Category: National

Historical Hints on Survival and Collapse Governments: Lessons for South Sudan and IGAD-Led HLRF

BY: James Okuk, PhD, Juba University, MAY/25/2018, SSN,

“The polis exists to assure the good life” – Aristotle. “For however strong a ruler may be, he will always have need of the good will of the inhabitants if he wishes to remain in power” – Machiavelli. “It is not by the concentration of powers, but by their distribution, that good government is effected” – Thomas Jefferson. “There is no time to waste. We must either unite now or perish” – Julius Nyerere;

I – WHAT SHOULD BE AT STAKE FOR SOUTH SUDAN IN THE HLRF?

All the above quoted political wisdom should serve as reminders for finalizing the High-Level Revitalization Forum (HLRF) without further delays. The conscience of stakeholders of the de facto Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU)—whose term of office ended in April 2018—and the loosed opposition groups should get awakened so as to reach an urgent conclusion of a peaceful settlement that must end the filthy civil war in South Sudan.

Also the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) should rethink its institutional bottleneck to become a trustworthy peace mediator with commendable achievement of the desired goal. The hierarchical decision-making organs of the IGAD (i.e., Assembly of Heads of State and Government that determines the policies and guidelines; Council of Ministers that approves the work programs and budget of the Secretariat; and Committee of Ambassadors that influence the Heads of State and Government, the Ministers and officials of the Secretariat, etc…) have often undermined the work of HLRF mediation experts, especially on issues of good governance and credibility of leadership of the awaited post-war South Sudan.

At the end of the game all the stakeholders (nationals and foreigners alike) should get tough lessons from evolution of political history of South Sudan so as to avoid dangerous blunders of unending crises. They must know that absence of good life, deflated people’s will, concentrated power and decayed national unity usually put BIG QUESTION MARKS on the essence of existence of modern democratic state in globalized era of universal human rights.

It was regrettably a wishful naivety to have thought that the tainted history of abortive governments and oppositions of the Sudan would absolve ‘independent’ South Sudan from inheriting the DNA of bad governance, dooming insecurity, confused economy and recurrent humanitarian catastrophe. The deceptive economic boom from oil revenues in the SPLM/A-controlled government in Juba (not clear for any confidence whether it is free-market capitalism, protected regulatory socialism or ‘mixed’ economy) has been infected by Dutch Disease with behavior of milking public coffers unaccountably.

As the reality of SPLM/A’s government and opposition has now gotten known by hard way of trial-and-error, it is high time the search for lasting peace is informed by roots and links of the evolved political past of South Sudan. Such acknowledgement is necessary, precisely when the territorial geography of the new country on the globe has not shifted to the Atlantic or the Indian Oceans, or even to the Red and the Mediterranean Seas.

The historical facts and actors about South Sudan must be gleaned and screened honestly from illusionary propagandist fictions. SWOT Analyses must be applied rigorously to identify internal and external Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats of the existing dysfunctional institutions and those leading them with defective attitudes. Also SMART Principles must be invoked to ensure adherence to Specificity, Measurability, Achievability, Realisticity and Timeliness of IGAD-mediated negotiations without fear or favor of anti-peace or anti-transformation proponents. Empirical descriptive evidence and logical premises must be used rigorously to arrive at sound prescriptive conclusions on resolving the daunting problems of leadership, security reforms, humanitarian assistance, sustainable economy, transitional justice and democratization of power in South Sudan.

What do you call the rivaling political leaders who act without vision for a mission and behave strangely as if there will not be a future to cherish for themselves or their heirs?

With its commendable emancipatory past, should the SPLM/A be allowed to continue disgracing the present and discrediting the future of South Sudan for posterity?

Is there a pride in the nauseating political disgusts about the renowned SPLM/A freedom fighters who sacrificed dearly to see South Sudan liberated from the injustices of old Sudan, but find themselves escaping the country for exile to live in diaspora as stateless individuals?

What honor is left there in the citizens who overwhelmingly voted for the independence of South Sudan but to get displaced internally to camps that are expensively guarded by foreign forces or seek refuge abroad in environmentally tough habitats of neighboring countries?

What do you call a government in a contemporary world whose 3rd secretary diplomat in headquarters of ministry of foreign affairs receive only a delayed monthly salary of 10 dollars?

What do you call a government in the era of universal human rights whose primary teachers are provisionally paid by foreign humanitarian donors (40 dollars a month) to keep them in schools for the sake of basic education rights of poor children, while the ministry of finance drags to pay in time the salaries of those teachers (equivalent to 5 dollars per a month)?

What do you call a naturally resource-rich country in the era of Millennium Sustainable Goals when 90% of its population live beyond the threshold of poverty line due to man-made crises?

As the war situation stands, it will not be sustainable to temporarily bandage a government or opposition on fear mongering of ‘if we don’t this we will collapse and perish’. Such demise is the determined destiny of any irresponsible government or opposition that blocks the needed drastic change of bad status quo to new normal. No amount of propaganda or intransigence can triumph because when political pendulum has swung to the extremes of frustrating fragile peddling, nothing but final collapse would get queued in the sequence of events.

The cross of the very authoritarian cult that the exiled and rebellious SPLM/A leaders had established in South Sudan when they were on grip of power, is what is haunting them mercilessly to the core now. The SPLM/A was supposed to be archived in libraries after the independence of South Sudan in 2011 because there was no Sudan to be liberated any longer in the new state. Only memorial celebrations of that formidable liberation movement in Africa would have remained upheld yearly every 16th May.

However, the real anguish about the embattled South Sudan is the possibility of its breaking up into tiny fragilities that would make it difficult for rescuing the savable from political ruins. The fragmented status quo usually leads to undesirable uncertainties (e.g., reckless adoption of unsustainable political governance mechanisms, crooked security approaches, anarchical political economies and unending humanitarian catastrophes) with disturbing threats to the dignity of international peace and security. That is why South Sudan shouldn’t be allowed to sink deeper into abyss because the repercussions of ‘failed African solution’ shall not smell good for the region after what was witnessed in Somalia.

The nauseating war situation of South Sudan is akin to John T. Rourke’s diagnosis in his Books “International Politics on the World Stage” (1st – 8th editions), Daron Acemoglu’s & James Robinson’s depictions in their Book “Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty” and Peter H. Schuck’s accounts in his Book “Why Government Fails So Often”. According to these critical writers, governments that mess up themselves with senseless conflicts and extractive corruption become predominantly characterized by:

1) Dynamics of arrogant and self-serving power ambitions greedy actors with no real sense of responsibility for state/nation building;
2) Little institutional engineering hampered by unsustainable bureaucratic deforms;
3) Poor performance due to incompetence lack prudence on political economy;
4) Recurrent abhorring violence exacerbated by rotten social fabrics;
5) Riveting dramatic events with politically-motivated complex tragedies; and
6) Dramatic collapse though sometimes hopeful ending that leaves everyone dumfounded by the turns and twists of new emerging realities.

The unending senseless wars drain the desired assurances in governments, oppositions, political parties, civil societies, interest groups and the entire people of a country. In such situation the international standards and humanitarian law become the first casualties (e.g., violence pursued and promoted not as last resort for a just cause; war declared and managed without legitimate authority; war conducted disproportionally for senseless aggression rather than self-defense; war fought without discrimination of non-combatants; and war continued without intention to restore the disturbed security and peace in the shortest time possible).

General Omar Bradley, the former Joint Chief of Staff of U.S.A Army, would not hesitate (as he did at the testimony to the Senate Committee in 1951 about extending Korean War into Red China) to call what is happening in South Sudan as “the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy”. The Dutch Father of International Law and the author of ‘On the Law of War and Peace (1625)’, Hugo Grotius, would also get irritated if the HLRF ends without compelling the negotiating parties to sing an equitable peace deal.

As nothing stands strategically designed for pursuing the undignified path of ‘real politics by other means’ but political survival through war, the sustainability of running South Sudan for longer in war would get squeezed into parochial irrational arena of unsophisticated luck or believe in superstitions. The history is full of refreshing hints of fate of governments and opposition groups that had defied the sense of preservation of human dignity.

II – GLIMPSES FROM TURKO-EGYPTIAN & ANGLO-EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENTS (1821 – 1956)

The governments that founded and ruled Sudan (including Southern Sudan) in the past were modeled after the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), which ended the Thirty Years of religious wars of monarchies in Europe. That Treaty upheld the sanctity of equality of sovereign European states based on respect for conciliatory secular approach to politics among the super powers who operate according to unified understanding for colonizing the less powerful nations that were regarded as not yet rational, scientific, moral and theistic for full humanity.

The history of Turkish-based Ottoman Empire (founded in 15th Century and collapsed in 20th Century when its territories were divided up in 1922 for trusteeship by strategic victors behind the League of Nations), is an important epistemological archive worth revisiting nowadays. That Empire was the founder of Sudan (land of the blacks) by default in 1821 via its commander, the Albanian-born Muhammad Ali Pasha (1769 – 1849). The objectives was to extract valuable resources and capture black slaves to be used for consolidation and expansion the colonial regime to new territories.

Muhammad Ali’s grandson, ‘the magnificent’ Khedive Ismail Ibrahim Pasha (1830 – 1895) tried to improve the tainted image of his government among ‘the virgin tribes’ of Southern Sudan. He appointed European adventurers to govern this slaves hunting zone (e.g., Samuel White Baker, Charles George Gordon and Eduard Schnitzler) to help him with reforms and “abolition of slavery” in accordance with Anglo-Egyptian Slave Trade Convention (1877) and the Congo Act (1885):

1) Freedom of navigation and trade for all nations in the region forming the basins of the Congo and Niger without allowing a total hegemony of Britain or Portugal;
2) Recognition of African boundaries as international borders demarcated by the dominant colonial powers who have endorsed the partition understanding via the Congo Act;
3) Future appropriation of territory on the African coast had to be conducted by the dominant colonial powers via notification in advance to the signatories of any territorial acquisition; and
4) Joint measures for suppression of slavery and slave trade within the colonial territories.

Also the history of British Empire (founded in 16th Century and expanded extensively between 17th and 20th Centuries to be known as the vast territory where the sun doesn’t go setting, though it diminished from 1950s and disappeared in 1997 after handing over Hong Kong to its rightful Chinese owners), is connected with the making of South Sudan though Lord Cromer (1841 – 1917) discredited it perceptively as a useless large tract that was difficult and costly to administer for any meaningful colonial interest. The Anglo-Egyptian colonial governments used the divide-and-rule tactics to subdue the local people of the Sudan but disadvantaging Southern Sudan through special policies of ‘Military Patrols’ to enforce colonial law and order, Closed District Ordinance (1921), Passports and Permits Ordinance (1922), Trade Permit Order (1928), Rejaf Languages Conference (1928)—six local vernaculars (Dinka, Nuer, Shilluk, Bari and Latuko and Zande) were recommended as medium for Southern education without prejudice to English or other European languages, ‘Building of Self-contained Tribal Units’ based on customary system, and banning mingling or intermarriages between Southerners and Northerners.

The post-World War I (1914 – 1918) and politics of the League of Nations; the invasion of Eritrea by Italy in 1935 with attempts to conquer parts of Sudan adjacent to Ethiopia; the World War II (1939 – 1945) and politics of the United Nations; the move by penultimate King Farouk I of Egypt to declare himself the Monarch of both Egypt and Sudan; and the pressure of Northern General Graduate Congress (formed in 1936) on the Anglo-Egyptian colonial Government to revoke its Southern Sudan policy and involve Sudanese in government, led to formation of Northern Sudan Advisory Council and enactment of Local Councils Ordinances in 1943 though with ‘safeguards’ by the British to uniqueness of the South. But the post-World War II (1939 – 1945) and politics of the United Nations shifted the paradigm where the British resorted to policy of empowering Southern Sudan educationally and economically to enable them stand strongly and competitively on their own as Negroid African, either as attached to the North, annexed to East Africa, or distributed between North and East Africa.

The U.K’s Labour Minister, Ernest Bevin, and the Egyptian Prime Minister Ismail Sedky Pasha signed a Protocol in 1946 on self-government and referendum for the Sudanese to decide on their annexation to Egypt or staying independent after nullification of Condominium Agreement (1899) and the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty (1936) prior to the exit of colonial officials from Sudan. The Condominium Civil Secretary, James W. Robertson, wanted the South to remain attached to the North and the Middle East rather than East Africa. He and the Machiavellian Northern Sudanese Judge, Mohamed Saleh Shingeiti, organized the Sudan Administration Conference in Khartoum (1946) with special focus on ‘Sudanization’ of public service. The Conference recommended for conduct of Juba Conference in 1947 to bring Southern participants (civil servants, local chiefs, religious leaders and British officials) on board by persuading them to get closer to central government in Khartoum in returns for equal treatment in job remuneration, promotion, privileges, transfers and education.

Unfortunately the London-Cairo-Khartoum geopolitics undermined the original mood and promised of the Juba Conference. London preferred appeasing Khartoum to strike a blow on Cairo and its push for unity of the Nile Valley. The 13-Man Committee that drafted the Self-government Statute (chaired by Justice Stanley Baker in 1951 and with MP Buth Diu as the only member from the South but who boycotted with disappointment when his call for federalism was rejected) was affected by the diplomatic wrangling and confusing legalistic interpretations of the Agreement between The Egyptian Government and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Island Concerning Self-government and Self-determination for the Sudan (1953.

With approval by the British authorities, the Northern politicians (patronized by Pro-Egypt Khatimya Islamists under Ali al-Mirghni and Pro-Britain Ansars Islamists under Abdel Rahman al-Mahdi) spat on the face of Southerners by denying them representation in the negotiations of Anglo-Egyptian exit from the Sudan. They despised the South as apolitical to be consulted because it didn’t have a single political party and would not deserve to sit equally with their masters to discuss government affairs. The Egyptian Information Minister Saleh Salim, serving under the Junta of Mohamed Naguib and Gamal Abdel Nasser, frequented his visits to Southern Sudan to promote unity of the Nile Valley.

It didn’t take longer before the workers in Nzara and Yambio went on riots, Torit armed forces went on mutiny, and wider unrest ensuing in Southern Sudan by1955. Khartoum blamed “the Southern Problem” on British policies of isolating the South from North with widened gap of mistrust, underdevelopment and backwardness of Southerners, disrespect of Northern traders and elites towards Southerners, false assumptions that Egyptians and British will intervene in favour of the South, miscommunication and maladministration by government officials, and rumour mongering by the opposition against Ismail al-Azhari’s interim government.

In a nutshell, the respective governments of the Great Ottoman Empire and the Greatest British Empire, including their extension into Sudan via assistance of de facto governments in Egypt, had to collapse mainly for these reasons: 1) conducting themselves above the fundamental universal human rights, and 2) pursuing globalization without moral conscience or human face. Regrettably, their political DNA is still haunting South Sudan nowadays (e.g., family dynasties with use of religions for political appearance of support and solidarity, proliferation of militias for government security against opposition, capitalist free market economy, anti-federalism, spree of corruption, maladministration, insensitivity to plight of local population, recycling of arrogant politicians in government, and intransigence on military might and other repressive demeanors against the colonized people).

III – HINTS FROM GOVERNMENTS OF INDEPENDENT SUDAN (1956 – 2011)

The Stanley Baker’s Statute of Self-government was passed into Transitional Constitution of the Sudan (1956) without incorporating the demand of Southerners for self-rule (Southern politicians were only persuaded that their demand would be given due consideration by Constituent Assembly during permanent constitution-making process). The independent Sudan didn’t change the bad politics of the colonial past, particularly against Southern Sudan and other marginalized peripheries that remained intact as God created them at the time of Adam and Eve (i.e., no added value of human and infrastructural development).

The British policies adopted after the Rajaf Conference (1928) and Juba Conference (1947) regarding ‘due recognition’ of uniqueness of Southern Sudan in its multi-cultural, multi-customs, multi-religious and multi-linguistic diversity, were trashed under new “Sudanization” policies adopted by the veterans of Northern Sudanese General Graduate Congress inline with the ‘Baqt’ (652 – 1323 A.D) of the Treaty that victimized the natives of Southern Sudan:

1) Allow safe and free movement and settlement of Arabs and Muslims into Nubians territory, and vice versa for a limited movement of Nubians to and through Egypt for trade only without resettlement;
2) Cease raids and wars between Egypt and Nubia so that the Peace of God and Islamic Message of Prophet Mohamed could prevail without obstruction;
3) Build a Mosque in Dongolla and protect it for the Muslims and the in respect to Rulers in Egypt;
4) Pay a tribute of 300 slaves annually to Egypt (reduced later to 360 slaves per 3 years);
5) Return to Egypt the escaped black slaves and fugitive Arabs who opposed the Islamic dynasty.

The political character of the Jellaba and the intelligentsia who inherited government institutions of post-colonial Sudan didn’t become different from that of Jihadists of the Mahdiyya (1885 – 1898) who unleashed havoc in Southern Sudan to extract resources for the upkeep of nepotistic, corrupt, brutal, famine-stricken and slaves trading regime of Khalifa Abdullahai Al-Taishi (e.g., the notorious Jihadist Zaki al-Tamal beheaded the Shilluk King Yor Akoch of Fashoda after capturing him in a fierce battle of Nigiir, and Karmallah al-Kerkasawi tried to Islamize by force the tribes of the Lado Enclave but was ferociously resisted by King Gbudwe Bazingbi of Azande who was eliminated by British later).

The elites in Khartoum continued to deny the demand of Southerners for federalism and sabotaged the implementation of feasibility studies on big developmental agro-industrial schemes and mechanized farming in Southern Sudan (e.g., Nzara Cotton Plantation and Cloth Industry, Melut and Mongalla Sugar Sugar Plantation/Processing, Aweil Rice Plantation/Processing, Wau Fruits Plantation/Canning, Tonj Kenaf Plantation/Processing, Kapoeta Cement Factory, Upper Talanga Tea Plantation/Processing, and Malakal and Bor Fish Freezing and Drying Industries, etc).

The young politicians of Southern Sudan didn’t compromise like their old fathers and uncles. They won elections overwhelmingly in 46 Southern constituencies in 1957 on the following campaign trail for change of status quo: emancipation of the marginalized with adoption of secular federalism, repatriation of Southern schools and students from Northern Sudan, recognition of both English and Arabic as official languages, establishment of independent economic development program for Southern Sudan, formation of independent organized armed forces for Southern Sudan, and repatriation of the Sudan back from the Arab World to Africa. By then the cold war between Russia and its allies versus the U.S and its allies was staring to get hot in Africa.

The learnt youth of Southern Sudan didn’t betray the cause even when their leader, Ezbon Mundiri, was arrested and imprisoned for seven years for crime against unity of the Arabized Islamic Sudan purported to have been committed by leading aggressively the Southern campaign on the above-mentioned cards. Fr. Saturnino Lohure Hilangi took the challenge of leadership of the federalists as he protested in the Constitutional Constituent Assembly (1958) and underscored the following statement succinctly as Southern Parliamentarians walked out to boycott the undesirable sittings:

“The South has no ill-intentions whatsoever towards the North; the South simply claims to run its local affairs in a united Sudan. The South has no intention to separating from the North, for had that been the case nothing on earth would have prevented its demand for separation. The South claims to federate with the North, a right that the South undoubtedly possesses as a consequence of principle of free self-determination which reason and democracy grant to free people. The South will at any moment separate from the North if and when the North so decides, directly or indirectly, through political, social and economic subjection of the South.”

The betrayal of aspiration of Southerners led to collapse of Ismail al-Azhari’s and Abdallah Bey Khalil’s governments (1956 – 1958) as their shifting coalitions got characterized by rivalling, strikes, violence, mutinies, imprisonments, dismissals, nepotism, divisions, conspiracies, vote of no confidence, change of electoral laws, budget crises, suppression of contrary opinions, and insensitivity to people’s predicaments caused by the raging civil war.

General Ibrahim Abboud’s Government (1958 – 1964) made things worse by banning discussions on self-rule (federalism); restricting recruitment of Southerners into armed forces except those who converted to Islam and embraced Arab culture; adopting Missionary Society Act (1962); expelling hundreds of foreign Christian missionaries from Sudan in 1964; and deploying Muslim missionaries and Arabic teachers to the South. The Junta used repressive military power (e.g., indiscriminate detentions, torture, assassination of Southern intellectuals, burning of villages and massacre of the civilians) to subdue the Southern resistance.

The exiled Southerners sought refuge in the sympathetic eastern and central African neighbouring countries, organized themselves into associations and liberation political groups: The Sudanese Christian Association in East Africa (SCAEA) and the Sudan African Closed District National Union (SACDNU) formed in 1962 and transformed to Sudan African Union (SANU) in 1963 with formation of Anyanya (snake poison) as an armed wing in 1964.

It didn’t take long before the Junta of General Abboud collapse finally as it failed to end the oppressive war in the South. The educationist Sirr al-Khatim al-Khalifa took the charge of the post-uprising interim government with participation of Southern Front (SF), most of whose leaders were young university graduates and local chiefs. Queen Elizabeth of the U.K visited the Sudan (February 8, 1965) where Interim Supreme Councillor, H.E. Mr. Luigi Adwok received her in Khartoum when he was the Rotational Head of State for the Sudan for that month, an honour detested by Northerners as it raised the political self-esteem of Southerners.

The traditional Northern political leaders (i.e., Khatimya, Ansars, Unionists, Communists & Islamists) got divided on how to handle “the Southern Problem” even when the Round Table Conference and 12-Man Committee were launched in 1965 to bring all the political forces and different shades of opinions together to deliberate on how to end the civil war and normalize the country again, especially in the Southern part of the country. But the Conference failed its objectives of healing the old wounds of slave trade and slavery—tributes to St. Josephine Margaret Bakhita (1869 – 1947) of Roman Catholic Church who got rescued from humiliation of slavery and to Effendi Ali Gifoon—known as Lwaldit Mayker of Fashoda village, the slave who became an outstanding fighter of Turko-Egyptian army in Mexico during South American wars (1862 – 1867) and also in the war against Mahdiyya (1898 – 1900) where he accompanied General Herbert H. Kitchener in his conquering expeditions. Its resolutions were thrown into politicization dustbin for the sake of partial elections and maintenance of shifting conspiratorial governments of Imam Sadiq al-Mahdi’s and Mohamed Ahmed Maghoub (1965 – 1969).

Additional number of movements and declarations propped up for liberation of Southern Sudan from the Sudan: Azania Liberation Front was formed by Joseph Oduho in 1965, Nile Provisional Government by Gordon Mourtat in 1969, Anyidi Provisional Government by Emedio Tafeng after crashing the Nile Provisional Government in 1969, the SUE Republic and Sudan African Union Conservatives declared by Michael Towil in 1969, and South Sudan Liberation Movement in 1971 by Joseph Lagu. The shifting governments in Khartoum kept harassing, massacring, arresting and assassinating Southerners (e.g., assassination of Fr. Saturnino in 1967 while mobilizing Anyanya forces at Uganda Border & William Deng Nhial in 1968 while campaigning for partial elections in Bahr el Ghazal); committing massacres; massacring of intellectuals in Wau where Southern First Veterinary Doctor from University of Khartoum Justin Papiti Akol Ajawin was shot dead with others in a wedding occasion and also in Juba and Malakal). Khartoum forces burnt many villages and closed down schools for scorch-earth policy of punishing Southern civilians for supporting the Anyanya guerrilla.

Prime Minister Sadiq tried to improve Sudan’s relations with Uganda, Congo, Kenya and Ethiopia to help his government to crush rebellion in the South. But the forced submission to the will of Khartoum under pretext of restoration of law and order in Southern Sudan pushed Israelis to support the South against the Arabized Islamists of the Sudan who wanted Israel wiped out from geography of the Middle East (indicated by Israel-Egypt War in 1967 and solidarity by Khartoum). The British volunteer guerrilla trainer known as Uncle Fashoda and Israeli retired Army General Kawagia John trained the Anyanya freedom fighters rigorously as he confirmed in 2013:

“The building of the military force in the South provided the basis and military framework which resulted in both command and operational experience. The above changed the situation of years whereby the North could harass the population in the South. The Anyanya soldiers demonstrated a high level of discipline, a willingness to learn all relevant subjects and above all to demonstrate stubbornness in sticking to their mission.”

It was just a matter of time before the government in Khartoum collapsed to the guts of the second military coup (1969 – 1985) led by Jaafar Mohamed Nimeiri in collaboration with the Sudan Communist Party. The Junta banned multi-party politics and adopted one-party presidential-parliamentary system under umbrella of Sudan Socialist Union (SSU)—politicians, teachers, farmers, technicians, professionals, intellectuals, armed forces, youth and women. From the onset Nimeiri acknowledged “the Southern Problem” and diagnosed it as being caused by local backwardness and western imperialism, similar to the findings of the Committee of Inquiry on Southern Unrest in 1955. He prescribed the solution to be the treatment of Southern Sudan as a unique region with its own diversity of culture and mode of rule within the bigger united, stable and prosperous Sudan.

Nimeiri issued a general amnesty for Southern opposition politicians and Anyanya fighters, promising them higher education opportunity and top public jobs (e.g., appointing first Southern law graduate of University of Khartoum, communist Joseph Garang, as Minister of Southern affairs though he hanged him to death later with Hashim al-Atta and other Communists for a foiled coup in 1971 but replaced with another Southern lawyer from University of Khartoum, Abel Alier Kwai). Moscow, Beijing, Libya and other communist countries isolated Nimeiri’s regime and motivated the traditional Islamic Northern political forces to harden their opposition to topple his government. Nimeiri had no choice but to look west for support from the U.S and the capitalist allies, including churches and Zionic lobbyists. He recommitted himself to resolving “the Southern problem” in accordance with the resolutions of Round Table Conference (1965). The World Council of Churches and the All African Council of Churches agreed to meditate the peace negotiations between Nimeiri’s regime and Anyanya leaders.

Though by then the Anyanya and South Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) were better organized under the young graduate of Sudan Military College, Joseph Lagu, he was faced with tremendous pressure for peace. Ugandan government became unsafe and unstable under President Idi Amin who arrested Mr. Rolf Steiner (the volunteer German Anyanya trainer) and handed him over to Khartoum where he was imprisoned for life. Zaire government of Mobutu Sese Seko got closer to Khartoum through Arab countries that funded his deficit budget and offered him other benefits. Ethiopian government of Emperor Haile Selassie improved its relations with the Sudan and couldn’t tolerate Anyanya rebellion within or across the borders. Humanitarian donors (e.g., Norway, Denmark, Sweden, UNHCR and Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan), Southern refugees and intellectuals pressed hard on the rebel opposition to minimize the divisive wrangling and agree to peaceful settlement.

The 1972 Addis Ababa Peace Accord between SSLM and Nimeiri’s government brought back the lost sanity. The Relief and Resettlement Commission was established with mandate of: 1) establishment of adequate reception centers containing facilities for shelter, food supplies and medication; 2) arrangement of transportation of refugees to permanent resettlement places of origin; and 3) provision of materials and equipment for executing this work. Christian missionaries and humanitarian NGOs were encouraged to assist the people of Southern Sudan with service delivery and community development projects (UNHCR, UNICEF, WHO, UNDP, FAO, German Caritas, Norwegian Church Aid, Lutheran World Service, Catholic Relief, ACROSS, etc…), including continuous assistance for student refugees until appropriate arrangements were made for their repatriation and resettlement.

The peace agreement provided for special security arrangement for Southern Command (12,000 troops with 6,000 Southern Sudanese distributed equally to its 3 regions and integrated into the Sudan Defense Forces within 5 years as managed by Joint Military Commission & Joint Cease-fire Commission). It also granted autonomy to Juba with jurisdiction over Southern Provinces (Bahr el Ghazal, Equatoria and Upper Nile), and where other culturally and geographically associated areas to Southern Complex (e.g., Abyei) would decide via referendum whether to join the South or remain where they have been transferred in the Northern Sudan.

The High Executive Council (HEC) was constituted together with the People’s Regional Assembly (PRA) to govern the South in a parliamentary system where the citizens would elect their representatives democratically via secret ballot. The PRA had to legislate for Southern Sudan in accordance with the Sudan’s constitution and the provisions of the peace agreement as incorporated into the Organic Law of the Regional Government, including Public Service and Economic Institutions (e.g., revenues from taxation, profits or loyalties accruing to the Central Government from exports in Southern region, and grants in-aid or donations). English was affirmed as the principle language for the Southern Region without prejudice to the use of any language or languages that would serve a practical necessity for efficient discharge of executive and administrative functions of the Regional government.

The Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie visited Juba to participate in the anniversary celebration of Addis Ababa Agreement (March 3, 1973). He donated the Multipurpose Training Center (MTC) in Juba for promoting developmental skills. The Tanzanian President Julius K. Nyerere also visited Juba (October 1974) and advised Southerners to be patient with implementation of the peace accord. He donated ox ploughs and agricultural hand tools with large quantities of maize seeds. The Libyan President Muammar Gaddafi visited Wau to participate in the Peace Agreement Anniversary (March 3, 1975) where he tried tipped Juba to conspire in overthrowing Nimeiri’s regime.

The Addis Ababa peace dividend blessed South Sudan with the opening of University of Juba in 1975 alongside Yambio Institute of Agriculture, Institute of Veterinary Science and Institute of Rural Development. Egypt, U.K and U.S offered some scholarships for competitive Southern Sudanese students to pursue tertiary education and come back home to contribute in building the country. The U.S.A Government constructed communications station (television, radio, telex and telephone) in Juba. The USAID paved a 500-mile road from the border of Kenya via Nadapal to Juba. Yugoslavia built the regional Government Complex in Juba with only 5 million USD (Big Parliament, 11 Ministries and 28 Residences). The Government of Netherlands through its business company built the Nile Bridge in Juba (the only bridge build on the Nile in the territory of South Sudan since the begining of God’s creation). The contingent of British Royal Army Engineers built Tonj Bridge and repaired other bridges and roads in Bahr el Ghazal. The Federal Republic of Germany Built the Bussere Bridge and repaired a 600-mile road from Juba to Wau. The Government of Kuwait established a coordination office in Juba headed by Ambassador Abdalla AI-Seraie to monitor Kuwaiti projects (e.g., AI-Sabah Children Hospital, Friendship Primary and Junior Schools, Nyakuron Cultural Center, Juba Broadcasting Station, Hai Kuwait Residential Area and Kuwait Mosque). Chinese Medial Team provide medical services in Juba Hospital and other parts of Southern Sudan.

Juba stood firm in honor of Addis Abba Peace Agreement when northern opposition (Umma Party) armed elements attacked Khartoum in 1976 and President Nimeiri went hiding for few days. However, the Field Marshal Nimeiri’s political behaviors became unpredictable when he declared ‘National Reconciliation’ in 1977 and 1978 with leaders of traditional northern political parties that were opposed to peace in the South, especially Sadiq al-Mahdi and other Muslim Brothers. Nimeiri decided to dishonor the peace accord by encroaching unilaterally and illegitimately on the land rights of Southern Sudan. He linked up with Egyptian Government to dig 360 kilometer Jonglei Canal (1974 – 1984) despite the outrage by the people of Southern Sudan who felt the threat on the environmentally rich Sudd Region (blockage of 350,000 m2 of grassy wetland and lagoons of 30 rivers converging naturally with plenty of variety of fish that die of old age). Also Khartoum tried to redrew the South-North boundaries with intention to annex oil and agricultural rich areas (Bentiu, Hofrat el Nehas, Kafia Kingi and Northern Upper Nile region) to the North, and to issue unilaterally oil exploration licenses (e.g., to American Chevron in 1974 and to French Total and Royal Dutch Shell in 1980), including construction of refineries in the North to process the pipe-lined Southern crude oil or ship it to international markets via Port Sudan with no returns to the South.

Nimeiri’s violations of peace agreement was exacerbated by the divisions and lack of unity of Southern the leaders under the conspiratorial groupings of Joseph Lagu and Abel Alier who were used by Khartoum by short-changing them in power as the Jellaba wished. His disruption of armed forces integration process in the South and declaration of the peace agreement as not Bible or Quoran provoked the discontented Anyanaya veterans to rebel (Kerubino Kwanin Bol in Bor on May 16, 1983 joined by William Nyuon Bany in Ayod on June 6, 1983, Dr. John Garang de Mabior from Panyigor, among others) and go to border of Ethiopia to form the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M) with the Manifesto that called for liberation of the old Sudan from bourgeoisie and marginalization so as to realize a new Sudan of camaraderie, nationalism, secularism, socialism, equality, freedom, justice, prosperity and respect of human dignity; signified by self-rule and equitable development regardless of gender, race, family, ethnicity, tribe, region or religion.

“In 1956 our country gained formal independence but entered into the era of neo-colonialism. Since then a small parasitic clique that had mutated from pre-independence system of exploitation and took over the formal instruments of oppressions in the form of the state for their own interests and against the interest of the majority of the Sudanese people. This clique has utilized the multi-racial and multi-religious character of Sudanese society to perpetuate their rule and to keep our people undeveloped and backward.” – Dr. Garang in 1983.

The renewed struggle went beyond “the Southern Problem” with civil war paralyzing the economy and causing humanitarian catastrophe, which become unbearable for civilians and armed forces to tolerate. The professional and trade unions became restive as they demanded for increase of salaries to cope with hyperinflation while government dragged its feet. The judges went on strike as Nimeiri imposed Islamic Penal Code (Sharia) to cuts of hands petty criminals and hang to death the black market dollar traders together with the accused for apostasy (e.g., capital punishment against Mahmoud Mohamed Taha).

Nimeiri failed to survive in politics by nooks and crooks and without peace in the country. The wrath of people’s power and second popular uprising in the Sudan caught up with his intransigence as he was on medical treatment visit to Washington-DC in April 1985. The American generosity and CIA-led foreign policy under President Ronald W. Raegan’s Administration had to stand with the people against the abnormal betrayal by Nimeiri. His diehards and arrogant apologists had to go hiding in shame, internally and abroad, as the plane carrying Nimeiri was landed in Military Airport in Egypt for arranged exile of a fallen dictator. The Regional Government of Southern Sudan Government, which rescued Nimeiri in 1976 when Khartoum was put on fire by Libya-backed Northern opposition armed elements and mercenaries, was already destroyed by Nimeiri-induced ‘Kokora’ (divisive politics and tribalism instead of equality) with politicians scattered in disarray to Malakal, Juba and Wau in 1980s after the unconstitutional dissolution of Juba-based regional government.

The National Alliance for National Salvation (NANS) of the banned political parties, professionals and trade unions, and students convinced the Chief of General Staff of the Sudan Defense Forces, Lt. Gen. Abdel Rahman Suwar Al Dhab, to become the Head of the Interim Revolutionary Command Council and with Dr. El-Jizouli Dafallah as the Transitional Prime Minister. The SPLM/A signed the Koka Dam Declaration (March 26, 1986) with the NANS to end the war and adopt a just secular system of governance. However it didn’t take long before partial elections brought back Sadiq al-Mahdi to assume the Premiership again without peace but more atrocities of war and creation of chaotic militias to terrorize Southern Sudan in attempt to defeat the SPLM/A militarily. Famine and humanitarian crises intensified in Sudan. The UN Secretary-General, Javier Perez, and the UNICEF Executive Director, James P. Grant, initiated the Operation Life-Line Sudan (April 1989) for quick response. Though many fake internal and external peace initiatives were attempted the war continued relentlessly.

Sadiq al-Mahdi’s government had to collapse again in June 1989 when the third Junta’s coup overthrow him in collaboration with National Islamic Front where Dr. Hassan El-Turabi was the ideologue. Islam was officially sanctioned as government’s policy. Holy war was declared against the SPLM/A. Radical international Islamists, including Osama bin Laden, got involved in pursuit of the Holy War and enforcement of “Islamic Civilization Project”. Mengistu Haile Mariam of the Derg Regime in Ethiopia was deposed and SPLA/M got split into Naser and Torit factions. The Frankfurt (1992) declaration on self-determination for Southern Sudan, the Abuja I and Entebbe (1992), Abuja II (1993) and other peace initiatives were attempted but failed due to intransigence of the warring parties.

The IGADD’s Declaration of Principles (1994) for achieving peace in the Sudan was adopted: dialoging for a just political solution, affirmation of the right for self-determination, making unity in diversity attractive with secular democracy, guaranteeing fundamental freedoms and human rights, realizing appropriate and fair sharing of wealth, and ceasefire and interim arrangements. The National Congress Government exploited the divisions within the SPLA/M and initiated some short-lived internal peace deals (Khartoum Peace Agreement in 1997 and Fashoda Peace Agreement in 1998) to pave the way for protection of oil areas in Southern Sudan. The Chinese, Indian, Malaysian, Canadian, French and Swedish oil companies got involved in the oil business in the Sudan despite human rights concerns on the scorched-earth policy against the local population in oil fields. Khartoum shipped the first oil consignment to the international markets in 1999, emboldening its arms sale capabilities for military victory against the SPLM/A and enforcement of its Islamic policies and Arabization of Southern Sudan.

The Zionic Lobbyists, the Churches, humanitarians NGOs, and human rights activists persuaded the U.S. Congress and President Bush to intervene robustly in order to end the war and achieve peace in the Sudan, using “Carrot and Stick Policy”. Osama Bin Laden’s terroristic attack on the biggest Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon (9/11/ 2001) made George W. Bush Jnr’s Administration press for peace in Sudan. The SPLM/A factions got reunited under the leadership of Dr. John Garang. The IGAD and its partners and friends (Troika, Italy, China, Netherlands, EU, AU and UN) were able to make a breakthrough with mediation of the Machakos Protocol (July 2002), which endorsed the previous IGADD’s Principles. This paved the way for agreements on Security Arrangements (September 2003), Wealth Sharing (January 2004), Power Sharing (May 2004), Resolution of the Conflict in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile (May 2004) and Resolution of the Abyei Conflict (May 2004) mediated by the IGAD Special Envoy and Kenyan Army General, Mr. Lazarus Sumbeiywo.

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) made the Sudan Government in Khartoum to grant a special autonomy for the Government of Southern Sudan (2005 – 2011) in Juba and in control of the 1o states in the South based on a separate secular Interim regional Constitution (2005). The SPLM became the ruling party in the South while its military wing, the SPLA, remained as standing army alongside with other organized forces. The oil wealth was shared between South and North. The developmental multi-donor trust fund was established and coordinated in Juba to assist in post-war reconstruction and normalization Southern Sudan.

Despite the hitches between Juba and Khartoum, the 2010 general elections confirmed the incumbent SPLM/A and NCP leaders to continue in the same power positions and make unity of the Sudan attractive. But the people of Southern Sudan overwhelmingly voted for separation in the January 2011 Referendum. The independence was declared with national euphoria and international admiration. In this regard, the Government of Field Marshal Omar Hassan Ahmed al-Bashir (1989 – 2011) could only be considered as partially collapsed after South Sudan broke away officially from Sudan in July 2011. President al-Bashir has been a bit lucky because the IGAD and the African Union were ready to cheer him up in solidarity as his government continue to facing tremendous political and economic difficulties, some of whose mitigations were designed in the expense of oil revenues accruing from independent South Sudan (e.g. paying Transition Financial Arrangements of 3.028 billion USD and hiring Sudan-based oil pipelines costing unfair 24.5 USD per a barrel). That unfair deal was negotiated by the leaders of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) under mediation of African Union High-Level Implementation Panel who favored the Sudan to get compensated by South Sudan for its losses. Part of the cause of 2013 spike of crisis in South Sudan could be traced to that deal and the oil flow shut-down in 2012 by Juba to the dismay of the world.

Abel Alier’s Book “Too Many Agreements Dishonored: Southern Sudan” and Dr. Lam Akol’s Book “SPLM/SPLA: Inside an African Revolution” had captured succinctly the machinations and hegemonies of governments of the Jellaba of Sudan but also the problems of Southern leaders (e.g., unity, federalism, armed forces, Jonglei canal, oil fields, land tenure, tribalism, the price of dishonoring peace agreements, regimes collapses, prospects for political settlements and multi-party politics). Both of these experienced politicians were convinced that the Machiavellian politics on economic and social progress in Southern Sudan was a farce without peace, security, stability, tranquility, good policies, stable government, professional workforce, financial resources, pluralism and inclusivity.

IV. LESSONS FROM SURVIVAL & COLLAPSE OF SUDANESE GOVERNMENTS

In recapitulation, the subsequent collapse governments of the independent Sudan, which kept short-changing themselves in Khartoum between military and civilian politicians had the same colonial ‘master-slave’ mercantilist mentality of extractive hegemony and alienating marginalization of Southern Sudan and the adjacent backward areas. Their political misconduct was met with fierce resistance by the liberation fighters who could not tolerate the disruption of the originality of cultural and religious settings and traditions of native African tribes; their kinship value system of totems and taboos; their believe in God as the source of all life and to whom all human persons should be responsibly accountable; their reverence of inter/intra generational powers of diviners, herbalists, warriors, elders and living-dead; and their preference for Christianity than Islam.

The hinted refreshing historical knowledge about the critical junctions of survival or collapse of governments and oppositions in the independent Sudan could be summarized in these points: imprudence of government and opposition leaders, politically motivated raging senseless long civil wars, discontent of citizens with corrupt political economy, popular uprisings due to sharp economic shocks on purchasing power of ordinary population, aggressive foreign sanctions provoked by humanitarian despair, and international lobbying for restoration of democratic civic duty in an environment of peace. Tough Lessons should be learnt here for shaping a way forward for a better South Sudan because history doesn’t forgive faltering leadership.

The exposed historical blunders should sent alerting signals and disqualify any consolation of political fallacy of the blind content that the earth will go around the sun normally with the morning and night passing daily for the status quo to remain triumphant against all odds of the pressing change. It should also shift the paradigm and present alternative keys that must unlock the potentials of finding reliable innovative solutions for a government and opposition of peace and happiness in South Sudan, based on liberal democratic culture of checks and balances with periodic trustworthy fair elections that are upheld legitimacy by both winners and losers. The glimpses from history should move the good people convincingly to withdraw their confidence from any bad political leader in South Sudan who cannot think outside the box to implement the vows of peace, justice, liberty and prosperity incrementally with spirit of stewardship and dynamic synergy of the stakeholder’s performance on the following mandate:

1) Commit to full and timely implementation of the revitalized ARCSS with oversight by reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC) and its Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism (CTSAMM);
2) Consolidate the restored security and peace in collaboration with IGAD and Partners;
3) Promote Human Rights and Fundament Liberties for Preservation of Dignity;
4) Fast-track and Provide Protection for Humanitarian Relief, Repatriation, Resettlement and Rehabilitation of IDPs and Refugees;
5) Recover the Economy and Manage it Effectively with Prudence, Transparency and Accountability for the Welfare of the People;
6) Rebuild the Destroyed Infrastructure and Construct new Public Facilities;
7) Provide Services for Human Development and Stable Livelihoods;
8) Expedite Public Service Reforms and Transformation for Civil and Armed Sectors;
9) Facilitate Transitional Justice, Reconciliation and Healing;
10) Devolve Powers and Allocate Development Resources to States and Counties;
11) Initiate and Finalize Permanent Constitution-making Process;
12) Facilitate the Conduct of National Population Census and Household Survey;
13) Facilitate Credible Conduct of Elections Before the end of Transitional Period; and
14) Perform the normal Functions of Government, Horizontally and Vertically.
—————————————————————-
Dr. James Okuk is professor of political science in University of Juba and peace-building consultant reachable at okukjimy@hotmail.com.

ARCSS & its Institutional and Judicial Reforms Agenda: Achievements and Failures

By Tong Kot Kuocnin, LLB (Juba), LLM (Nairobi) MAY/21/2018, SSN;

I. Introduction

Since the establishment of the government of Southern Sudan in 2005 following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, South Sudan failed to embark on extensive judicial reforms with a rigorous process of impartial and non-partisan appointment of the Chief Justice, justices, judges and other judicial officers where applicants should have been publicly interviewed by a revamped Judicial Service Council (JSC). Subsequently, parliament should have vetted and passed the nominees before full appointment by the President.

However, as I always share different and contending opinion, my contention has always been that, the effectiveness of judicial reforms depends on wider reforms in the entire justice sector. This would include critical stakeholders, such as, the prosecuting authorities, penal institutions and the police – and even the executive and parliament which put forward and approve budgetary allocations.

This is to ensure that complementary reforms are taking place within all those other institutions in order to ensure effective and timely delivery of justice.

Since 2005 to date, weak institutional culture and structural impediments have stood in the way of judicial reforms, but this should not be allowed to retard efforts to implement an ‘ambitious plan to make the courts more efficient and open, increase professionalism, and expand the court system’ if at all the judiciary leadership was willing to undertake much needed reforms.

The process of judicial reforms has to revamp an opaque system, many of whose members have historically had strong senses of entitlement as liberators of the country. These reforms, should aim at overcoming internal resistance, strengthening weak accountability mechanisms, and finding the necessary resources in order to stir forward the reforms sought.

Another key component of judicial reforms is structuring judicial accountability. Accountability is a particularly tough challenge because many South Sudanese do not understand how the court system works. Thus, for such institutional and judicial reforms to take root, users of the justice system – whether lawyers or everyday citizens – have to understand how the courts should function and demand that judicial officers deliver quality judicial services. This requires high and consistent levels of sensitization.

The Compromise Peace Agreement commonly referred to as the ‘The Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (2015) contains key fundamental recommendations in justice sector reforms.

Access to justice has been pointed out as the first pillar and key result area. This should ‘encompass such actions as the establishment of the Hybrid Court for South Sudan to try those who bear greatest responsibility of the atrocities during the conflict.

The establishment of an independent judicial body to known as ‘hybrid court for South Sudan came as a result of disregard of the laws and customs of war resulting to a serious violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

The court, according to the terms of the ARCSS, shall have jurisdiction with respect to genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes as well as other serious crimes under international law and relevant laws of the Republic of south Sudan including gender based crimes and sexual violence.

This entails, in part, an attempt to in this regard break the ‘traditional refrain of the soldier and the bureaucrat that “I was only doing my duty” is no longer an acceptable ground for abrogating the rights of humanity in the person of the other’ as much of the power of government is exercised by the president through bureaucrats who regulate the daily lives of citizens and therefore exercise broad delegated powers.

Thus, inspiring public confidence in the redress of grievances, human rights violations and various forms of injustices obtainable through legitimate means within known structures and predictable processes is important in the consolidation of peace in South Sudan.

Legitimate structures for peaceful settlement of disputes and fair administration of justice within strong democratic institutions of governance are amenable to peace consolidation only if these institutions are transparent, accountable and non-corrupt and the power isn’t absolutely control by the elite heading the institution.

This has hitherto been tested that States with high institutional quality are less likely to experience civil war or conflict due to their responsiveness to the needs of their citizens; whereas those with low quality institutions can lose the loyalty and support of their citizens, and consequently fall prey to violent conflicts. This has been our challenge since the inception of the then government of Southern Sudan in 2005.

As already said, peace, stability, and development are more likely to happen in countries with strong democratic institutions not held hostage by the few elites who wields an absolute power, not only because they are inclined towards upholding justice, human rights, equality and the rule of law, but due to the high level of political inclusivity, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms they exude.

II. Achievements

Since weak or lack of strong institutions is not only the cause of state failure to prevent human rights violations but also the reason that state power is used to perpetrate injustices. It is to be underscored here that there are no much achievements made thus far by the current government since the signing of the Peace Agreement in August 2015.

The institutional reforms sought as enshrined in the agreement remains largely an untenable dream as there exist a serious lack of political will to undertake such reforms as these reforms predictably brings unwarranted and an unexpected complete change and overhaul of the current dysfunctional system.

Strong democratic institutions are remedial and can facilitate the movement from instability to stability; from human rights violations to a situation where such rights are universally upheld, respected and protected.

The economic reforms as stipulated in the agreement remains on the paper to be realize as the government took no attempt to institute such reforms as required by the agreement.

The spirit of the agreement hasn’t been implemented as expected as the leadership of the country indulge in mockery not only of its citizens but equally to the region which brokered the agreement and the international at large.

III. Failures

In terms of implementation progress, leaders in South Sudan have not been moving as fast as expected when their progress is measured against the milestones stipulated in the ARCSS.

The leaders in Juba should be credited for managing to form the TGoNU, as well as constituting the Council of Ministers in April 2016, as provided for in the ARCSS. But it is sad to say that they have not started establishing the necessary institutions of governance provided for in the ARCSS.

However, the implementation of other provisions of the ARCSS has been slow, poor and above all, not been implemented as FVP Taban Deng Gai, who took over the leadership of SPLM-IO after the June 2016 J1 incident was only working to appease his BOSS.

Not only that, there has been slow implementation of the ARCSS as evidenced by the delays in the formation and reconstitution of transitional institutions and mechanisms, provided for under Chapter 1 (14.1) of the agreement which include, inter alia, the institutions such as the Commission for Truth, Reconciliation and Healing (CTRH); Hybrid Court for South Sudan (HCSS); CRA; and the Board of the Special Reconstruction Fund (BSRF).

All these have not yet been established – yet most were supposed to be in place within the first month of the TGoNU, as provided in the ARCSS.

The slow progress recorded in implementing the ARCSS is one of the main causes of this return to violence. Political will has also been singled out by the JMEC as one of the key factors behind this limited implementation progress.

The fact that key signatories to the peace deal – specifically Kiir – signed the peace pact with many reservations, obviously has a bearing on his will and commitment to the agreement. This, however, does not in any way downplay the other factors contributing to the limited progress in implementing the ARCSS – notably the struggle for power and control between SPLM/A-IG and SPLM/A-IO leaders Kiir and Machar; the exclusion of other stakeholders to the conflict in the ARCSS negotiation process; and nation-building complexities that naturally face the South Sudanese, as the state is still in its formative stages with very little institutional infrastructure to anchor governance and other systems.

IV. Conclusion

This article therefore accentuates the need to have robust institutional reforms as the basis for institutional and judicial reform mechanisms to avoid replication of failure of institutional and judicial reform measures as South Sudan is still trapped in violence and political uncertainty.

South Sudan should relentlessly embark on the path of reforming structures of governance through designing institutions responsive to current demands of peace-building, reconciliation, and national cohesion.

To surmount such challenges, the inevitability of institutional reforms comes to bear since the process largely depends on the nature of government and democratic institutions in place in the country. There is a need to exert more pressure to procure workable political will to institute such reforms.

Thus, this article maintains that strengthening of institutions, as a strategy of peace-building, is most likely through implementation of various judicial reforms mechanisms. Such mechanisms should aim at confronting the past, ending injustices, fostering reconciliation, redressing the victims, ending the culture of impunity and building structures that can prevent recurrence of past injustices.

The author holds Bachelor of Laws (LLB) Degree from the University of Juba and a Master of Laws (LLM) specializing in Law, Governance and Democracy from the University of Nairobi. He an advocate before all courts and his areas of research interest are: constitutional law and human rights, access to justice and transitional justice, rule of law and good governance.

SPLM reunification: Is Taban Deng done politically in South Sudan?

By: Peter Gai Manyuon, South Sudan, MAY/08/2018, SSN;

Taban Deng Gai has been the First Vice President of South Sudan since 2016 after J-1 incident that killed thousands from both Kiir’s forces and Riek Machar’s forces.

Previously, he was the Minister of Mining and the Governor of the Unity State, a position he held before and after South Sudan’s independence in 2011 until 2013 when he was sacked by President Kiir.

On the 7th of May 2018, Taban came out with a press statement amalgamating his bodyguards or his forces to the Kiir forces claiming the reunification of the Sudan People Liberation Movement (SPLM) when in fact his closed allies were not part of the decision and many from his group are currently confused about the unfortunate decision from their boss.

It should be noted, General Taban Deng Gai is done politically in South Sudan and what he (Taban) will enjoy now and beyond is the title former First Vice President of the Republic of South Sudan, nothing more.

You can’t tell me, General Taban will be President after President Kiir or whoever will be the President in South Sudan.

Why do I say so? In fact, general Taban has got four groups of enemies in South Sudan as per politics is concerned.

The first enemy is the general population of the Country because many masses have taken him as the only obstacle to peace in the Country after the collapse of the peace agreement in 2016 July. Taban was taken as an opportunist who only wanted destruction and position, not peace.

The second enemy is Kiir’s group, because they normally say frankly, Taban is the only Nuer man more dangerous than Dr. Riek Machar in South Sudan politics and therefore, he (Taban) covered himself with the name of SPLM in opposition as the only protector in Juba and in the region but now his position and resources are in serious risks.

Don’t ask me why now but ask me after two months from now so that I will be able to give you an answer.

Furthermore, Micheal Makuei Lueth (information minister), General Kuol Manyang (defense minister) and other extremists from Kiir’s camp will eventually introduce a methodology of finishing Taban politically in SPLM since they looked at him as the person who caused the 2013 crisis.

The third enemy is Dr Riek Machar’s group, where currently I don’t see any possibility of Taban assimilating or associating himself in the Nuer-Nation politics is 1% as per now and beyond.

Grassroots Nuer population have taken Taban as an obstacle to peace since Khartoum Peace Agreement and the 2015 agreement that Taban claimed the position of First Vice President through deception.

The fourth enemy to Taban are his supporters in Juba, mainly Hotels officials, there will be instructions from Kiir soon to evacuates the hotels’ accommodations to their various homes in Juba or the States.

In this case, many will defect from the government and rejoin any rebel factions in the Country because the aims of many who are with Taban is money, nothing else.

In summary, since Taban and his group denounced being part of the SPLM in opposition, then he should be ready for serious humiliation both physical and political, and most likely he will be sacked from being the first Vice President and will not also get any position either as deputy chairman of the Party or as Secretary General as he wishes.

Taban will go home in peace after sacking from the second top office in the country and all his supporters especially those in the hotels and other cities will disintegrate and merge with other political parties in the Country.

Peter Gai Manyuon, is an author, Independent Journalist, and Columnist who has written extensively on Human Rights and Democracy in South Sudan He can be reached at southsudanjournalist@gmail.com or independentjournalistpgm.wordpress.com.

To Prof. Andrew Akon, Pres. Kiir’s doctor: Kiir a Disgrace and Sexual Abuser!!!

MAY/02/2018, SSN

Dear Professor Andrew Akon,
Head of Presidential Medical Unit, Consultant Gastroenterologist,
and Presidential Adviser, JUBA, South Sudan;

I’ve read your letter dated 30/04/2018, to the public trying to cover up the truth about the health status of President Salva Kiir.

I pity you because you’re not only writing in emotions but because you’re ignorant and blind with the bloody money you’re sucking at J1 (Presidential Palace, Juba).

You, as a trained physician and with the advances in the medical technology, I want to challenge you to take blood sample from President Kiir and blood samples from some few children of his personal guards and to expose who’s the actual parent of these children.

Do you think these tests results will not reveal that President Kiir is the biological father of more than 50% of these children?

Do you think it’s still a secret that President Kiir on many occasions sexually abused the wives of his personal guards?

Do you think it’s still a secret that President Kiir has turned J1 into a cross-sexual center?

Do you think it’s a secret that on many occasions the presidential guards have retaliated and taken revenge (sexually) in their anger on Mama Ayen, the First Lady?

Do you think it’s still a secret that president Kiir knew that Dr. Makur Koriam is the boyfriend of his wife and First lady and he, Kiir’s not able to take action?

Do you think it’s still a secret that President Kiir has on many occasions raped innocent young girls in both his office and at J1?

Do you think it’s still a secret that President Kiir has disgraced the church and sexually abused many choir girls in return for the public money he gives them?

Do you think it’s still a secret that on many occasions President Kiir has slept with many young girls in return for his approval to them of dollars?

Do you think it’s a secret that president Kiir has on many occasions slept and sexually abused his women ministers, namely Awut Deng, Jemma Nunu and Nadia Arop?

Do you think it’s still a secret that president Kiir slept with the wife of Mr. Mayen Wol, the current Undersecretary in the ministry of Petroleum?

Is it not the wife of the same Mr. Mayen Wol who has threatened president Kiir of going to the media about this sexual affair and using it as a trump card to force president Kiir to unconditionally release Mr. Mayen whom he’d jailed for allegedly stealing millions of dollars, and has now as a result made him an Undersecretary in the ministry?

Which president Kiir are you defending, you, Professor Akon, and with all the above facts, do you still want to say that president Kiir is sound and busy with the HLRF (High Level Revitalization Forum of IGAD) and the National Dialogue?

The fact remains, President Kiir is unfit and has caused more damage to the Country than any other person else. He’s a disgrace to not only his family or the Dinkas (his dominant tribes-people), but to the nation as a whole.

The people of South Sudan need Truth and Justice. I need justice for all South Sudanese and the people abused at J1.

BY: Dr. Mawien Akot, (now living in) CANADA

EDITOR’S ADDITIONAL NOTES:…………………………….

THAT THIS Professor Andrew Akon Akech, M.D, who’s head of Presidential Medical Unit in Juba, a Consultant Gastroentrologist and Presidential Adviser, in a letter:

  • Ref.RSS/OP/PMU/L1/04/18, titled: DR. MAWIEN AKOT’S IN THE CYBER SPACE,
  • was responding to Dr. Mawein Akot’s comments on the alleged deterioration of President Kiir’s health and mental capacity in a video tape posted online on April 29, 2018, and he declared that “Dr. Mawien Akot was never a physician nor has ever been associated with the healthcare of the president.”

    Prof. Andrew Akon Akech further stated that, “Records at the PMU (Presidential Medical Unit) are unequivocal: Dr. Mawien Akot has never been a full time or part-time employee of the department. It’s thus inconceivable that a practitioner in his sound mind and senses should claim having knowledge on the medical condition of a “patient” he’s never seen nor examined.

    “Dr. Mawien’s derogatory remarks could be perceived as a cabal whose intention is to gratuitously muckrake an individual or institution.”

    Dr. Mawien Akot, who said he is working as a consultant physician at the presidential medical unit said during a Facebook Live video from Canada, where he is now residing in, had declared that, “The president is not in his mental capacity, and he is not in his physical capacity to rule the country,” Mr Mawien said of President Kiir on Friday.

    “In the next one month or two months, I might be going back to Juba. I will go to my position as a consultant physician, and what I say I am the one responsible for it. Even if they will kill me, I know I will die for my country,” he said.

    “I am a Canadian trained physician. I cannot disclose the real information about somebody whether he is in sound mind or not. But what I can tell you is that the leadership in South Sudan in the next six months, you will hear a lot of things happening, without mentioning names,” he added.

    President Kiir’s spokesman Ateny Wek Ateny said in a statement to Radio Tamazuj earlier that the country’s president is in good health, pointing out that Dr Mawien was telling lies from Canada.

    “The President is fit and healthy to continue to lead this nation to normalcy, the elections and beyond,” Ateny said.

    The presidential spokesman said Mawien Akot has never attended to President Kiir’s health, pointing out that Mawien was not part of the presidential health unit. Ateny said Dr. Mawien was working only at Juba Teaching Hospital.

    Latest Breaking News: Why Army Chief of Staff, Ajongo, was killed by Pres. Kiir…

    APR/21/2018, SSN;

    It’s now emerging from various sources inside the Juba government that it was President Salva Kiir and others who decidedly conspired to assassinate by poisoning the SPLA Chief of General Staff, Lt.Gen. James Ajongo Mawut, who supposedly was announced to have died in Cairo, Egypt, last Friday, 20, 2018.

    However, his death is shrouded in mysterious circumstances and even the exact cause of death.

    Reportedly, during an important meeting at Bilpham, the SPLA Headquarters, that was attending by the President, Salva Kiir, the Defense minister, Kuol Mayang, the ruthless Chief of National Security, Akol Kur and some member(s) of the Jieng Council of Elders, the President ordered the Chief of Staff to travel to an unnamed country to purchase and bring CHEMICAL WEAPONS FOR USE IN UPPER NILE REGION against the opposition forces fighting against his Kiir regime.

    Further, the Chief of Staff was informed that according to prevailing protocol, his presence and signature were necessary and important during the purchase and transportation of these chemical weapons, which are actually banned by the international community.

    During the meeting, all the Army commanders in attendance and the Chief of Staff and his military commanders strenuously objected to the use of these banned weapons in the wars in South Sudan.

    After this, it’s reported that the angered dictator, President Kiir ordered the Chief of Staff and his officer commanders to exit from the meeting, whence thereafter the president and his inner group brought forward the plan to dismiss the Chief of Staff but his co-conspirators seriously objected to the idea.

    Their reason was that this will seriously create a situation similar to that of General Paul Malong, who, after his dismissal as Chief of Staff, created a serious crisis that eventually ended with Gen. Paul Malong creating his own rebel group against Pres. Kiir.

    Hence, the President didn’t proceed with idea of dismissal of Gen. Ajongo, instead, the next plan of the president and his conspirators was to kill Gen. Ajongo by poisoning.

    Then, it’s reportedly said that the body was sent on a plane to Egypt where he was later officially declared as died.

    Mawut, who joined the SPLM/A, southern Sudanese rebel movement in 1983, became army chief of staff in May 2017 after Gen. Paul Malong was sacked.

    Is IGAD complicit in the confinement of Dr. Riek Machar?

    By Duop Chak Wuol, South Sudanese, APR/05/2018, SSN;

    In most organized societies, keeping someone in detainment who did not commit any crime is a criminal act punishable by law. However, in its 61st extra-ordinary session held on March 26, 2018 in Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) released a communiqué stating that it decided to lift the house arrest it imposed on the leader of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army-In Opposition (SPLM/A-IO), Dr. Riek Machar.

    In addition, IGAD demanded that the rebel leader must first denounce violence before it can decide where he should be relocated. The East African regional bloc also asserted that Machar must only be transferred to a country without borders with South Sudan and that a group of designated IGAD ministers will propose and decide where the armed opposition leader will be moved to.

    If such a resolution sounds like a conspiracy to you, then you are probably correct, because it fits within the meaning of a carefully-orchestrated political plot.

    The statement was not only unreasonable — it was, in fact, a glorification of Salva Kiir’s tyranny and an insult to those who lost their lives in the civil war.

    IGAD’s decision to lift Machar’s unlawful imprisonment is a welcome move. I strongly believe that placing Machar under house arrest was questionable. By signaling the release of the armed opposition leader, IGAD identified its blunder for the first time.

    However, I wonder why the regional bloc wants the SPLM-IO leader to be relocated to a different nation instead of allowing him to go to any place of his own choosing?

    There is absolutely no rational explanation as to why a group of IGAD leaders united themselves to keep an innocent man in confinement against his will when, meanwhile, Kiir committed massacres and enjoyed freedom in Juba.

    IGAD leaders should explain to the people of South Sudan why they are willing to punish Machar while simultaneously failing to bring the war to an end. The bloc should also explain why it is interested in preventing Dr. Machar from participating in South Sudan’s politics.

    IGAD’s main goal is to work for a peaceful solution to the ongoing civil war, instead of choosing a seemingly one-sided approach.

    If the bloc does not change its current stance on South Sudan’s situation, then I suggest that the African Union (AU) and the international community take over the peace process.

    The South Sudanese are also interested in knowing whether IGAD is merely an entity for East African leaders to protect themselves or is instead interested in solving regional issues.

    It is worth noting that South Sudan’s conflict has become a lucrative business for some countries. What these nations need to know is that tens of thousands of people have died because of Kiir’s political madness.

    Protecting Kiir by passing pro-Juba resolutions will not only escalate the war but will increase South Sudanese anger towards Kiir.

    The Republic of South Sudan should not be a testing ground where civil liberties and human rights are traded for money, regional interests, or hidden intentions.

    If IGAD is working for the goodness of the people of South Sudan, then it must not justify Salva Kiir’s ruthlessness by coming up with motions that are contrary to its own vision.

    The March 26th decision by IGAD to transfer the rebel leader to a country outside of the East African region only strengthens the suspicion already present in the minds of millions of South Sudanese that the regional bloc is marred by bribery, illicit deals, greed, and conspiracy.

    Is the confinement of Riek Machar an act of complicity? What crime did Riek Machar commit against Uganda, Kenya, Sudan, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, or Eritrea?

    Is IGAD conducting itself impartially in relation to South Sudan’s peace process? Why are the leaders of the East African regional bloc seemingly working in the best interest of Juba’s atrocious regime?

    What exactly is IGAD trying to tell the people of South Sudan and the international community? Is IGAD trying to legitimize the regime of a murderous tyrant?

    Dr. Machar did not commit a single crime against any IGAD member state. If the bloc’s resolution is not an act of collusion, then I am not sure what it really means.

    I agree with the idea that leaders should denounce and condemn violence. However, the notion that Machar is the only leader who should denounce violence is rather fallacious. The conditions set by IGAD are absurd.

    Transferring Machar from South Africa to another country should not be called a release — it is, in fact, an extension of his current confinement. The reality is that the bloc is not ready to release the rebel leader.

    If IGAD is impartial in its quest for peace, then it must ask all South Sudanese leaders, including Kiir, to denounce violence.

    IGAD has been somewhat instrumental before, but the people of South Sudan know that most of its decisions have been anti-SPLM/A-IO.

    I am not quite sure whether this apparent help-Kiir-at-all-costs policy is influenced by Kiir’s ally, Yoweri Museveni.

    There is nothing wrong with supporting your friend or counterpart, but giving your full support to a leader who slaughtered tens of thousands of his fellow citizens without any good reason is rather reprehensible.

    The ethnic carnage Kiir carried out in December 2013 in Juba was so brutal that only a leader who does not care about the suffering of South Sudanese would support it.

    The leaders of IGAD should work towards finding a lasting solution to the conflict and not allow themselves to be used by Kiir. Salva Kiir is a cunning person.

    He used the 2013 fake coup as evidence to purge Machar and other South Sudanese leaders who he saw as a threat to his leadership. There was no such a thing as a coup in this instance, contrary to what Kiir would like everyone to believe.

    The real coup was the bogus one he orchestrated in Kampala with the help of Museveni.

    It is good to remind people that in 2016, when the SPLM-IO leader was forced to go to Juba to implement the August 2015 imposed peace agreement, he was nearly killed.

    What I find ironic about this specific narrative is that when Machar survived the July 2016 assassination attempt and fled Juba, there was not a single IGAD leader who came out and criticized Salva Kiir.

    One would argue that the only thing the East African regional bloc wants is to keep Kiir in power, regardless of what the people of South Sudan want.

    Peace is better than war. I am certain that the South Sudanese want peace to return to their country. IGAD must know that peace will not be achieved by imposing anti-peace resolutions on the SPLM/A-IO leader.

    Kiir is the one who started the current civil war and Machar is the victim.

    Thus, for the bloc to insist that Dr. Machar should continue living in exile instead of completely lifting his house arrest to live a free life is not a plausible decision the armed opposition should endorse.

    The bloc must choose between keeping its tainted image, or else risk being declared by the South Sudanese as “not a credible, neutral, or impartial entity.”

    Complicit or not, the people of South Sudan are fully aware of IGAD’s pro-Juba stance.

    The author can be reached at duop282@gmail.com.

    To IGAD, AU and Troika: Time to Call off Addis Peace Talks & Declare Regime Change in South Sudan

    By: J. Nguen, Commentator, analyst & advocate, FEB/14/2018, SSN;

    The question today isn’t whether the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCISS) be revived or not, but rather, it’s whether those who invariably refuses the resuscitation of the agreement must be punished and held to account.

    We know for certain that the ARCISS had collapsed on July 8th, 2016, when Dr. Riek Machar was violently pushed out of Juba in what many analysts characterized as a “well-organized assassination” attempt on the life of a man who came to Juba to implement the peace agreement.

    We also know that the regional (IGAD) and the USA Administration under former president, Barack Hussein Obama, sided with President Kiir’s regime and placed Dr. Machar under house arrest in South Africa. These are tried cases, but hit dead end.

    As a matter of fact, these desperate moves were falsely intended as shortcuts to end the contradictions and bring unfounded peace in South Sudan.

    Without any doubt, these fraudulent efforts failed in earnest. Instead, suffering worsened and civil war spread like a wildfire across South Sudan.

    In addition, for a year and half, President Kiir was licenced to rein terror on the lives of innocent South Sudanese –free hand; while the world watched on in deafening silence with no condemnations even on moral ground.

    Uganda’s President Y. K. Museveni went as far as congratulating Salva Kiir for killing innocent South Sudanese. What a world!

    Because of these hopeless contradictions, thousands of innocent of South Sudanese died in the mix. And this is tragic when a rogue regime is unleashed and left unchecked.

    In this regard, Salva Kiir’s regime went on rampage, murdering, raping, displacing and destroying innocent South Sudanese’s lives and properties in this unscrupulous world of paradoxes.

    After a year of extreme bloodshed, when no news was a good news, when facts there were news of mass murders, raping, displacement and destruction of properties in South Sudan. When hope was so far and beyond reach.

    Then, by default, President Donald J. Trump came to power in 2017 in US. Remarkably, President Trump saw the appalling flights of innocent souls in South Sudanese, in an unforgiving million ways and in unforgivable world.

    Then, President Trump, moved on moral grounds, sent his top ambassador, Nikkie Haley to south Sudan to see developments, first hand. Amb. Haley was so disgusted and appalled by the flights of decomposing South Sudanese in IDP camps inside the country and in the refugee camps in the neighboring countries.

    Like any sane and moral human being, Haley was taken aback by the narrated stories and experiences shared by the victims concerning Salva Kiir’s “scorched earth policy” of ethnic cleansing on all tribes in South Sudan with the exception of Dinka, where Kiir belongs.

    For Trump’s administration, this experience revealed the ugly side of Kiir’s regime, and the fact that Kiir doesn’t care about the life and suffering of South Sudanese. This revelation changed the course of President Trump’s administration and its approach toward the civil war in South Sudan.

    As a result, President Trump through Amb. Haley, endorsed the resuscitation of the collapsed Peace Agreement in South Sudan in the name of High Level Revitalization Forum under IGAD.

    As a result, on the 21st of December 2017, the Cessation of Hostility and unfettered Humanitarian Access Agreement was signed in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. However, before ink went dry, President Kiir violated the agreement by sending his lieutenants and First Vice President, Taban Deng Gai on offensive in Upper Nile, Unity and Jonglei States.

    As a result, thousands of civilians were displaced. And as I write, this violation continues, which in many ways showcase that Kiir and his lieutenants in crime can never be persuaded peacefully.

    Despite Kiir’s intransigence, on February 5th, 2018, the High Level Revitalization Forum begun. The aim of the talks is to ensure that peace returns and prevails in South Sudan so suffering of people ends.

    However, because President Kiir is so removed from the reality, so stubborn, and the fact that he does not care and fear no one, his troops continued to violate the Cessation of Hostility and restricted humanitarian access to the needy.

    Not only that, the regime has arrogantly refused to follow through with the rules of the talks, by overcrowding the venue with un-commissioned personalities just to show defiance and arrogance.

    To make matters worse, Kiir gave a middle finger to the IGAD, African Union, EU and Troika by refusing to sign the Declaration of Principles (DoP) for the talks.

    Kiir’s delegation refused to sign the DoP on the ground that article 28 on the DoP, which states that “punitive measures” be taken against anyone found to be obstructing the implementation of the peace agreement, is unnecessary and not needed.

    In this regard, in my view, this is a fine and explicit defiance and test case for IGAD, AU and the Troika countries. It’s also a serious indication that Salva Kiir is not committed to any peaceful political settlement aimed to end South Sudan’s conflict.

    Furthermore, the regime has today sentenced Mr. James Gatdet Dak, former spokesman of Dr. Riek Machar to 20 years life in prison and death by hanging. Note, this is happening while the region and the world is searching for peace to return to South Sudan.

    Without any doubt, these undertakings by Salva Kiir are aimed to derail any chance for peace in South Sudan. Salva Kiir rendered peace talks underway in Ethiopia irrelevant and useless.

    The question now is, why do we bother for something considered dead on arrival by one party to the conflict? Is this not waste of time and of scarce resources?

    In my honest opinion, moving forward with High Level Revitalization Forum is irrelevant, at this point. Therefore, what must be done moving forward, and to make sure that Salva Kiir listen, is a declaration of regime change agenda.

    The prospect of the High Level Revitalization Forum succeeding is highly minimal and limited. Salva Kiir’s regime has made it very difficult and revealed that he will not respect it.

    With all these signs written on the wall, it’s time for the world at large to change course and abandon this delusional view that Salva Kiir and cohorts might change their minds.

    President Kiir believes in military Solution and will not change his mind any time soon, comes rain or sunshine.

    As such, I proposed the following grand strategies and options to achieve desirable peace and positive outcomes for conflict in South Sudan:

    1. That IGAD, AU, European Union and the Troika countries should immediately suspend peace talks in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. It’s rather useless to force a donkey to drink when all the indications showed his/her unwillingness.

    2. That Troika countries, European Union and the African Union must convene an urgent meeting of “coalition willing” with the Islamic Republic of Sudan, and requests the Khartoum authorities to immediately suspend transportation of South Sudan’s crude oil through its territories. In return, the Troika countries, EU, IGAD and the African Union will divert all the necessary aid.

    3. That IGAD, EU, AU and the Troika countries must immediately impose more targeted individual sanctions and travel ban on South Sudan government officials including President Salva Kiir himself and First Vice President Taban Deng.

    4. That IGAD, European Union, African Union and the Troika countries must suspend all diplomatic ties with Juba immediately.

    5. That Troika countries, EU, IGAD and the AU must immediately impose blanket armed embargo on the Government of South Sudan and suspend all financial support both military and bilateral cooperation with any Eastern and Northern Africa country found to be supporting or colluding with Salva Kiir regime, even remotely.

    6. That Troika countries, EU, AU and the IGAD must overwhelmingly support military “regime change” as the only option to depose Kiir regime from power.

    These must be the options to walk away with. Because, under the current political configuration in South Sudan, the region’s stability is under serious threat. Under Salva Kiir’s regime, the region is unlikely to be stable.

    Evidently, South Sudan is currently a hotbed for the Al-Shahab’s financiers. Secondly, South Sudan Government is harboring and supporting Ethiopian and the Sudanese negative forces -the rebel groups.

    Therefore, with these indisputable facts, it’s imperative to note that “REGIME CHANGE” in South Sudan is ONLY the best option. It will bring needed peace in South Sudan and stability to the region.

    J. Nguen is a South Sudanese political commentator, analyst and advocate living aboard. He can be reached at jamesnguen@gmail.com

    The facade of the International Community in South Sudan

    BY: ELHAG PAUL, South Sudan, JAN/25/2018, SSN;

    At long last the SPLM/A in its different guises together with its off-shoots have called the bluff of the international community. For four years now the international community’s handling of the peace talks and implementation of ARCSS leaves a lot to be desired. During this period, they have left footprints of bias everywhere.

    Just before the start of the revitalization talks, the international community issued strong letters sending a message that this time round they meant business. This raised the hopes of South Sudanese and for the first time the people appeared to give the international community the benefit of doubt about their conduct of the talks.

    Ms Rebecca Nyandeng Garang, the widow of the late leader of SPLM/A, Dr John Garang, captured the positive feeling of the South Sudanese people in her interview with Mr John Tanza on Voice of America on 2nd January 2018.

    Nyandeng expressed optimism about the revitalization talks based on the assurance she received from IGAD. This is what she said, “And I was happy to hear that IGAD said they were speaking in the same voice. Because IGAD in the other hand also have to unite their ranks and file.”

    Asked by Tanza, why she was saying so, Nyandeng explained, “I say so because IGAD was divided. From 2013, even during the 2017 there are some leaders in IGAD who are supporting leaders instead of supporting people of South Sudan.”

    Given the numerous violations of the Cessation of Hostilities agreement signed on 21st December 2017 by the government, the international community initially went mute only to issue the usual statement loaded with condemnation wrapped up with moral equivalence.

    Many people have been asking what the international community is doing given their latest tough statement. Nobody has the answer and unfortunately the hopes of the people have once again been dashed. Nyandeng must be very disappointed.

    The South Sudanese people have for over a year now lost faith in the international community following the naked violation of ARCSS by President Salva Kiir’s regime and its subsequent silence followed by their endorsement of General Taban Deng Gai as a replacement to Dr Riek Machar.

    Why the international community as guarantors of the agreement chose to ignore Juba regime’s destruction of the agreement remains to be explained? It is something that makes many people to date to scratch their heads.

    Worse still, they have gone on to isolate and confine the victim, Dr Riek Machar, the leader of SPLM/A-IO in South Africa. Machar has his own blemishes, but to put the blame of what happened in Juba in July 2016 on him to the extent of victimising him is as unfair and unethical as to reveal the internecine bias by international community against an innocent person exercising his birthright in his country’s affairs.

    Machar’s isolation has proven one thing beyond doubt. His absence has not brought any peace. The war has continued unabated and this should be a reason enough to exonerate this innocent man and release him from the crude illegal confinement in South Africa.

    Democracy demands that there must be a level field for all to compete for the highest office in the land. At the moment that is not the case in South Sudan. An innocent man is illegally held against his wishes in foreign land while the culprit is allowed to roam freely mismanaging the country.

    This culprit, the trouble maker is in Juba. He is called President Salva Kiir, an extremely dangerous tribalist-psychopath who has already committed ethnic cleansing and continues to pose serious risk to himself, the people of South Sudan and South Sudan the country itself.

    The facade of the international community in relation to peace in South Sudan dressed up in statements like, “We care for the people of South Sudan”, “There will be consequences”.. etc is unravelling before the eyes of the people of South Sudan and the world.

    The revitalisation of ARCSS was meant to be a serious business. Though speeches were delivered by Troika, African Union and IGAD as mentioned above, only for the regime in Juba to instantly rubbish it by violating the CoH openly without any consequences as promised.

      The international community has lost credibility in South Sudan.

    The majority of South Sudanese now wrongly or rightly believe that the international community including IGAD are conniving with the government of South Sudan against them. In a sense, the international community is viewed as part of the problem and as such they are perceived as allies of the Juba regime.

    Conversations in South Sudanese circles nowaday is riddled with expressions like, “We are fighting the whole world.” This collective belief can be seen from the outcome of the National Dialogue consultations results held in Uganda and Kenya.

    Please see, ’19 Things Uganda Refugees Want: An Official Summary by the National Dialogue of South Sudan’ (https://www.ssnationaldialogue.org/press-release/uganda-refugees-want-change/) and ‘Official summary of South Sudan National Dialogue in Kenya consultation in Nairobi, Kenya.’ (https://www.ssnationaldialogue.org/wp-content/uploads/Nairobi-Consultation.pdf)

    Gatluke Reat in his letter to Troika titled, ‘What is the difference between Hitler’s Nazi regime and Troika today in South Sudan’ compares the activity of the International Community in South Sudan with the appeasement of the Nazi regime in Germany by some European countries in 1940s.

    Although South Sudanese understand that the reigning world ideology of globalisation has made everything to be seen in monetary terms including human life, they can not understand why lessons learnt from the holocaust are ignored. It is clear that the cost of appeasing totalitarian regimes eventually out ways the benefits.

    Please see (https://africanspress.org/2018/01/02/what-is-the-difference-between-hitlers-nazi-regime-and-troika-today-in-south-sudan/).

    Boumkuoth Gatkouth writing a week after the signing of the Cessation of Hostilities agreement (CoH) questions whether the process would be fruitful. He highlighted the continuous silences of IGAD on the violation carried out by the government.

    In his article, ‘The IGAD-led High Level Revitalisation Forum & Its Prospects’ (http://www.southsudannation.com/the-igad-led-high-level-revitalization-forum-its-prospects/), Gatkouth concludes that IGAD is not neutral and can not be trusted.

    Why is the international community losing credibility in South Sudan? Primarily there are three drivers. These are: direct intervention of IGAD member countries in support of the Juba regime; the application of policy of moral equivalence by Troika; and the failure of African Union to protect the “African person”.

    When the conflict broke out on 15th December 2013 with President Kiir targeting and cleansing the Nuer people around Juba, Uganda joined the Juba regime on pretext of stopping genocide.

    The reality on the ground was completely different. It was the government of President Kiir that was committing genocide on the Nuer people. How could Uganda then stop genocide by aiding the genocidaire? This is a question that Uganda needs to answer.

    Uganda even sent its jet fighters to bomb the Nuer who were fighting to defend themselves from the Juba regime in Bor using internationally banned cluster bombs.

    In addition to this President Yoweri Museveni visited Juba on 30th December 2013 and said, “We gave him [Machar] four days [agreed that] if he doesn’t [comply with the agreement], then we shall have to go after him. That is what we agreed on.”

    Please see, ‘South Sudan – Uganda’s Museveni threatens Machar over ceasefire’ (https://africasustainableconservation.com/2013/12/30/south-sudan-ugandas-museveni-threatens-machar-over-ceasefire/).

    This declaration by President Museveni on behalf of the regional leaders clearly proves that the region sided with the Juba regime. This explains the fact that none of the countries in region condemned the ethnic cleansing of the Nuer by the Juba regime. The crime was hashed up.

    The other country in the region openly siding with the Juba regime is Kenya. Both Uganda and Kenya to date often allow Juba regime’s security agents to kidnap South Sudanese exiles in their countries.

    Now all these countries are members of IGAD and given their collusion with the Juba regime, is it any wonder why peace is difficult to achieve. We move on to the Troika.

    When President Kiir unleashed his tribal militia known as Mathiang Anyoor on 15th December 2013 to cleanse the Nuer in Juba, everyone who was in Juba was horrifically shocked.

    Hilda Johnson, former Special Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nation in Juba at the time records her observations of the grave crime in her book, ‘South Sudan The Untold Story: From independence to civil war’, on chapter 6 under the subtitle, The Nightmare. The Nuer cleansing in Juba was witnessed by the whole world.

    When I talk about the world, I mean all the representatives of the foreign governments in Juba witnessed it. In spite of this fact, the world outside South Sudan was kept uninformed and as a result no country to date has condemned Juba for the grave crimes it committed. The UN and the Troika countries kept their mouths zipped up.

    Following the ethnic cleansing of the Nuer and prior to April 2014, the international community did not condemn the grave crimes against humanity committed by the regime.

    However in April 2014 when the Nuer wrongly and unacceptably retaliated by killing people in Bentiu, Akobo and Bor, the international community swiftly reacted by rightly condemning the opposition for these heinous acts.

    Unfortunately from then on it embarked on a policy of moral equivalence. If the Juba regime commits a crime, the international community will wait until the opposition retaliates and thereafter it will condemn both sides equally.

    A good example of their application of this policy is in the areas of sanctions and press releases. All the so called targeted sanctions in South Sudan have been equally applied on the warring parties.

    Surely, this can not be right. In any conflict there must be a culprit and in the case of South Sudan the Juba regime without doubt is, yet it has never been held responsible.

    Eric Reeves, senior fellow at Harvard University, elsewhere argues that the balancing of moral equities plays into the hands of the aggressors.

    I agree with Reeves’ argument because in my view it psychologically distributes the guilt to all the actors which in a sense absolves the wrong doer from acknowledging the reality of his/her actions and the responsibility that accompanies it.

    Further, this policy has the potential to fuel the conflict and keep it going endlessly as both sides get corrupted with time and believe that their position is right.

    The problem with this policy is that it suggests those applying it do not have a moral position/responsibility on the issue at hand. But is this really true? What has happened to the values flowing from the instruments of the various resolutions of the United Nations?

    What has happened to the Western values of justice and fairness? Perhaps South Sudanese are not perceived as humans enough and thus do not deserve to be treated as such.

    The history of European interaction with Africa speaks for itself. Its vestiges may be what are in the policy of moral equivalence applied to South Sudan. Here is where African Union should have been of help, but perhaps it may have moved on and forgotten about the value of the “African person”.

    The report of African Union Commission of enquiry in South Sudan (http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/auciss.final.report.pdf) which went through sieving many times before its release clearly captures what happened in Juba in December 2013.

    African Union as the body with power over IGAD has been expected to play supervisory role to make sure that the issues presented in the report are addressed adequately to provide lessons for the future in relation to the continent.

    Thus for the sake of the “African person” (the civilians, women, children and old persons being raped and killed) it should have exercised maximum supervision on the conduct of the peace talks and the implementation of August 2015 Agreement on Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS).

    So far the indication is that it did nothing. So, when the Juba regime violently destroyed the peace agreement by turning the city into a battle field in July 2016 forcing the former Vice President Dr Riek Machar out of the country into the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudanese expected the guarantors of the deal and the international community including African Union to hold the regime to account.

    Surprisingly, like in 2013 they did not condemn the regime but went on to reward it for violating the agreement. Without exception they endorsed President Kiir’s blatant decision to install Mr Taban Deng Gai as vice president.

    All these were done in a lightning speed without any enquiries on the fact that the population of Juba were criminally exposed to serious danger by the government.

    Unlike IGAD, the West African regional body ECOWAS regardless of the interest of the member states seems more competent in handling political conflicts efficiently in that part of Africa. When former President of Gambia Yahya Jammeh was voted out in December 2016, he attempted to stick to power by depriving the winner Adama Barrow.

    ECOWAS acted swiftly to protect democracy. It mobilised a regional force within a short time which saw Jammeh off with no violence, and the winner Adama Barrow installed in power. Well done ECOWAS for standing up for democracy in Africa. You make the average African person proud.

    So South Sudanese for the last four years have been watching some of the regional countries openly supporting the regime that is tormenting them; Troika’s application of equal moral equities and the failure of the African Union to protect them helplessly while their suffering continues.

    Now they are making sense of their experiences and translating that into a belief that they are on their own. Are they not right?

    Whether the talks in IGAD succeed or not, it does not matter. South Sudanese are beginning to discuss ways of finding their own solution to their problem. That by default is empowerment.
    [Truth hurts but it is also liberating]

    Elhag Paul
    elhagpaul@aol.com
    @elhagpaul

    The Opposition in South Sudan must either self-finance or perish!

    BY: Samuel Atabi, South Sudanese, JAN/21/2018, SSN;

    The African anti-colonial and independence movements fighting in 1950’s and 60’s were a lucky lot. There was a glut of military, financial and political support, coming mainly from the anti-capitalist socialist countries led by the Soviet Union and China.

    Most of the post-independence African rebel groups were/are not that lucky; they had to struggle to get any support, not only from fellow Africans but also from beyond.

    Among the post-independent strugglers for self-determination could be found our very own Anya-Nya, the separatist group that was first led by the Catholic priest, Fr. Saturnino Ohure.

    The Anya-Nya had an uphill task of getting both recognition and funding. It was shunned by the newly-minted members of the Organization of African Union (OAU).

    The OAU was against any group which sought to change the borders of the newly independent nations on the continent, as bequeathed by the departing colonial powers.

    Further afield, the Anya-Nya message of separation from an Arab country elicited no sympathy: the national interests of the Western nations dictated them to side with the Arab north as petrodollars from the Arab Middle East were flowing into their financial market and economy.

    The socialist nations, on the other hand, steered clear of the separatists as they negatively reminded them of their own separatist agitators back home (for example among the Tibetans and the Caucuses region).

    Deserted by both fellow Africans and the world, the Anya-Nya was left to devise its own means to finance the war effort. It embraced trading with other ‘pariah’ movements like the Simba, a Katangese separatist outfit that was equally shunned by the world.

    The Anya-Nya was able to batter ivory from our elephants, for guns and bullets which were supplied by the Simba.

    But, the fortune of the Anya-Nya never remained bleak for ever, it changed dramatically, when, following the 1967 war between the Israelis and the Arabs, the former opted to give limited but crucial training support to the Anya-Nya.

    Later, this limited relationship threatened to blossom into a very dangerous level (from the point of view of Khartoum) when General Idi Amin overthrew the government of Milton Obote of Uganda in 1971.

    Obote was a fanatical believer in Pan Africanism, an OAU ideology that underpinned the inviolability of the colonial borders referred to above. He used to arrest and jail leaders of the Anya-Nya whenever they crossed into Uganda.

    Amin was sympathetic to the cause of the Southern Sudanese and was therefore suspected of giving military support to the Anya-Nya. Amin was also very friendly to the Israeli.

    Thus suddenly, the future looked bright for the Anya-Nya.

    But then, the leaders in Khartoum saw this too and, to preempt any escalation in the war, it decided to make peace with the Anya-Nya. In 1972, the two sides to the war signed a peace agreement also known as Addis Ababa peace Agreement.

    This proves one of the usually overlooked points about the leaders in Khartoum: they have the ability to recognize ripe moments for peace.

    In 2005, they saw the writings on the wall and sued for peace, again.

    The Addis Ababa agreement was shuttered in 1983, when the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (the SPLA) was launched to fight the Khartoum government. Like the Anya-Nya, the SPLA had no ready support on the continent, again for the same reasons.

    However, this time, the Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie, who had overseen the Addis Ababa peace Agreement, was already deposed, and a ‘socialist’ government of Mengistu Haile Mariam was in-charge of the country.

    At the time, Mengistu was embroiled in a war against a separatist insurgency in Eritrea. Ethiopia had suspected that Sudan was supporting the Eritrean insurgents.

    This suspicion made it easier for Mengistu to support the SPLA but not before the SPLA publicly renounced separatism as its war objective. The Ethiopian support probably comprised mainly of territorial sanctuary, political cover and military training.

    The real major military support for the SPLA is reputed to have come from the late Libyan leader, Col. Muamar Gaddafi.

    The Libyan leader was known to be a generous military supporter of insurgent groups, particularly those fighting what he termed as imperialists.

    He was accused of being the supporter of the Irish Republican Army, the IRA, which was battling the British in Northern Ireland to force the unity of the two Irelands.

    In 1986, Gaddafi was reported to have supplied the IRA with a massive 105 tons of weaponry. On the ship which ferried the weaponry to Ireland were 40 general-purpose machine guns, 1,200 AK-47s, 130 revolvers, over a million rounds of ammunition, 20 heavy Russian-made DHSK machine guns, RPG-7 rocket launchers with grenades and a number of SAM-7 missiles (1).

    The SPLA is believed to have received a similar amount of weaponry, from Gaddafi.

    Financial support to the SPLA was and has been shrouded in secrecy, but is thought to have come from various sources including business adventurers, Arab sheiks, sales of illegal commodities (timber, gold, and diamonds) resale of relief goods and others.

    Despite this support, the SPLA was unable, on its own, to force the Khartoum government to a negotiating table. This was basically because the SPLA system had lacked a coherent ideology and military discipline and was blighted by corruption.

    The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the SPLA and Khartoum was a result of pressure exerted on the latter by the US and the wider international community.

    The corruption, indiscipline and lack of clear vision, among the ruling SPLA leaders, of how to develop the new nation of South Sudan, have led directly to the present internecine civil war among the people of South Sudan.

    Since 2005, the SPLA leaders have pillaged and stolen from the state coffers with abandon and impunity. Many of the SPLA leaders both in government now and those in the exile are very rich people.

    Some of these leaders have formed armed groups to fight their erstwhile colleagues in Juba.

    Like the Anya-Nya and the SPLA before them, these myriads of small armies cannot attract external military and financial support. Yet, their leaders are not prepared to fund these guerilla armies using some parts of the stolen monies.

    The autocratic government in Juba, on the other hand, now has complete freedom to plunder the oil dollars and spend them freely to obtain weapons.

    The government is also aware of the dire financial strait the opposition is in and has now come up with a strategy to sit them out by refusing to accept meaningful dialogues.

    This government strategy of attrition has been given a boost by the attitude and the stance of the Mediator (IGAD, Troika, and AU).

    It is now obvious that by leaning hard on Sudan, a country originally suspected of supporting the SPLA-in-Opposition (SPLA-IO), members of the Mediation have effectively cut weapon and ammunition supply to the rebel.

    Yet, the Mediator has failed to curtail supplies of arms to the government, which should have provided a balanced approach.

    Furthermore, the Mediator has contrived to decapitate the opposition leadership when they decided to put the leader of the SPLA-IO under house arrest, far away from the theatre of the war.

    Again, there is no an equivalent action taken by the Mediator against the leadership of the government in Juba.

    When these moves are combined with unfair mediation practices shown by IGAD (e.g. the government also has a seat on mediating team), one can very clearly see the overall game plan: that of strengthening military, political and diplomatic position of the government to defeat the outgunned, poorly funded and leaderless opposition.

    The shortsightedness of these maneuvers by the government and its supporters in the mediation team is obvious.

    It is not useful to rehearse here what the deleterious consequences of these moves are, but it is important to reiterate the legendary resourcefulness of South Sudanese freedom fighters to overcome adversities as happened in the past.

    The emerging new leaders of the freedom movements will turn these adversities into a virtue.

    The protracted nature of the next phase of war, wrought about by the government and the mediator machinations, will help to entrench the ‘hatred’ of the oppressive system and of those implementing it among the fighters and the wider population.

    This hatred will provide the ideological underpinning necessary for perseverance in the fight against the enemy until victory is achieved.

    Additionally, the absence of any external support to the opposition will provide the incentive to develop a home-grown means of generating funds to buy the necessary equipment and armament to prosecute the protracted struggle.

    The opposition will sell gold, diamond, and even uranium, to all comers for arms or cash. In extreme cases, the opposition and their followers will change their Christian faith for Islamic one if that will bring them freedom.

    This is not as outlandish as it sounds because those ruling in some neighboring countries did convert to Islam in order to obtain military support.

    Historically, thousands of Jews, when being persecuted by the Nazi, had to accept Christian baptism to gain freedom (2). One cannot blame them for this.

    It is not yet too late to solve the South Sudanese problem. END

    References: 1. Ed Moloney (2002). A Secret History of the IRA. Penguin.
    2. Giles MacDonogh (2009) 1938 Hitler’s Gamble. Constable.

    Predicting South Sudan Future under Taban Deng and Pres. Kiir and problems to come

    BY: DANIEL JUOL NHOMNGEK, KAMPALA, UGANDA, JAN/04/2018, SSN;

    Perhaps, it may be important to begin this article with the quote from Margaret Thatcher, the former British Prime Minister and stateswoman who was once stated that, “power does not corrupt men, fools, however, if they get into a position of power, corrupt power.”

    This is exactly what is going in South Sudan, which is the subject of this article.

    I cannot say that those who are in power in South Sudan are fools but if they corrupt power as they are doing now then they fit to be described as such.

    This article therefore attempts to predict what will happen in some time to come in South Sudan if South Sudan continues to be run by both Taban Deng and President Kiir Mayardit.

    In particular, the way Taban Deng is dealing with and relating to the president of South Sudan leaves much to be desired. Taban’s dealing with the President now appears that he has ulterior motive and there is likelihood that it will be too late before South Sudanese discover that Taban has already taken power.

    Taban is going to take power in three or so years to come because he is now busy to apply the principles found in the Book entitled 48 laws of power.

    In that Book, Robert Greene and Joost Elffer discuss the principles one must follow if he or she is to get into power. Some of those principles are—
    ….first, Never outshine the master;
    ….second, always make those above you comfortably superior;
    ….third, when you show yourself to the world and display your talents, you naturally stir all kinds of resentment, envy…
    ….Fourth, never put too much trust in friends,
    ….fifth, learn how to use enemies;
    ….sixth, conceal your intentions;
    ….seventh, always say less than necessary; eighth, make other people come to you—use bait if necessary;
    ….ninth, win through your actions, never through argument;
    ….tenth, learn to keep people dependent on you;
    ….eleventh, use selective honesty and generosity to disarm your victim; etc”.

    The above principles are the ones Taban Deng is using in South sudan in an attempt to get power. Taban is trying to make President Kiir as much comfortable superior as possible. This implies in practice Taban has to be snobbish, sheepish and submissive in serving the president.

    In other words, Taban does not want to question anything or say anything that is contrary to his boss, the president’s views as he always pampers him with all kinds of words such as “my president”.

    This is despite the fact that though Taban may know that things are not alright in South Sudan, he does not want to question anything or say anything that the president may not like because his mission is not to serve South Sudanese but to be closer to the president as much as possible with the hope that he will get power with time, which is shown by steps he took so far to come closer to power.

    The first step for Taban to power was (as majority of South Sudanese know), was overthrowing Dr. Machar through crookec means in 2016 hence throwing the country into further turmoil.

    Therefore Dr. Riek was the first big causality of Taban’s quest for power even though many fundamentalists in the SPLM have not yet understood and what the target of Taban Deng Gai is.

    The ultimate target of Taban is to become the president of South Sudan whether by fair or crooked means. Hence, Taban is using all means available within his reach to get to power.

    In fact, I have described SPLM supporters above as fundamentalists because they do not accommodate opposing views contrary to what they believe in and any person who holds contrary views is branded as a rebel. This provides cultural medium to the maneuvering techniques of Taban to power since he is an appropriate candidate for SPLM party that likes praises and flatters.

    The above observation in relation to Taban does not take a person much time to make as any person who might have been keenly observing South Sudanese unfolding problems since 2013 to date would have discovered that Taban is at the centre of the entire crisis that befell the country.

    For instance, the study of the root causes of the present war pins Taban down as he is a major player in the outbreak of the war.

    The actions of Taban has shown that he has been planning how to get to power and in order to do that he has to find a way of passing his superiors such as Dr. Riek Machar. Thus, the first plan for him was how to get resources. He put that plan into action by misappropriating resources that were intended to reconstruct the Unity State after the civil war between South and North of Sudan.

    Taban corrupted oil money besides two percentages (2%) (That was intended to build area where oil is drilled from) during his governorship and it is that money he used later in 2013 to fund the present war before he joined the government in 2016.

    As the events have disclosed in the process, the intention of Taban of financing the war using the money he corrupted was not to fight for Dr. Riek but to instigate the war that would lead to Riek leaving the SPLM party to make a room for him as he considered Dr. Riek as an obstacle to him getting power.

    This plan succeeded in 2016. This fulfils common view he holds that one of the people who deny him power is Riek, and if Riek were to get out of the way, he would become the president of South Sudan.

    After having done away with Dr. Riek, Taban has been confirmed by the President of South Sudan as first Vice President while Dr. Riek Machar is wasting away under house arrest in South Africa. However, the beneficiary of Dr. Riek Machar and South Sudanese suffering is South African Government of which unconfirmed report points out that it is now receiving $ 450,000 monthly as a fee for keeping Dr. Riek under house arrest.

    In fact, with Dr. Riek out of political scene and Taban at the centre of power, his next move is to consolidate power and if possible to become the president of South Sudan sooner or later. There is a real fear that Taban is likely to get power in South Sudan as long as Kiir is still the President of South Sudan for the following reasons—

    First of all, Taban uses money and because of that he corrupts the system to get as much money as he can in order to use the money later to buy people to support him. For instance, since he was appointed a governor until 2013, the two percent (2%) of oil money that was supposed to be used for development in Unity State was never used for the development as it was intended.

    It was that money Taban used to finance the war since 2013 to 2015. Though he financed the war his intention was not to maintain the war in order to ensure he put Dr. Riek presidency but just to put Dr. Riek into deeper problems so that he has access to power easily which happened in 2016.

    It is therefore hard to defeat a person like Taban in a country like South Sudan where poverty is high. The use of money and the weakness of the President make it likely that Taban will take power which will take the people of South Sudan by surprise.

    Secondly, Taban has completely weakened the SPLM party as he is the real man behind the decision of the president of South Sudan to sack the members of the party and SPLA officers. Taban being a dealer, he has created a very strong network within the government as some of the ministers and advisors to the president are his friends.

    These ministers and advisors are the ones who hold fate of all civil servants and army in South Sudan and whatever they have said is the law. Hence, whether the president likes it or not, whoever they have recommended to be removed or to be appointed can be removed or appointed as they wish.

    It is in relation to the above we see General Malong and his associates being removed from power as a way of weakening Malong and by implication the president. This is because the approach of Taban in getting power is two-pronged: the first step is to weaken the government by smuggling in his right hand people who serve his interest.

    The ultimate goal of Taban is to weaken the SPLM party that has been making it difficult for him to get power and instead to create the SPLM version that will work in his favour.

    The plan of Taban is to isolate the president and other strong members of the SPLM so that he later does away with the president with ease. In actual sense, Taban is creating a SPLM party of dealers that will control the system not the country and then later use the system funded with the oil money to silence all the critics. At that point there will be no Dinka nor Nuer to support their leaders as it is the case now.

    However, it is not that he will create a nation but he will create a super tribal body composed of different dealers from different tribes who will deal with their tribes either through fair or crook means hence weaken the spirit of tribalism as well as the spirit of nationalism.

    Though this analysis (how Taban may get power) may be correct, the president of South Sudan and his supporters will never understand it or agree with it because they don’t accommodate different opposing views as they don’t like opposition or someone who tells them the truth; hence, they will rather be with Taban Deng who flatters them than someone who tells the truth.

    Thirdly, as a strategy of remaining the First Vice President, Taban will never accept peace with Riek Machar or rebels as long as their coming back to Juba affects his position. Since he has all money it takes the whole South Sudan to have it, Taban will use as much money as possible to ensure that peace does not come.

    It is because of the same reason the kidnapping of the members of the opposition is common in Kenya contrary to the international law. He might have bribed some elements in the Kenyan Government to help him achieve his unbridled desire for power by rooting the rebels out from Kenya.

    Fourthly, Taban will never accept peace to prevail among civilians within South Sudan since some sort of peace will always be a threat to his position as citizens will be able to speak one voice and question his ability to be the First Vice President.

    This is why he has been accused of leaving his national position and gets involved in the issues of tribal land back home between his tribe and Ruweng people.

    And at the same time he and his friends inside the state house will always tell the president that things are going on well on the ground in different part of the country thus the president stays in J1 while lives of the citizens keep on deteriorating all the times due to rampant insecurity.

    This strategy is to keep the president out of the reality and to keep citizens engaged in tribal war to ensure that he gets power with ease.

    Fifthly, one of the reasons Taban is pushing for the reunification of the SPLM party is to ensure that he is confirmed in the position of the first Vice President. With the affirmation in that position, he will at any time become the next leader after the president or in case anything happens to the President he automatically take over.

    Fortunately, FDs have understood this ploy and therefore not ready to risk, which explains the collapse of reunification deals many times.

    Sixthly and finally, Taban Deng Gai is likely to take over power unless there is external intervention to oust him. This is because the president will not be able to control him given the fact that President Kiir does not analyze the movement of a person as long as that person does not show opposition to him.

    After taking over power, the following are the problems as discussed below—
    …..First of all, as soon as Taban takes over the power he will dismantle the SPLM part completely and move towards Khartoum by introducing the Arab style of governance. This is the system of governance where security apparatus protects the presidency not citizens, where the president is above the laws of the country while he or she is being protected by strong personal security sweet coated with national security title, consequently, the country will be highly insecure as citizens will be acting as informant on each other. All these will be intended by Taban to build power base for himself and his cohorts.

    …..Secondly, Taban will run South Sudan like a king as he does not respect the law. His negative attitude towards the law was seen when Counsel Wani successfully challenged the decree of the president appointing ministers to East African Community Parliament.

    At that time reacting to the news that the East African Court of Justice had nullified the Presidential decree, he was quoted to have said that the action of Wani was an embarrassment to the country and to the president because to him the action of the president is not supposed to be challenged in law.

    This shows that Taban does not respect the law and if he becomes the president of South Sudan, the people will have to forget about the rule of law, which by implication means that corruption and bad governance in general will flourish under Taban Deng Gai.

    …..Thirdly, disunity and unknown gunmen will be common in South Sudan. All these will result into South Sudanese rising against the President Taban and he will die like Gadafi or if not removed he will finally die in power leaving South Sudan in more crisis than now.

    In summary, the above discussed predictions and problems will happen in South Sudan unless the citizens of South Sudan realize earlier that Taban is not a reformist but dealer that will use the state for his own benefits to their detriment and the only way to save South Sudan is not to allow him become president of South Sudan. END

    The Author is a lawyer by profession; he graduated with honors in law from Makerere University, School of Law. He participated in various workshops and training in community law and community mobilization in awareness of their constitutional rights in Uganda.

    He is the member of Public Interest Law Clinic (PILAC) and NETPIL (Network of Public Interest Lawyers) at Makerere University; he is currently doing research with NETPIL on private prosecution; he is trained in Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR); he participated in writing Street Law Handbook on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Uganda.

    He can be reached through juoldaniel2003@gmail.com or +256784806333.