self-determination. The EDF also represents an attempt to establish an extra-tribal regionally-based organization that pursues a number of political objectives in both defensive and proactive ways. From the 1980s the leading lights of the organization have been Dr Theopholis Ochang, a medical doctor and politician, and Martin Terensio Kenyi, an American-educated military leader from the Madi tribe. In 1997 the EDF signed on to the Khartoum Agreement and began a period of collaboration with the government.

However, on March 5, 2004, Dr Ochieng, in his capacity as Chairman of the EDF, signed the Nairobi Declaration of Unity with Salva Kiir, Deputy Chairman of the SPLM/A, making an alliance between the two military and political organizations. The EDF had been one of the most effective components of the SSDF and a fierce critic of the SPLM/A and the leadership of Dr John Garang. That it should take this course indicates the failure of reconciliation efforts, a rejection by its military leadership of being absorbed into the GoS army, and also local concerns, chief of which is protecting its people in Equatoria from the continuing depredations of the Lord’s Resistance Army (a Ugandan rebel group). It is noteworthy that the agreement gives high priority to south–south reconciliation and to local level administrations, both matters that the EDF leadership has long advocated.

Another signatory to the Khartoum Agreement is the Bor Group, which was formed by the late Aron Thon Arok in the mid-1990s. It is led by Kelia Riak, and the military forces are commanded by Major Deng Kelei, who was also recently appointed commissioner of Bor town. Like many other SSDF groups, most of the members of the Bor Group were originally in the SPLM/A and left it for various reasons. Often people from southern Bor claimed that they were being persecuted by forces from north Bor, which is the home area of John Garang. Although this disaffection dates from the 1980s, the attacks by the Nuer that the Bor experienced in 1991, by the Nuer following the Riek Machar–Garang rupture, made joining the SSIM impossible. Therefore the Bor Group kept its semi-independent status. Its activities are restricted to the town and to matters of self-defence, and its representative attributes to these efforts the lack of organised violence (whether stemming from the government or the SPLM/A) in their area of operation. Local administration and services in the town are provided by the government.

Kawach Makuei, who signed the Khartoum Agreement on behalf of the South Sudan Independence Group (SSIG), was initially in Anyanya II, and then became a senior member of the SPLM/A before falling foul of Garang, after which he was held in an SPLM/A prison between 1984–1993, is based in Aweil. The group under late Kerubino is currently operating in southern Bahr El Ghazal under John Machamdit.

Formed as a result of the Juba Conference of April 2001, the Mobile Forces drew elements from all of the SSDF components. Numbering as many as 3,000, these Forces were based around Juba under the leadership of Benson Kuany, who had been a leading member of both Anyanya I and II. After a clash in Juba among the SSDF, the government responded by removing all the SSDF groups from the city, while the Mobile Forces, much reduced in numbers but still under Benson, were re-assigned to the Malakal area. 

The SPLM/A-United, led by Lam Akol, signed an arrangement parallel to that entered into by Riek Machar with the GoS. Known as the Fashoda Agreement, it brought him into the government in 1997. The SPLM/AUnited is not formally a member of the SSDF, but it has worked increasingly closely with it, has similar objectives, and comparable relations with the GoS military. Because Lam never accepted Riek’s leadership, he did not follow him when he established the UDSF, and instead became a member of the ruling National Congress Party. Lam accepted the position of transport minister and remained in that role until late 2002, when he was dismissed. Having been expelled from the government, Lam became a leading figure in the newly-established Justice Party, which claims a country-wide membership and espouses democracy and self-determination for the south. However, in late 2003 Lam defected to the SPLM/A. Since then both the SPLM/A-United and the Shilluk forces, which are based in the Malakal area towns of Fashoda and Tonga and led by Awad Jago, have been mired in conflict. 

A much smaller group is the South Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM), a largely Nuer organisation (although its membership also includes Anuak and Murle), which was established in the late 1990s as a separate entity, owing to frustration with Riek’s SSIM and Garang’s SPLM/A. The founders of the SSLM aspired to follow the legacy of Anyanya I, echoing its commitment to democracy and self-determination. Its leading lights included the leader, Michael Wal Duany, an American citizen and professor of political science at Indiana University; Timothy Taban, the senior military commander; and Gabriel Yoal Doc. A former judge, John Luc, played a critical role in the establishment of the SSLM before returning with Riek Machar to the SPLM/A. Idealistic, but lacking outside support, the SSLM was able to capture Akobo only with the help of local forces. As a result it had to form an alliance with Tuat Wath Pal, a former Ethiopian Derg official and a Nuer. Because of its vulnerable position, the SSLM had little option but to sign an agreement with the Sudan government in July 2002. The SSLM, like the SPLM/A United, is formally outside the SSDF, but retains ties with it, shares many of its political sentiments and has a similar relationship with the GoS. 

Beyond those groups which signed formal agreements with the GoS is another cluster of what are more clearly militias who are now part of SSDF as a result of the Juba conference organised by Gatluak Deng. The biggest group is the Mundari Forces, led by Kelement Wani, who was one of the few surviving officers of Anyanya I (and hence is technically senior to Paulino). Kelement, who served as a major-general in the Sudanese army, has a reputation for being a shrewd military strategist, which makes him a person worthy of considerable respect. He is also a member of the ruling National Congress Party, an advisor to the SSDF, and deputy chairman of the Southern Co-ordinating Council (which once again illustrates the fluid character of these organisations and their leaders). Made up largely of former SPLM/A members, the Mundari Forces came into being in the mid-1980s as a self-defence organisation. This group is now a major component of the SSDF and critical to the defence of Juba. Kelement’s headquarters is in Terakaka, north of Juba. 

Bari Forces of Bahr Jebel

Operating both north and south of Juba are the Bari Forces of Bahr Jebel, led by Mr Paulino Lonyumbek, a psychiatric medical assistant.

Also formed in Equatoria as a means of defence against the SPLM/A are the Didinga and Buya (Taposa) militias. But as a result of the efforts of the Sudan Council of Churches in mid-2002 to reconcile the Didinga with the SPLM/A, their organization has largely disintegrated because many of its members appear to have returned to the SPLM/A. Meanwhile, the militia of the largely pastoralist Taposa seem to have used the weaponry supplied by the government as much for cattle raiding and banditry as for fighting the SPLM/A. At least formally, these militias are members of the SSDF. The Madi tribe also formed a similar type of militia and fought the SPLM/A repeatedly in the 1980s, before being absorbed by the SSDF. Equatoria based militias have their own local leaders, but they are (or were) officially under the overall direction of Martin Kenyi of the EDF. But again personal ambition, the government’s policy of dividing the components of the SSDF and daunting logistical problems make it difficult for Martin to control the forces that do not belong to the EDF.

The Murle have also formed a militia that was subsequently absorbed by the SSDF. They are a largely pastoralist people, with a reputation for being committed to their cattle. They are also ferocious fighters, with a long history of contentious relations with their neighbours, particularly the Bor Dinka. These long-standing conflicts were exacerbated when, after the outbreak of Sudan’s second civil war, SPLM/A Dinka arrived in Murle territory well armed and supplied. Like the Equatorians, the Murle established a militia with the objective of self-defence, and subsequently gained the support of the government. The Murle force is under the immediate control of Ismael Konyi, a major-general and sultan. In addition, Ismael was recently appointed walli of Jongelei State in which most of the

The Dinka Forces

Also active in the SSDF are the Dinka forces of the elderly Sultan Abdel Bagi and his son Hussein, which operate in Bahr El Ghazel north of Aweil. Since 1964, when Abdel Bagi’s forces were first attacked by Anyanya, he has more often than not allied himself with the government of the day against southern rebels. After 1983 Abdel Bagi’s forces fought the SPLM/A, and in addition had to defend themselves against the Baggara Murahaleen, which had been established under the auspices of the government of Sadiq Al- Mahdi. Recently Abdel Bagi reached agreement with the National Islamic Front government, which now supplies his forces with some armaments and has promised to contain the Murhaleen. He in turn protects his villages against the SPLM/A, and from his headquarters in Marian provides soldiers to patrol a stretch of the railway line running north of Aweil to the Bahr Al- Arab. However, as a result of SPLM/A attacks on a number of bridges, the railway is not functioning at present. The sultan’s forces also played a critical role in the 2002 government re-capture of Gogriel, a town important in the defence of the oil fields, by intercepting SPLM/A forces that were being sent to reinforce the besieged town. Abdel Bagi opposes both an independent south and domination of the region by the SPLM/A. He is affiliated with the National Congress Party, but his son, Hussein, is a member of Hassan Al-Turabi’s Popular National Congress.

Another group operating in western Sudan, and with a basis of support among the 24 tribes that make up the Fertit is the Peace Forces of El Tom Anour, a major-general in the Sudanese army. The Fertit tribes are largely peasant farmers, in contrast to their pastoralist Dinka neighbours. They are partly Islamicised and many, most notably Anour, see the Dinka as a threat. Indeed, many of the Fertit currently in Wau fled to the town after SPLM/A attacks. Wau is now divided between them and the Dinka. Anour’s agreement with the government dates back to 1987: in exchange for military assistance and recognition of Fertit militia ranks parallel to those of the army, his forces participate in joint operations and supply the army with intelligence. However, the Fertit militia does not operate outside its local area. It provides security for the trade route from Wau to Raga, and in a number of villages around Wau. In 2001 the largely Fertit town of Raga was captured by the SPLM/A, but the forces of Anour and the government eventually took it back. Peace Forces are now a component of the SSDF, are committed to an independent southern Sudan, which seeks southern self-determination within a united Sudan. 

• As the above overview makes clear the SSDF is a broad conglomeration of what were originally tribal militias. They are linked by their shared commitment to an agreement reached by Riek Machar that is clearly no longer operational, even if the government has not officially disowned it. 

• This agreement and the existence of the SSDF, however, give its adherents a sense of identity, a rationale for their tactical alliance with the government, and a measure of security, also serves as a rallying-point for a large group of southerners currently excluded from the formal IGAD peace process. 

• Nevertheless they are demanding that their interests should be recognised. The major concerns of SSDF leaders relative to the rapidly unfolding peace negotiations are the security arrangements and what their own future in terms of the final peace agreement is likely to be. 

• However, the finely-tuned government policy of dividing southerners; the Military Intelligence practice of dealing with each group separately, and not permitting the SSDF to establish an effective and united organization; all conspire to prevent these bodies (the SSDF, the UDSF, and the Southern Co-ordinating Council) from uniting.

• The SPLM/A has claimed that all of these organisations, and particularly the SSDF, are stooges of the government. But now the chickens are coming home to roost for both the GoS and the SPLM/A. 

• To date, however, the approach of the partners to the IGAD negotiations has largely been to ignore the threat to the peace process posed by the SSDF. While the mediators, GoS the SPLM/A, and key international actors like the United States seem to believe that a viable peace process can go ahead with the south militarily and politically divided, southern civil society has recognised the threat, and consistently pressed for reconciliation. 

• The SSDF’s stance has consistently been based on arguments for the legitimacy of the Khartoum Peace Agreement, including the provisions regarding the security arrangements. These, like the subsequent IGAD Agreement, called for the maintenance of a separate southern armed force until the outcome of a referendum to determine whether the south was to remain part of a united Sudan or become independent. 

• The critical difference between the two arrangements was that the Khartoum Agreement identified the SSDF as the sole southern agent charged with providing security for the region, while IGAD’s Security Arrangement Agreement designated the SPLM/A alone as assuming this role. 

• In the event, the capacity of the SPLM/A to continue the war undermined the Khartoum Agreement, and there is reason to fear that a similar failure to acknowledge the SSDF could threaten the viability of the IGAD peace process. 

• Further exacerbating tensions between the protagonists, particularly the SSDF’s Nuer members, who make up the majority in the oil-producing Unity State, was the new agreement on wealth-sharing, which provided for only 2% of oil revenues to be allocated to oil-producing states, as against the 40% allotted in the Khartoum Agreement. Even if the GoS was sowing the seeds of discontent and had no intention of implementing the promises of the Khartoum Agreement (as its critics claim), the response of many Nuer in the north was nonetheless one of extreme anger. This too diminished any prospect of SPLM/A–SSDF rapprochement.

• Despite these setbacks, south–south reconciliation, and particularly that between the principal southern combatants, remains a major concern of southern civil society. Many announcements were made and plans initiated to pursue this aim, but for one reason or another they have never been realised. The SPLM/A appeared reluctant to accept initiatives popularized by Riek Gai, chairman of the Southern Co-ordinating Council, while the SSDF is averse to supporting efforts led by the church groups, which they believe are too close to the SPLM/A.

• The most promising effort, which is not yet dead but is currently on life-support, was started by a group of southern politicians resident in the north who have close links with the SPLM/A. It has been taken up by the European Commission (EC), which has offered facilitation and financing. In this three-cornered contest, only the weakest element, the SSDF, has been consistent in its support for reconciliation with the SPLM/A. The latter’s leadership appear anxious not to acknowledge the military capacity of the SSDF, are concerned lest direct negotiations should force them to make concessions or share power, and probably fear the disruptive effect of absorbing senior officials from the SSDF into their own ranks. It must also be clear to the senior members of the SPLM/A that if leaders of the GoS affiliated armed groups like Lam Akol (although not himself a member of the SSDF), Tito Biel, and James Leah are prepared to rejoin the mother party without conditions, then there may be no pressing need for formal reconciliation talks. A handful of southern opposition politicians, such as the EDF leader, Theopholis Ochieng, have recently joined the SPLM/A.

• Although the GoS in late 2003 sent signals that it had no objection to formal SPLM/A–SSDF reconciliation talks under EC auspices, its members were clearly divided over the issue. In the first instance the military, and particularly Military Intelligence, has long been reluctant to accept a process that might well see the SSDF absorbed by its foe of almost 21 years. Perhaps, as some critics suggest, elements in the government who do not support the peace process see the SSDF as a means to undermine the IGAD Initiative, either now or in the future. There were also disagreements in the government between two groups. The first, led by the First Vice-President, Ali Osman, favours a political alliance with the SPLM/A and they tended to be more sympathetic to SPLM/A–SSDF reconciliation, even if it meant the loss of military allies. The second, following a former Peace Advisor, Ghazi Salahadien, opposes such a move, and prefers to develop allies among non-SPLM/A groups, including at least some elements in the SSDF. As a result this group tends to oppose reconciliation if it means absorption of these forces into the SPLM/A. Despite the obstacles to reconciliation, the need for it has never been greater. The decision by Lam to go back to the SPLM/A precipitated conflict within his military organization, the SPLM-United, which quickly spread to the Shilluk community. Until that time, the Shilluk had enjoyed the enviable distinction of having stayed out of Sudan’s civil war. The GoS supported one faction and brought in other groups from the SSDF (notably those of Thomas Mabior and Gabriel Tangye) to fight Lam. They in turn were divided over whether or not to fight their former partners. For the first time in many months, regular forces of the GoS became engaged in the conflict. Much property has been burned and looted, and an undetermined number of civilians have been displaced, wounded and killed as the conflict continued. A similar pattern is occurring in WUN as a result of the return of Tito Biel and James Leah (leaders of SSIM) to the SPLM/A and their being sent back to the field to bring over their forces. The GoS military is struggling to keep its remaining allies in the SSIM afloat, which includes providing artillery support, something not seen in the area for more than a year. And again civilian casualties are mounting, many communities have been displaced and valuable infrastructure, including a new and modern clinic and a school outside Bentiu, has been destroyed. Significantly, Paulino Matiep has refused GoS orders to deploy his forces against those of Tito and James. Both of these conflicts are continuing at the time of writing, and there is good reason to fear that in the absence of a genuine process of reconciliation between the SPLM/A and the SSDF, other components of the latter will divide and produce violence in the same way. In January 2004 the GoS appointed some 60 SSDF commanders to senior ranks in its army, in so doing heightening tensions with the SPLM/A and often causing divisions between these newly-commissioned officers and their forces, who are in no position to receive such benefits. While there is little doubt that nothing more than opportunism has motivated some of these officers, the more thoughtful have struggled to decide whether, in the face of the SPLM/A’s refusal to support a genuine reconciliation, they should rejoin a party they had left many years before, or whether they should hold down positions in the GoS until the end of the interim period, when the outcome of the referendum would be known. In addition, the in-coming officers were acknowledged to be representatives of their components of the SSDF. This, at least in theory, made them duly answerable to both the national army and the SSDF High Command. How sincere the commitment of these newly-commissioned officers is to the GoS, however, has already been cast into doubt. One of them, Brigadier James Leah, defected to the SPLM/A and reported that he had accepted promotion only because he had been in fear for his life.

• More alarming than the personal dilemmas of these officers may be the thinking behind the GoS’s policy. Critics accuse the Khartoum government of playing the old game of dividing and weakening the south by attempting to keep a valued core from the SSDF that can be used to at any time to abort the peace process or to put pressure on southern regional governments during the transitional period.

• But if the intention of the GoS in making these appointments was to throw up obstacles to SPLM/A–SSDF reconciliation, the government would effectively be in league with hard-line elements in the SPLM/A, who want to defeat the SSDF and marginalize its southern political opposition before they accept a reconciliation process. While presented as a harbinger of peace, the unprecedented visit of a high level SPLM/A delegation to Khartoum in December 2003 was noteworthy for what it did not do (meet with either its major military foe, the SSDF, or its major political opponents, the leadership of the Southern Co-ordinating Council). This was not lost on the southern Sudanese community, which has as much to fear from south–south strife as north–south conflict.

• Deepening the pessimism felt by many over the prospects for reconciliation is the limited pressure that is being exerted by the international community, in particular the US. The latter’s position appears to be based on a number of false assumptions. First, it believes that the SSDF is an anarchistic group that is incapable of being understood. Second, it holds that internal security within post-conflict southern Sudan cannot be considered part of the peace process, and is best left to the SPLM/A, which will assume responsibility. Third, the US is inclined to follow the lead of John Garang, who urges patience and assures those who have raised the issue that he is finalizing his position on south–south reconciliation. In response it must be said that the SSDF clearly can be understood, as the above analysis should have made clear; that south–south reconciliation is an absolutely essential component of a peaceful Sudan and commands the support of the overwhelming majority of southern Sudanese; and that while positions are being finalised, violence is deepening in southern Sudan. Divisions are taking root that will carry over to a post-peace agreement southern Sudan.

• The Sudan IGAD Peace Process may well have passed a critical juncture from which there is no turning back. Few in southern Sudan will be convinced of its legitimacy unless the many divisions in their community — and none is more marked than that between the SSDF and the SPLM/A — are resolved.

• From its inception the Sudan IGAD Peace Process has suffered from a lack of democracy, and from the assumption by the mediators and important elements among the international community that the SPLM/A and the GoS control the destiny of the country. The first shock to the holders of this myopic view was the rapidly escalating war and humanitarian crisis in Darfur. The second shock could well be a demonstration of the inability of either the GoS or the SPLM/A to control and pacify the disparate elements of the SSDF.

• Wars of liberation such as that conducted by the SPLM/A have the effect of both uniting and dividing people. In the process of division, various armed and militia groups come to the fore. This experience is not unique to Sudan, but what is surprising is that, given a wealth of relevant international experience to draw on, and the significance of the SSDF as a military force in the conflict, all the external parties involved in the peace process have failed to recognize this as a major threat to the peace process. No doubt the argument will be made that from the beginning of the IGAD negotiations it was agreed that they should be confined to the GoS and the SPLM/A, but it is doubtful if this legalistic argument will carry much weight if the final agreement does not produce peace and security because the violence between the SSDF and the SPLM/A continues unabated.

• Unlike other groups and political parties in Sudan that have a broad interest in the outcome of the IGAD peace process, the focus of the SSDF leadership has largely been restricted to issues relating to the security arrangements. To its credit the GoS did bring Commander Martin Kenyi into the security arrangements negotiations, even if the final agreement did not reflect any of his or the SSDF’s concerns. Even at this late date, however, there are three other means by which the interests of the SSDF could be taken up. First, as noted, the agreement on security arrangements provides merely a framework; it needs much more hard and detailed discussion to produce a workable final form. The SSDF leadership should be involved in that process. Second, efforts by the mediators to address the concerns of the SSDF can be carried on outside the formal structures of the IGAD peace process. Last and most significantly, there must be a major push both to encourage and make possible direct talks between the respective leaders of the SPLM/A and the SSDF. The Sudanese people in general, and particularly their southern citizenry have suffered almost 21 years of civil war, and they deserve a peace agreement which at least gives them genuine hope for the future