| Security Arrangements and the
failings in IGAD peace process
Analysis by the Institute of Strategic Studies
June, 2004
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With the signing of a formal peace agreement, a
significant stage of the IGAD
peace process has been reached. But the danger in giving undue attention to the signing of a
peace agreement is to buy into a misplaced optimism. In fact the
peace-making exercise has been beset by enormous difficulties,
as evidenced by more than ten years of the IGAD process and almost two years of continuous
negotiations since the signing of the Machakos
Protocol. Indeed, the peace process has done nothing to reduce, much less eliminate, the
multiple layers of distrust that have accumulated over
half a century of independent statehood, the majority of those
years being consumed by
civil war.
Genuine peace must be considered more than a
mere absence of war, but instead
part of a process leading to the resolution of long-standing grievances and inequities that
produced the war. If security maintenance and
conflict management become the sole objectives of the
transitional period
there will be no sustainable peace, either in the south or in
the rest of Sudan. Even
with a peace agreement the parties will have to move rapidly to reach a final resolution on
security arrangements in the transitional period,
a process that, as argued above, is highly problematic and will prove even more challenging to
implement, given doubts about whether there
is any real commitment to either the peace process or to
tackling the root causes
of the conflict. Against that background, security related problems have three origins:
first, failings in the IGAD peace process; second,
obstructions by the belligerents, and particularly the GoS, and lastly, weaknesses of the
monitoring instruments.
Failings in the IGAD Peace Process
A major weakness of the peace process stems from
the prevailing logic of the
IGAD mediators, which has been to limit the negotiating parties
to the GoS and SPLM/A,
partly on the grounds that this would simplify an already complicated process, and also
to reduce the threat to the viability of the process
by bringing in additional groups. The unstated argument has been
that the present military
regime in Khartoum could be counted upon to be more
reliable than a government made up of Sudan’s fractious
political parties, even
if these groups can claim with some truth better to represent the people of the country. From
a democratic perspective the position of the mediators
has never been defensible, and with the outbreak of war in the west and the obstruction of the
army to the peace process, it has become absolutely
essential to bring other sections of the Sudanese community on board the peace process, and
just as importantly into a transitional national government.
Such incoming groups might object to some
elements of the peace process, but
– unlike sections in the military and government – they are
not reaping benefits
from the war and hence are far more likely to be committed to peace. That they will
inevitably demand greater regional representation should
not be viewed as unduly complicating the situation, but instead
– in the wake of the
Darfur crisis – should be recognised as critical to achieving peace and stability in both the
south and west of the country. It must be stressed,
however, that the buy-in must not be restricted to groups from
the riverine core that
have long dominated the state, but must also include the new
forces from the peripheries and the disenfranchised that are increasingly challenging their
marginalisation.
As argued elsewhere
the IGAD mediators have
long paid lip service to the notion
that the peace process involved two stages: the first stage,
which gave primacy to a
peace agreement between the GoS and the SPLM/A, and a
second stage that would immediately follow and involve bringing
the other major Sudanese
constituencies into the process. While there have always
been doubts as to the seriousness of this commitment, the argument for it has never been
greater when viewed against the analysis above.
The move of the SPLM/A into the national government could be a force for reform, but all too
often the movement has resisted broadening the
base of governance and has been equally reluctant to support
far-reaching democratic
change and early elections.
Belligerents’ obstructions to
reconciliation
Also vital to securing the peace agreement is
the need for reconciliation between
the various southern groups in conflict. This is a far-reaching
task, but particular
attention must be given to the need for reconciliation between
the principal fighting forces in the south: the SPLM/A and the
SSDF.
Although south-south reconciliation is embraced
by southern Sudanese of all
political complexions, in practice it has been opposed at
different times by both
the SPLM/A and the GoS. The SPLM/A opposed reconciliation with the SSDF because it would imply
sharing power, while the GoS’s opposition was
due to fears of losing a valued ally and being confronted by a
united south. Nonetheless, the
civilian population that regularly finds itself the victim
of the animosity between the SPLM/A and the SSDF often considers
reconciliation between these
two groups as important as that between the SPLM/A
and the GoS.
The above analysis, however, suggests that some
elements of the SSDF (particularly
those recently utilised in the Shilluk Kingdom) have become little more than militias
operating at the behest of the government, as their opponents
have long claimed. And indeed, the actions of a number of these militia leaders have been in
complete opposition to the leadership of the SSDF,
which has consistently supported reconciliation and opposed
recent rounds of
fighting in WUN and the Shilluk Kingdom. The decision to grant senior ranks in the national
army to more than sixty officers of the SSDF is also
consistent with a policy of making these armed groups mere
adjuncts of the army.
Moreover, it should be noted that this development was opposed
by the senior SSDF leadership who upheld the Khartoum Peace Agreement, which stipulated
that the southern forces would maintain a separate
existence from the national army.
All of this complicates the reconciliation
process enormously, as well as playing
to hard-liners in both the GoS and SPLM/A who are opposed to reconciliation with the
SSDF.
Dr John Garang, as demonstrated by his actions,
has long supported piece-meal reconciliation with individual
SSDF leaders because
this reduces any threat to his power, and the effective fracturing
of the SSDF favours this approach. Instead of negotiations
leading to a moderating
of positions, consensus, and overcoming long-standing divisions
among southerners, the general thrust of recent developments is for the SSDF to divide between
commanders who deserted the organisation for
the SPLM/A, and a rump closely tied to the government, and hence
available to pursue the agenda
of the national army. Thus the conflicts that led
to the formation of the SSDF are not being resolved and are left
as an open wound that
can burst out again at a future time.
Weakness of the monitoring instruments
With the achievement of peace and the
anticipated cease-fire the VMT, the CPMT,
and the JMC are likely to be replaced by UN or other forces.
However, some assessment
of the experience of these monitoring groups should be considered
by any incoming peacekeeping forces. From the outset it was clear that the drafters of the
security agreements had the objective of maintaining
the status quo and defined peace conservatively as the absence of war, and not more positively
as a means of resolving root causes of the conflict. Moreover,
the instruments put in place to oversee the security regime –
the VMT, the JMC, and the CPMT – have likewise defined their
tasks narrowly and conservatively and, with the partial
exception of the JMC, have striven to ensure that Sudanese civil
society has had no part in their operations.
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They
have thus followed the general thrust of the IGAD mediators, who
have also been reluctant to permit any involvement in the peace
process beyond the GoS and SPLM/A. This lack of engagement with
civil society is most clearly reflected in both the lack of
vigour with which the leaders of the VMT, the CPMT, and the JMC
have taken up human rights issues, and the limited ways they
have defined human rights.
With respect to the VMT it is clear that its
principal internal weakness has been
its cumbersome means of conducting investigations, a result of
its convoluted
decision-making structure which involves reaching agreement by both the GoS and
SPLM/A
before an investigation can be launched. No doubt
these problems were exacerbated by four major changes in its leadership. That said, the VMT’s
operations, like those of the CPMT, were seriously
hindered by the blatant interference of the GoS, notably in objecting to its personnel and
proposed bases. The failure of the Sudan IGAD
Peace Secretariat and the VMT to act decisively in the case of
Akobo, a failure which
was then repeated in WUN and the Shilluk Kingdom, encouraged
disrespect of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement and gave a powerful and wrong message to
the belligerents.
In addition, the VMT has also suffered from
being poorly funded and having inadequate
mobility, a particular significant disability given the scale of
operations of southern Sudan.
No doubt the most positive aspects of the VMT are
that it is an integral part of the IGAD peace process and that
it includes representatives
from both the GoS army and the SPLM/A. That said, the VMT has been even more distant from
Sudanese society and less transparent than its
sister organisations.
The
CPMT, with its objective of monitoring the
performance of the armed forces
in meeting the stipulations of international law on the
protection of civilians
in war zones, has a unique role and hence needs to be critically
appraised because it could well
serve as a prototype in many conflicts around
the world. Given its principal concern with human rights, a
primary conclusion must
be that the military orientation of the CPMT is inappropriate,
that the role of the military in the organisation should be restricted to logistics, and
that leadership be placed firmly in the hands of civilians
with experience in Sudan and with human rights. Many of the problems of the organisation
– its distance from Sudanese society; the ignorance of its
monitors as regards the peace process; its slowness in moving
into the war front in eastern Sudan; the complete failure to
take up a position in Darfur; its personnel problems – derive from a misplaced
military command and control
approach to its work.
Second, as an organisation whose credibility
depends upon the objectivity of
its reports, the CPMT must be free of links with bodies such as
the US State Department,
which have particular political objectives. The CPMT and any
successor organisation needs friends in the international
community that can be
called upon for support when faced – as is inevitably the case–
with hurdles thrown up by resentful armed forces; but these same
friends must not
compromise the organisation’s integrity. Clearly this is a
difficult balance to
achieve.
Thirdly, the CPMT’s accountability links are
neither with IGAD, nor with any Sudanese
body, but with distant Washington. And lastly, although the CPMT
should not assume a role in
punishing parties in breach of the Civilian Protection
Agreement, ways must be found that take forward issues when they are not addressed after
the release of a report condemning the guilty party.
In response to both of the latter concerns, the CPMT or any
successor organisation
that takes up its important task, should be linked to either
IGAD, or ideally some credible
Sudanese organisation that can both ensure means
of accountability and take to a higher level abuses that are not
addressed.
The experience of the JMC is more limited than
that of the other two security organisations, but its claim that there have been no major
violations of its cease-fire
since it came into effect19 is certainly a worthy achievement if true. Also
noteworthy has been its utilisation of military officials
from both the GoS and SPLM/A, alongside civilians. Its strong presence on the ground, greater
links to the local community, and multiple responsibilities
also compare favourably with the VMT and the CPMT. But it also has some of the same
weaknesses as its sister organisations. First, has been
the disadvantage of not having a strong, legitimate, and
independent body that
has the capacity to actively oversee its mandate. Second, like the
other organisations, the effective implementation of the Nuba Mountains Ceasefire, and indeed
the entire IGAD peace process, largely and ultimately
depends on US pressure.21 Third, the Nuba
Mountains Agreement has
been criticised for treating conflict in the territory as separate from the broader civil
war in the south. Fourth,
and like the VMT, the
JMC has suffered from on-going financial short-falls, made worse
by the fact that its
mandate has had to be renewed every six months. Lastly, as Paul Murphy has pointed out in
a statement that has relevance for all of the security
organisations operating in Sudan, ‘the Nuba Mountains
ceasefire experience
indicates that it is important to ensure that ceasefire monitors
are familiar with the culture,
context, and the history and dynamics of the conflict
situation, nationally and within the areas under inspection.
In summing up,
many of the issues raised here – bringing other parties into the peace process, the creation
of a transitional national government that has
the confidence of the Sudanese people, and the need for greater accountability of the
instruments monitoring the security regime – speak very
clearly to the need for the peace process and the country to be
democratised. Indeed, faced
with a faltering central government, a deepening
crisis of the state, and growing demands from disaffected regional and tribal groups,
only such a transformation offers the prospect of
a peaceful and united Sudan. Equally important, only a
democratic regime can be
expected to have the commitment to confront the grievances that gave rise to war in the
south and are producing conflict in other parts of
the country.
Indeed, neither of the two wars that have
afflicted the south, nor the conflict
that is currently raging in Darfur, are aberrations, but instead
should be viewed as the
inevitable results of a state dominated from its beginnings
by minority interests. Sudanese governments have held power through various means –
parliaments, the armed forces, sect, and religion.
These governments have varied in their make-up
and the ruthlessness with which
they have pursued their projects of self-aggrandisement. But in
the end, the various
approaches to projecting power and using the state for enrichment
have represented different sides of the same coin, and the Sudanese state has not changed
fundamentally in five decades of independence.
The same malfunctioning state is now spawning revolts among
groups inspired by the achievements of the SPLM/A but fearful
that the IGAD peace
process will deepen their own marginalisation.
It is thus ironic that the
SPLM/A appears to be
casting off its commitment to
a New Sudan, which involves a fundamental transformation of the
state, in favour of
buying into the state at the very time that the Sudanese state faces a crisis of legitimacy
greater than at any time since independence.
However, even if the
SPLM/A is prepared to make
these compromises in the interests
of attaining a measure of power, it is now clear that many disaffected groups will not
accept an outcome whereby the division of spoils
is merely re-divided among a select few. The Sudanese state has largely lost its legitimacy and
if present and past ruling groups, together with
the international community, ignore that striking reality and
view the transitional
period merely in terms of security maintenance, then it is safe to assume that the present
crisis will deepen and violence will continue.
Instead, the transitional period must be
recognised as an opportunity – perhaps
the last opportunity within a united Sudanese state – to
respond positively to
the deeply felt grievances and inequities in the country.
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