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FREEDOM OR SLAVERY: PROBLEMATIZING THE QUESTION OF SELF-DETERMINATION IN THE SUDAN

By: Geoffrey Anthony Koma Bin’Achayo, SJ: March 25, 2008;
 
We [Southern Sudanese] went to the bush to stop the enslavement of our people. If this means every one of us dies to the last man and the last woman, then we will do it. We will do it for the future generation so that our children will be free. Besides, it is better to be dead than to be a slave – John Garang De Mabior
 
The conflict in the Sudan that the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) addressed is Africa’s longest struggle against the colonization, Islamisation and the Arabicisation of the South; that is, conversion of non-Arabs and non-Muslims into Arabic and Islamic culture. The Arabs in the North think that the Southern Sudanese have no inherent right to rule the South because they are second-class citizens and therefore, ‘abid’ - slaves or serfs (Oduho and Deng). Given that most Southerners have their traditional customs, beliefs and other ways of life and they are not willing to let them be destroyed, “[…] many of its members […] still believed that South Sudan must secede from the north, such that a South Sudanese national identity can evolve and develop” (Nyaba).
 
Generally, the term “self-determination” means freedom from external control or influence over decision-making. However, this definition for Sudan’s case is a bit problematic and confusing because it is open to different interpretations because it is only applicable to a country undergoing ‘foreign colonialism.’ What we are concerned with in the Sudan is the so-called “internal colonialism” of the Christian South by the Muslim North. This means that the self-determination we are referring to is the constitutional one, which is delineated as the right of ‘a people’ to determine the way in which they shall be governed; whether they shall be self-governed or governed by another power. In the context of the CPA, we can recognize self-determination as the inalienable right of the Southern Sudanese people to determine their political “status,” and pursue their social, economic, religious and cultural progress freely as they choose.
 
Unity or Secession?:
Since ‘independence,’ the question of self-determination in the Sudan has always been tricky. In the article 2.5 of the first chapter of CPA, it is stated that by 2011, there will be a referendum for the people of Southern Sudan to vote in order to confirm the unity of the Sudan, or vote to secede from the North. But, why break away from the North? What would self-determination mean to the oppressed South? Do the Southerners really know the contents of what they are voting for as stipulated in the CPA? In other words, is the civil society and/or grassroots community in the South well educated to know who they are, and what they are really voting for? How shall the election be conducted or carried out? These questions lead us to examine the social, political, economic and moral implications associated with self-determination.
 
The Scramble for Power and Scarce Resources:
The major invariable problem of the Southern Sudanese (mashkalat el junub el Sudan) is division based on internal scramble for power and scarce resources among the leaders themselves. For instance, within the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M), Riek Machar, who is a Nuer by tribe, broke away from SPLM/A, and formed his own party known as Southern Sudan Independent Movement (SSIM). Machar felt that the internal structures of the SPLM as a movement are dominated by the Dinka who claim to be the ruling class in Sudan. The Dinka enjoyed all the benefits arising from economic and military power at the expense of other ethnic groups in the South. Yet, among the Dinka themselves, there are further divisions between the Dinka Bor and the Dinka Bahar El Ghazal which explains the divergence between John Garang and Salva Kiir. Actually, during the liberation war, “Dr Garang depended a lot on his Dinka Bor tribesmen and he rewarded them abundantly for their loyalty. This has been the source of resentment by most Southern Sudanese, including other Dinkas, like Salva Kiir, who do not come from Bor” (Taban).
 
Ethnicity and Identity:
Another challenge that may arise in the separation of the South from the North is the problem of ethnicity and identity. However, we should differentiate between the terms “ethnicity” and “race.” The term “ethnicity” comes from the Greek word “ethnos” which means people or nation. It is the process by which a human person or people relate to a large group of people who share a national, racial, linguistic, or religious tradition. The word “race,” on the other hand, is derived from the Latin word “ration” (reason and understanding); it is an ideology used by the European colonialists to distinguish between the ‘superior’ and ‘inferior’ people (Tschuy). Hitherto, such a relationship in the South is sometimes translated into tribalism and ethnic conflicts, and that raises questions as to whether the Southern Sudanese understand themselves as a “people” linked by a common history or origin. A case in point is the ongoing tensions in the East, Central and Western Equatoria, inter-clan conflicts in Lakes State and Warrap State (among the Rek, the Luacjang and the Pakam), and the unceasing intertribal conflicts between the Nuer and the Tomonyjang (Dinka). This may appear as minor cultural issues but they are ‘timed bombs’ that might disrupt the unity of the South.
 
While justifying the argument for secession, we can affirm that all Southern Sudan’s ethnic groups should break away from the Arab-North in order to maintain their national social, cultural and political identities. The problem however is that within the South, other minor tribes may feel threatened by the majority tribes. Therefore, if the Southerners vote in favor of secession, then the benefits of self-determination would still go to the Southern major tribes such as the Dinka and Nuer. As the Arabs in the North see themselves as a people ‘born to rule’ the whole of the Sudan, and so do the Dinka and Nuer in the South. Accordingly, the fear of self-determination through secession is that the Dinka (which constitutes more than twenty-five tribal groups), and the Nuer would nationalize the land in the South, and they may become the aristocrats and dominate other minority tribes.
 
Indeed, “once the right to secede and establish an independent state is granted to one people within a state, it is feared that other people might claim similar treatment, thereby disremembering the existing state, and probably leading to its total disintegration” (An-Na’im). A case in point is the separation of former Soviet Union and the Yugoslavian Republic, Pakistan and India, Eritrea and Ethiopia, etc. Equally, if the Madi, Acholi, Lango, Bari Speakers, Taposa and others who by common history, culture and language are linked to the neighboring states like Uganda, Kenya and Congo demand secession within the Southern State, there is a possibility that they may join their people in Uganda or Kenya since they have similar cultures, customs, traditions, languages and origin. In fact, the idea of “[…] whether the political development of South Sudan and the future of its people should be linked with their kin in East Africa, or their lot thrown in with Arab and Middle Eastern people” (Nyaba), has been the predicament of the colonial administration in the history of the Sudan. Subsequently, such separation is dangerous because it threatens the territorial integrity of the neighboring states.
 
Problem of Self-Government:
Because of the lack of strong political will and tribalism, there is also a problem of self-government among the Southern Sudanese. In 1955, shortly before the independence of 1956, and in 1963, wars broke out in the Sudan and this had to be resolved by the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972. Under this Agreement, the South won significant powers of self-government, and it was granted autonomy within national unity. For eleven years, this autonomy, with the support of the Southern Sudanese, was seen as a well-calculated move because it ratified the law, and it gave birth to the Southern Sudan Provinces Regional Self-Government Act, which was incorporated into the constitution of the State. For the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) “[…] ‘autonomy’ meant federation, and they came armed with a proposal for a full federal structure. In the end they were offered, and finally accepted, something far less in what became the Southern Regional Government” (Johnson).
 
Regrettably, the idea of autonomy in which the South could be divided into smaller regions was negatively perceived by the South; that is, it was understood as a “re-division” (Johnson). It became a ground for ethnic conflict called “Kokora” (division) which was propagated by some presumptuous leaders in the South. It occurred because of the Arabs’ ideology of ‘divide and rule’ through regional self-government since the South had weak economic base. President Ga’afar Nimeri used the idea of regional autonomy as an “intellectual judo.” That is, he abrogated the Addis- Ababa Agreement and re-imposed northern hegemony in the social fascistic form of Shari’a law, and that sparked off the revolutionary war of 1983 (Shivji). Explicitly, by the policy of regional autonomy, the Arabs wanted to develop a ruling class in the South as a way of implementing ‘indirect rule.’

Consequently, the Dinka tribe found themselves victims of this ideology as they scrambled for a fair share of the “National Cake.” It is very difficult to dismiss this claim for 'kokora' because it was linked to tribalism. For example, by the time 'kokora' took place in between 1981 to 1982, Dinka was the dominant tribe in every Ministry; the entire Executive, the Legislature, the Judiciary, the Police and the Army. However, with the advent of the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS), is the history repeating itself or not?
 
Economic Impracticality:
Another problem associated with self-determination through secession in Southern Sudan is economic in nature. Currently, the Southern Sudan is economically non-viable to cater for all the needs of its people. It is still in the “process of becoming” because of its backwardness. By “process of becoming”, I mean a realization or achievement of the dreams of the SPLM/A about establishing a just and democratic “New Sudan” that recognizes its citizens as equals before the rule of law. And, I understand “backwardness” as “[…] a society’s incapacity to master its environment and harness it by utilizing the positive aspects for that society’s betterment” (Museveni). Apparently, despite the Oil in Bentiu, the South is lagging behind in terms of social and economic progress in development compared to the North. Yet, owing to low levels of science and technology, South Sudan has poor roads, inadequate hospital facilities, no hydroelectric power, poor industries, ineffective communication systems, low level of per capita income, and so forth.
 
The Way Forward:
It is an indubitable fact that the question of national unity and economic progress in the Sudan has always been clogged-up by tribal division and racial antagonism. Also, it is the fear of domination and neglect of the South by the North. However, what happens when the people of the South say “no” to secession? This is not to say that I am advocating for unity, and rejecting the idea of secession. The question of whether secession should be pursued or not lies squarely on the secret ballots of the people of the South. Neither the SPLM, nor the National Congress Party (NCP) can determine it. What I just want to put forward is some positive implications of the Southern Sudanese’s demand for right to self-determination, inter alia, by adopting a system of government within a unified Sudan “…by making the unity of Sudan attractive to the people of South Sudan” (CPA). In brief, it is a way of forging a national unity in diversity.
 
Referendum: Federation versus Secession:-
Scholars like Issa G. Shivji, Abdullah Ahmed An-Na’im, Francis M. Deng, H. W. O. Okoth- Ogendo, Riek Machar, and Ernest Wamba-dia-Wamba, offer a number of competing claims for and against self-determination through unity or secession. All the same, the right to self-determination does not necessarily mean establishing an independent state because it can also be exercised through local or regional autonomy. This means that self-determination need not be exercised through unity or secession, but through a federal system of government, which I think is the middle ground between secession and unity. One thing for sure, that the CPA could have stipulated within the context of national unity, as a third alternative for voting during a referendum is “secession versus federation” rather than ‘unity versus secession.’ Federation as a political unit would mean, a group of various bodies or parties in the Sudan uniting to achieve a common goal. At the regional level, we should understand it as a confederation; that is, a group of states allying together to form a political unit in which they keep most of their independence but act together for certain purposes. For example, defense.
 
First, by adopting a national unity government and granting regional self-government in the South, the problems of tribalism, cultural identities, religious intolerance, political and economic inequalities would be solved. Second, considering that “[…] Sudan is a multi-cultural, multi-racial, multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-lingual country […]” (CPA), the problem of domination of minority tribes by the majority tribes in the South may not be an obstacle to peace and progress. In other words, autonomy helps in balancing of power among various ethnic groups or tribes in the Sudan, especially if federal constitutions are created. Third, the advantage of voting for a confederation versus a separation is that during the interim period, in case the Government of National Unity manipulates the national constitutions and rigs the elections, any of the alternatives could be fair for the Southern Sudan. Subsequently, the SPLM and other political parties in the South will be representing the plight of the oppressed South, and that would act as a “cohesive power” in achieving a radical transformation of the whole of the Sudan as a nation; that is, the “New Sudan.” Otherwise, without federation, in practice, the central government in the Sudan would be a government of the North rather than of the government of national unity.
 
Enticing the People of the South:
Should it happen that the Southern Sudanese want to address their predicaments, while aware that the only better option that the CPA offers for them is secession, in that case, they should know who they are, their history and what they are preparing to vote for. If not, the problems of the South would merely be a repetition of history. For example, because of a lack of awareness of the masses, in the self-determination elections of 1954 and 1972, the oppressive Khartoum government was able to lure the Southern government to forget about the idea of secession. In fact, the results of self-determination votes were purely based on persuasion and fraud. Obviously, if Bashir wants to fight off the idea of secession and retain power, he would ensure that all his loyalists in the South are constantly well-fed and ignorant (so that they cannot think) by availing them “pregnant envelopes” of legal-tender. But to be honest, “even if the [Khartoum] government built each of them [Southerners] a storied building, [the Southerners…] will accept these “gifts”… and still vote for secession. They will consider these gifts as their rightful compensation for the many years they were neglected.” (Taban).
 
The CPA offers a ground for the people of the South and other war-affected areas an opportunity to break the circle of domination and conflicts arising from Islamisation, Arabicisation, slavery, Sha’ria Law, and all sorts of economic, political, cultural and religious injustices, and embark on for peace, unity, equality, human rights and justice. Therefore, it would be appropriate that the masses or civil society in the South should be rightly educated to know their rights, and know what it means to be “a people” in a multi-cultural, multi-racial, multi-religious, multi-ethnic, and multi-lingual nation like Sudan. Ultimately, although the period for the plebiscites in article 2.2 of the CPA may be inadequate, nevertheless, the contents and the implications of the CPA should be exposed to the civil society within these six years. In that way, we would open an avenue to secession, and make the unity and national identity of the people of the South more attractive for the 2011 Referendum.
 
Geoffrey Anthony Koma Bin’Achayo, S.J. – New Sudan