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FREEDOM OR SLAVERY: PROBLEMATIZING
THE QUESTION OF SELF-DETERMINATION IN THE SUDAN By: Geoffrey Anthony Koma Bin’Achayo, SJ: March 25, 2008; We [Southern Sudanese] went to the bush to stop the enslavement of our people. If this means every one of us dies to the last man and the last woman, then we will do it. We will do it for the future generation so that our children will be free. Besides, it is better to be dead than to be a slave – John Garang De Mabior The conflict in the Sudan that the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) addressed is Africa’s longest struggle against the colonization, Islamisation and the Arabicisation of the South; that is, conversion of non-Arabs and non-Muslims into Arabic and Islamic culture. The Arabs in the North think that the Southern Sudanese have no inherent right to rule the South because they are second-class citizens and therefore, ‘abid’ - slaves or serfs (Oduho and Deng). Given that most Southerners have their traditional customs, beliefs and other ways of life and they are not willing to let them be destroyed, “[…] many of its members […] still believed that South Sudan must secede from the north, such that a South Sudanese national identity can evolve and develop” (Nyaba). Generally, the term “self-determination” means freedom from external control or influence over decision-making. However, this definition for Sudan’s case is a bit problematic and confusing because it is open to different interpretations because it is only applicable to a country undergoing ‘foreign colonialism.’ What we are concerned with in the Sudan is the so-called “internal colonialism” of the Christian South by the Muslim North. This means that the self-determination we are referring to is the constitutional one, which is delineated as the right of ‘a people’ to determine the way in which they shall be governed; whether they shall be self-governed or governed by another power. In the context of the CPA, we can recognize self-determination as the inalienable right of the Southern Sudanese people to determine their political “status,” and pursue their social, economic, religious and cultural progress freely as they choose. Unity or Secession?: Since ‘independence,’ the question of self-determination in the Sudan has always been tricky. In the article 2.5 of the first chapter of CPA, it is stated that by 2011, there will be a referendum for the people of Southern Sudan to vote in order to confirm the unity of the Sudan, or vote to secede from the North. But, why break away from the North? What would self-determination mean to the oppressed South? Do the Southerners really know the contents of what they are voting for as stipulated in the CPA? In other words, is the civil society and/or grassroots community in the South well educated to know who they are, and what they are really voting for? How shall the election be conducted or carried out? These questions lead us to examine the social, political, economic and moral implications associated with self-determination. The Scramble for Power and Scarce Resources: The major invariable problem of the Southern Sudanese (mashkalat el junub el Sudan) is division based on internal scramble for power and scarce resources among the leaders themselves. For instance, within the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M), Riek Machar, who is a Nuer by tribe, broke away from SPLM/A, and formed his own party known as Southern Sudan Independent Movement (SSIM). Machar felt that the internal structures of the SPLM as a movement are dominated by the Dinka who claim to be the ruling class in Sudan. The Dinka enjoyed all the benefits arising from economic and military power at the expense of other ethnic groups in the South. Yet, among the Dinka themselves, there are further divisions between the Dinka Bor and the Dinka Bahar El Ghazal which explains the divergence between John Garang and Salva Kiir. Actually, during the liberation war, “Dr Garang depended a lot on his Dinka Bor tribesmen and he rewarded them abundantly for their loyalty. This has been the source of resentment by most Southern Sudanese, including other Dinkas, like Salva Kiir, who do not come from Bor” (Taban). Ethnicity and Identity: Another challenge that may arise in the separation of the South from the North is the problem of ethnicity and identity. However, we should differentiate between the terms “ethnicity” and “race.” The term “ethnicity” comes from the Greek word “ethnos” which means people or nation. It is the process by which a human person or people relate to a large group of people who share a national, racial, linguistic, or religious tradition. The word “race,” on the other hand, is derived from the Latin word “ration” (reason and understanding); it is an ideology used by the European colonialists to distinguish between the ‘superior’ and ‘inferior’ people (Tschuy). Hitherto, such a relationship in the South is sometimes translated into tribalism and ethnic conflicts, and that raises questions as to whether the Southern Sudanese understand themselves as a “people” linked by a common history or origin. A case in point is the ongoing tensions in the East, Central and Western Equatoria, inter-clan conflicts in Lakes State and Warrap State (among the Rek, the Luacjang and the Pakam), and the unceasing intertribal conflicts between the Nuer and the Tomonyjang (Dinka). This may appear as minor cultural issues but they are ‘timed bombs’ that might disrupt the unity of the South. While justifying the argument for secession, we can affirm that all Southern Sudan’s ethnic groups should break away from the Arab-North in order to maintain their national social, cultural and political identities. The problem however is that within the South, other minor tribes may feel threatened by the majority tribes. Therefore, if the Southerners vote in favor of secession, then the benefits of self-determination would still go to the Southern major tribes such as the Dinka and Nuer. As the Arabs in the North see themselves as a people ‘born to rule’ the whole of the Sudan, and so do the Dinka and Nuer in the South. Accordingly, the fear of self-determination through secession is that the Dinka (which constitutes more than twenty-five tribal groups), and the Nuer would nationalize the land in the South, and they may become the aristocrats and dominate other minority tribes. Indeed, “once the right to secede and establish an independent state is granted to one people within a state, it is feared that other people might claim similar treatment, thereby disremembering the existing state, and probably leading to its total disintegration” (An-Na’im). A case in point is the separation of former Soviet Union and the Yugoslavian Republic, Pakistan and India, Eritrea and Ethiopia, etc. Equally, if the Madi, Acholi, Lango, Bari Speakers, Taposa and others who by common history, culture and language are linked to the neighboring states like Uganda, Kenya and Congo demand secession within the Southern State, there is a possibility that they may join their people in Uganda or Kenya since they have similar cultures, customs, traditions, languages and origin. In fact, the idea of “[…] whether the political development of South Sudan and the future of its people should be linked with their kin in East Africa, or their lot thrown in with Arab and Middle Eastern people” (Nyaba), has been the predicament of the colonial administration in the history of the Sudan. Subsequently, such separation is dangerous because it threatens the territorial integrity of the neighboring states. Problem of Self-Government: Because of the lack of strong political will and tribalism, there is also a problem of self-government among the Southern Sudanese. In 1955, shortly before the independence of 1956, and in 1963, wars broke out in the Sudan and this had to be resolved by the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972. Under this Agreement, the South won significant powers of self-government, and it was granted autonomy within national unity. For eleven years, this autonomy, with the support of the Southern Sudanese, was seen as a well-calculated move because it ratified the law, and it gave birth to the Southern Sudan Provinces Regional Self-Government Act, which was incorporated into the constitution of the State. For the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) “[…] ‘autonomy’ meant federation, and they came armed with a proposal for a full federal structure. In the end they were offered, and finally accepted, something far less in what became the Southern Regional Government” (Johnson). Regrettably, the idea of autonomy in which the South could be divided into smaller regions was negatively perceived by the South; that is, it was understood as a “re-division” (Johnson). It became a ground for ethnic conflict called “Kokora” (division) which was propagated by some presumptuous leaders in the South. It occurred because of the Arabs’ ideology of ‘divide and rule’ through regional self-government since the South had weak economic base. President Ga’afar Nimeri used the idea of regional autonomy as an “intellectual judo.” That is, he abrogated the Addis- Ababa Agreement and re-imposed northern hegemony in the social fascistic form of Shari’a law, and that sparked off the revolutionary war of 1983 (Shivji). Explicitly, by the policy of regional autonomy, the Arabs wanted to develop a ruling class in the South as a way of implementing ‘indirect rule.’
Consequently, the Dinka tribe found themselves victims of this ideology as they
scrambled for a fair share of the “National Cake.” It is very difficult to
dismiss this claim for 'kokora' because it was linked to tribalism. For example,
by the time 'kokora' took place in between 1981 to 1982, Dinka was the dominant
tribe in every Ministry; the entire Executive, the Legislature, the Judiciary,
the Police and the Army. However, with the advent of the Government of Southern
Sudan (GOSS), is the history repeating itself or not? |
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