Archive for: September 2012

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The Only Weapon Left to Fight Corruption in South Sudan

John Adoor Deng. SSN; As from today, one can recall numerous articles written against corruption in South Sudan. In the same direction, we have heard numerous position papers, enacting of rules to govern the practice and speeches delivered against corruption and against corrupt officials, by various authorities including the most powerful men and women in the Republic of South Sudan. All these attempts fall into deaf ears and the vice (corruption) is still active in all institutions!

The question is what is the weapon left to fight corruption in South Sudan? An attempt to answer this question summarizes the purpose of this article.

Indeed, corruption in South Sudan is real and active as confirmed by our beloved president, General Salva Kiir Mayardit, in his letter to the suspected corrupt officials both former and current. The president, on his letter made it clear that the vice is bad; as it robbed our innocent masses of their hard earned resources.

Thus, the question about what weapon is left to fight Corruption in South Sudan is worth wrestling with in the next few paragraphs.  Of course I must knowledge that the war on corruption in South Sudan is well fought but it has for some reasons failed to cut off the corruption vessels.

This may be because we are using an exhausted weapon as demonstrated by the fact that nobody has been prosecuted by the anti-corruption commission since 2005 when the vice took roots in our national resources.

Nature dictates that if all avenues fail in the capacity of human beings, they must consult the supernatural realm. The cases about corruption in south Sudan will not be done to finality in the physical-mental realm. The vice is chronic within every individual in south Sudan if I have to exaggerate it in this context.

The majority of our national elites find favors in the practice of corruption. And the families, relatives, friends, colleagues, tribesmen, mates of the elites are indirectly involved in the vice as they rely on the corrupt officials (but to them not corrupt but their helper!!! ) to provide them with support services.

In this direction, I believe that corruption has become chronic as we accrued such behaviors during our protracted war with the Arabs. For example, in many refugee and displaced camps,  people  used to  cheat to have many ration kilos, some were counted twice so as to have enough food for their families, this was corruption.

In the rebel army, people used to loot civilian things and say that it was an order from above! But that was not true as there were no such orders from above, this was corruption.

For those that were inside Khartoum, they used to live double life as being supporter of SPLM/SPLA in the  dark and being supporter of NIF on the surface so that they survived from assassination from the Arab militants at the time. This was to some extent corruption.

Believe it or not, this culture had encroached into our very wholeness and people don’t feel that they are corrupting even when taking things of the public as theirs.  The culture of corruption is embedded in every individual and many are corrupt but thinking that what they are doing is “normal”.

Hence, the modality of the supernatural becomes appropriate as the only weapon left to fight corruption. What we need is not fighting corruption per se but the transformation of behaviors into normal human instinct sharing spirit.

Biblical history reminds us on how the modality of supernatural was effective with the city of Nineveh (Jonah 3&4). The city was transformed into corruption free city and all corrupt officials were forgiven by God. The forgiveness came after repentance.

I therefore would take the opportunity through this article to appeal to all our religious categories (Christianity with its various denominations, Islam with it various sectors and may be African Traditional Religions (ATR)) in the country to propose two days for national fasting and prayers.  In these two days, nobody will be allowed to work, eat, or dress on with good clothes, all must wear  under privileged clothes and pray for forgiveness asking God to rid out the spirit of corruption within us, in our departments, tribe and cities.

As in the case of Nineveh, we can be forgiven, transformed and redesigned for posterity. AUSTRALIA, JULY 27/2012

The Author is John Adoor Deng: MPRL & Director of South Sudan support Foundation. He can be reached at johnadoordeng@yahoo.com.au

Disclaimer: The views expressed above are solely those of the author(s) and do not represent those of the website.

CPA 2005 North-South Sudan Agreement

1. Power Sharing Agreement (Click Here To Read More………………….)

Protocol Between THE GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN (GOS) AND THE SUDAN PEOPLE’S LIBERATION MOVEMENT (SPLM) ON POWER SHARING in Naivasha, Kenya, Wednesday, May 26, 2004

PREAMBLE:
CONSCIOUS of the need for an expeditious termination of Sudan’s protracted and costly war;
MINDFUL AND AWARE of the yearning of all the Sudanese for a quick, just and sustainable peace;
ENCOURAGED by the progress made thus far in our pursuit for realizing comprehensive Peace Agreement in the Sudan;
DETERMINED to crown the valuable achievement of this Peace Process by arriving at an equitable and fair formula for sharing power in the Sudan;
RESOLVED to usher in an era of responsible, just, transparent, people-led and integrity based governance;
CONVINCED that decentralization and empowerment of all levels of government are cardinal principles of effective and fair administration of the country…..

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2. Wealth Sharing Agreement (Click Here To Read More……………..)

WEALTH SHARING
1.0 GUIDING PRINCIPLES IN RESPECT OF AN EQUITABLE SHARING OF COMMON
WEALTH

1.1 The Parties agree that the guiding principles and provisions below shall be the basis for the comprehensive text on Wealth Sharing.
1.2 The wealth of Sudan shall be shared equitably so as to enable each level of government to discharge its legal and constitutional responsibilities and duties.
1.3 The National Government shall also fulfil its obligation to provide transfers to the Government of Southern Sudan.
1.4 The sharing and allocation of wealth emanating from the resources of the Sudan shall ensure that the quality of life, dignity and living conditions of all the citizens are promoted without discrimination on
grounds of gender, race, religion, political affiliation, ethnicity, language, or region. The sharing and allocation of this wealth shall be based on the premise that all parts of Sudan are entitled to development.
1.5 The Parties agree that Southern Sudan faces serious needs to: (i) be able to perform basic government functions, (ii) build up the civil administration, and (iii) rehabilitate and reconstruct/construct the social and physical infrastructure in a post-conflict Sudan.
1.6 The Parties agree that Nuba Mountains, Southern Blue Nile, Abyei and other war affected areas face serious needs to: (i) be able to perform basic government functions, (ii) establish and build civil
administration and (iii) rehabilitate and reconstruct/construct the social and physical infrastructure in a post-conflict Sudan…………

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3. Security Arrangement and Machakos Protocol (Click Here To Read More………….)

Interim Security Agreement

Naivasha: Thursday, September 25th, 2003

WHEREAS
the Government of the Republic of the Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army (the Parties) have been conducting negotiations in Naivasha, Kenya, since 2nd September, 2003 under the auspices of the IGAD Peace Process; and

WHEREAS
the Parties reiterated their commitment to a negotiated, peaceful, comprehensive resolution to the Sudan Conflict within the Unity of Sudan as set forth in the Machakos Protocol of 20th July 2002; and

NOW RECORD THAT
within the above context, the Parties have reached specific agreement on Security Arrangements during the Interim Period, the initialed text of which is annexed hereto and which will be subsequently incorporated into the final Peace Agreement; and…..

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Security and Machakos protocols

Interim Security Agreement

Naivasha: Thursday, September 25th, 2003

WHEREAS
the Government of the Republic of the Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army (the Parties) have been conducting negotiations in Naivasha, Kenya, since 2nd September, 2003 under the auspices of the IGAD Peace Process; and

WHEREAS
the Parties reiterated their commitment to a negotiated, peaceful, comprehensive resolution to the Sudan Conflict within the Unity of Sudan as set forth in the Machakos Protocol of 20th July 2002; and

NOW RECORD THAT
within the above context, the Parties have reached specific agreement on Security Arrangements during the Interim Period, the initialed text of which is annexed hereto and which will be subsequently incorporated into the final Peace Agreement; and

IT IS AGREED AND CONFIRMED THAT
the Parties shall immediately resume negotiations on the remaining outstanding issues and subsequently negotiate a comprehensive ceasefire agreement in order to achieve a final, comprehensive Peace Agreement in the Sudan.

Hon. Idris Mohamed Abdelgadir; for The Government of the Sudan; Cdr. Pa’gan Amum Okiech, for The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army.

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Framework Agreement on Security Arrangements During the Interim Period
Between The Government of the Sudan (GOS)

and

The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement / Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLM/SPLA)

  1. Status Of The Two Armed Forces:
    1. In the context of a united Sudan, and should the result of the referendum on self-determination confirm unity, the Parties (the Government of the Sudan and the Sudan People’s liberation Movement and Army) agree to the formation of the future army of Sudan that shall be composed from the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA).
    2. As part of a peace agreement and in order to end the war, the Parties agree that the two forces, the SAF and the SPLA shall remain separate during the Interim Period, and further agree that both forces shall be considered and treated equally as Sudan’s National Armed Forces during the Interim Period taking into consideration 1 (c) below.
    3. The parties agree to the principles of proportional downsizing of the forces on both sides, at a suitable time, following the completion of the comprehensive ceasefire arrangements.
    4. The national Armed Forces shall have no internal law and order mandate except in constitutionally specified emergencies.
    5. 2–Ceasefire:
      • 3—Redeployment :
        1. The two forces shall be disengaged, separated, encamped and redeployed as will be detailed in the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement.
        2. Except for those deployed in the Joint/Integrated Units, the rest of the forces of SAF currently deployed in the south shall be redeployed North of the South/North border of 1/1/1956 under international monitoring and assistance within and up to two and one half years (2 1/2) from the beginning of the pre-Interim Period .
        3. Except for those deployed in the Joint/Integrated Units, the rest of SPLA forces currently deployed in Nuba Mountains and Southern Blue Nile shall be redeployed South of the South/North border of 1/1/1956 as soon as the Joint/Integrated Units are formed and deployed under international monitoring and assistance.
        4. The SPLM/A undertakes that the demobilized Southern Sudanese from those currently serving in SAF in Southern Sudan shall be absorbed into various institutions of the Government of Southern Sudan along with demobilized SPLA soldiers.
        5. The parties agree to implement with the assistance of the international community DDR programmes for the benefit of all those who will be affected by the reduction, demobilization and downsizing of the forces as agreed in 1(c) , 3(d) and 7(B). Joint/ Integrated Units:
          There shall be formed Joint/ Integrated Units consisting of equal numbers from the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) during the Interim Period. The Joint/ Integrated Units shall constitute a nucleus of a post referendum army of Sudan, should the result of the referendum confirm unity, otherwise they would be dissolved and the component parts integrated into their respective forces.4—Elaboration On Joint/Integrated Units:

          1. Their Character:-They should have a new character based on a common doctrine.
          2. Their Functions:-
            1. They will be a symbol of national unity during the Interim Period.
            2. They will be a symbol of sovereignty during the Interim Period.
            3. They will participate in the defence of the country together with the two forces.
            4. They will provide a nucleus of a post Interim Period future army of the Sudan should the vote of referendum confirm unity.
            5. They shall be involved in the reconstruction of the country.
              • C—Size and Deployment :The size and deployment of the Joint/Integrated Units throughout the Interim Period shall be as indicated below:-
                1. Southern Sudan: twenty four thousands (24.000)
                2. Nuba Mountains: six thousands (6.000).
                3. Southern Blue Nile: six thousands (6.000).
                4. Khartoum: three thousands (3.000).
                5. Eastern Sudan:-
                6. The redeployment of SPLA forces from Eastern Sudan to South of the South/North border of 1/1/1956 shall be completed within one (1) year from the beginning of the pre-Interim period .
                7. The parties shall discuss the issue of establishing Joint/Integrated Units.
                8. 5—Command and Control of The Two Forces :-
                9. The Parties agree to establish a Joint Defence Board (JDB) under the Presidency, and shall be comprised of the chiefs of staff of the two forces, their deputies and any number of senior officers to be agreed to by the parties. It shall take its decisions by consensus and it shall be chaired alternately by the respective Chiefs of Staff.
                10. Functions of JDB : The JDB shall perform the following functions :
                  1. Co-ordination between the two forces.
                  2. Command of the Joint/ Integrated Units.
                11. The JDB shall perform the following functions :
                12. Co-ordination between the two forces.
                  1. Command of the Joint/ Integrated Units.
                  2. -Common Military Doctrine:-
                    The parties shall develop a common military doctrine as a basis for the Joint/Integrated Units, as well as a basis for a post Interim Period army of the Sudan, if the referendum vote is in favour of unity. The parties shall develop this common doctrine within one year from the beginning of the Interim Period. During the Interim Period, the training of the SPLA (in the South), the SAF (in the North) and the joint units (in both North and South) will be based on this common doctrine.
                  3. 7–Status of Other Armed Groups In The Country:
                  4. No armed group allied to either party shall be allowed to operate outside the two forces.
                  5. The Parties agree that those mentioned in 7(a) who have the desire and qualify shall be incorporated into the organized forces of either Party (Army, Police, Prisons and Wildlife forces), while the rest shall be reintegrated into the civil service and civil society institutions.
                  6. The parties agree to address the status of other armed groups in the country with the view of achieving comprehensive peace and stability in the country and to realize full inclusiveness in the transition process.
                  7. —National Security Organs and Police forces:
                  8. Structures and arrangements affecting all law enforcement organs, especially the Police, and National Security Organs shall be dealt with as part of the power sharing arrangements, and tied where is necessary to the appropriate level of the executive.
                  9. Done at Lake Naivasha Simba LodgeDate: Thursday, September 25th, 2008.

Wealth Sharing

WEALTH SHARING
1.0 GUIDING PRINCIPLES IN RESPECT OF AN EQUITABLE SHARING OF COMMON
WEALTH

1.1 The Parties agree that the guiding principles and provisions below shall be the basis for the comprehensive text on Wealth Sharing.
1.2 The wealth of Sudan shall be shared equitably so as to enable each level of government to discharge its legal and constitutional responsibilities and duties.
1.3 The National Government shall also fulfil its obligation to provide transfers to the Government of Southern Sudan.
1.4 The sharing and allocation of wealth emanating from the resources of the Sudan shall ensure that the quality of life, dignity and living conditions of all the citizens are promoted without discrimination on
grounds of gender, race, religion, political affiliation, ethnicity, language, or region. The sharing and allocation of this wealth shall be based on the premise that all parts of Sudan are entitled to development.
1.5 The Parties agree that Southern Sudan faces serious needs to: (i) be able to perform basic government functions, (ii) build up the civil
administration, and (iii) rehabilitate and reconstruct/construct the social and physical infrastructure in a post-conflict Sudan.
1.6 The Parties agree that Nuba Mountains, Southern Blue Nile, Abyei and other war affected areas face serious needs to: (i) be able to perform basic government functions, (ii) establish and build civil
administration and (iii) rehabilitate and reconstruct/construct the social and physical infrastructure in a post-conflict Sudan.
1.7 That, without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 1.3 herein, Southern Sudan, and those areas in need of construction/reconstruction, shall be brought up to the same average level of socio-economic and
public services standard as the Northern states. To achieve these objectives will take time and effort to build up local institutional, human, and economic capacity. For this purpose, two special funds shall
be established as provided herein.
1.8 That revenue sharing should reflect a commitment to devolution of power and decentralisation of decision-making in regard to development, service delivery and governance.
1.9 The development of infrastructure, human resources, sustainable economic development and the capacity to meet human needs shall be conducted within a framework of transparent and accountable government.
1.10 That the best known practices in the sustainable utilization and control of natural resources shall be followed.
1.11 This Agreement sets out the respective types of income, revenue, taxes and other sources of wealth to which the various levels of government are entitled.
1.12 The Parties recognize that the National Government, during the Interim Period, will need to mobilize additional national resources.
1.13 There is a limit on how much additional national resources can be mobilized and part of the national needs in a post-conflict Sudan will have to be met by external assistance.

1.14 The National Government shall not withhold an allocation due to a state/region [1] or the Government of Southern Sudan. Any level of Government may initiate proceedings in the Constitutional Court should
any other organ or level withhold monies due to it. The National Government shall make transfers to the Govt. of Southern Sudan based on the principles established.
1.15 In agreeing to these wealth sharing arrangements the Parties signal to the international community that it will have to play a strong and constructive role in providing post-conflict construction/reconstruction
assistance to Sudan, especially to Southern Sudan and other war affected and least developed areas.
1.16 The National Government shall assist the Government of Southern Sudan, during the pre-Interim Period, in cooperation with international
organizations, to develop and implement a program for capacity enhancement in the South. The highest priority should be public finance and intergovernmental relations, including expenditure management to
ensure accountability.

2.0 OWNERSHIP OF LAND AND NATURAL RESOURCES
2.1 Without prejudice to the position of the Parties with respect to ownership of land and subterranean natural resources, including in Southern Sudan, this Agreement is not intended to address the ownership of those resources. The Parties agree to establish a process to resolve this issue.
2.2.The Parties agree that the regulation, management, and the process for the sharing of wealth from subterranean natural resources are addressed below.
2.3.The Parties record that the regulation of land tenure, usage and exercise of rights in land is to be a concurrent competency exercised at the appropriate levels of government.
2.4.Rights in land owned by the Government of Sudan shall be exercised through the appropriate or designated levels of Government.
2.5.The Parties agree that a process be instituted to progressively develop and amend the relevant laws to incorporate customary laws and practices, local heritage and international trends and practices.
2.6 Without prejudice to the jurisdiction of courts, there shall be established a National Land Commission that shall have the following functions:
2.6.1 Arbitrate between willing contending Parties on claims over land, and sort out such claims.
2.6.2 The party or group making claims in respect of land may make a claim against the relevant government and/or other Parties interested in the land.
2.6.3 The National Land Commission may at its discretion entertain such claims.

2.6.4 The Parties to the arbitration shall be bound by the decision of the National Land Commission on mutual consent and upon registration of the award in a court of law.
2.6.5 The National Land Commission shall apply the law applicable in the locality where the land is situated or such other law as the Parties to the arbitration agree, including principles of equity.
2.6.6 Accept references on request from the relevant government, or in the process of resolving claims, and make recommendations to the appropriate levels of government concerning:
2.6.6.1 Land reform policies;
2.6.6.2 Recognition of customary land rights and/or law.
2.6.7 Assess appropriate land compensation, which need not be limited to monetary compensation, for applicants in the course of arbitration or in the course of a reference from a court.
2.6.8 Advise different levels of government on how to co-ordinate policies on national projects.
2.6.9 Study and record land use practices in areas where natural resource exploitation occurs.
2.6.10 The National Land Commission shall be representative and independent. The composition of the membership and terms of appointment of the National Land Commission shall be set by the legislation
constituting it. The Chairperson of the National Land Commission shall be appointed by the Presidency.
2.6.11 The National Land Commission may conduct hearings and formulate its own rules of procedure.
2.6.12 The National Land Commission will have its budget approved by the Presidency and will be accountable to the Presidency for the due performance of its functions.
2.7 In accordance with this Agreement and without prejudice to the jurisdiction of courts, there shall be established a Southern Sudan Land Commission which shall have the following functions:
2.7.1 Arbitrate between willing contending Parties on claims over land, and sort out such claims.
2.7.2 The party or group making claims in respect of land may make a claim against the relevant government and/or other Parties interested in the land.
2.7.3 The Southern Sudan Land Commission may entertain such claims at its discretion.
2.7.4 The Parties to the arbitration shall be bound by the Southern Sudan Land Commission’s decision on mutual consent and upon registration of the award in a court of law.
2.7.5 The Southern Sudan Land Commission shall apply the law applicable in the locality where the land is situated or such other law as the Parties to the arbitration agree, including principles of equity.

2.7.6 Accept references on request from the relevant government, or in the process of resolving claims, and make recommendations to the appropriate levels of government concerning:
2.7.6.1 Land reform policies;
2.7.6.2 Recognition of customary land rights and/or law.
2.7.7 Assess appropriate land compensation, which need not be limited to monetary compensation, for applicants in the course of arbitration or in the course of a reference from a court.
2.7.8 Advise different levels of government on how to co-ordinate policies on GOSS projects.
2.7.9 Study and record land use practices in areas where natural resource exploitation occurs.
2.7.10 The Southern Sudan Land Commission shall be representative and independent. The composition of the membership and terms of appointment of the Southern Sudan Land Commission shall be set by the legislation
constituting it. The Chairperson of the Southern Sudan Land Commission shall be appointed by the President of the Government of Southern Sudan.
2.7.11 The Southern Sudan Land Commission may conduct hearings and formulate its own rules of procedure.
2.7.12 The Southern Sudan Land Commission shall have its budget approved by the Government of Southern Sudan and shall be accountable to the President of the Government of Southern Sudan for the due performance of its functions.
2.8 The National Land Commission and the Southern Sudan Land Commission shall co-operate and co-ordinate their activities so as to use their
resources efficiently. Without limiting the matters of coordination, the National Land Commission and the Southern Sudan Land Commission may agree:
a) to exchange information and decisions of each Commission; that certain functions of the National Land Commission, including collection of data and research, may be carried out through the Southern Sudan Land Commission;
c) on the way in which any conflict between the findings or recommendations of each Commission may be resolved.
2.9 In the case of conflict between the findings or recommendations of the National Land Commission and the Southern Sudan Land Commission, which cannot be resolved by agreement, the two Commissions shall reconcile their positions. Failure to reconcile, the matter shall be referred to the Constitutional Court.

3.0 OIL RESOURCES

A. Guiding Principles for the management and development of the petroleum sector
3.1 The Parties agree that the basis for an agreed and definitive framework for the management of the development of the petroleum sector during the Interim Period shall include the following:
3.1.1 Sustainable utilization of oil as a non-renewable natural resource consistent with:
a) the national interest and the public good;
the interest of the affected states/regions;
c) the interests of the local population in affected areas;
d) national environmental policies, biodiversity conservation guidelines, and cultural heritage protection principles.
3.1.2 Empowerment of the appropriate levels of government to develop and manage, in consultation with the relevant communities, the various stages of oil production within the overall framework for the management of petroleum development during the Interim Period.
3.1.3 Give due attention to enabling policy environment for the flow of foreign direct investment by reducing risks associated with uncertainties regarding the outcome of the referendum on self-determination at the end of the Interim Period.
3.1.4 A stable macroeconomic environment that emphasizes stability of the petroleum sector.
3.1.5 Persons enjoying rights in land shall be consulted and their views shall duly be taken into account in respect of decisions to develop subterranean natural resources from the area in which they have rights, and shall share in the benefits of that development.

3.1.6 Persons enjoying rights in land are entitled to compensation on just terms arising from acquisition or development of land for the extraction of subterranean natural resources from the area in respect of which they have rights.
3.1.7 The communities in whose areas development of subterranean natural resources occurs have the right to participate, through their respective states/regions, in the negotiation of contracts for the development of those resources.
3.1.8 Regardless of the contention over the ownership of land and associated natural resources, the Parties agree on a framework for the regulation and management of petroleum development in Sudan during the Interim Period.
B. National Petroleum Commission (NPC)
3.2 The Parties agree that an independent National Petroleum Commission (NPC) shall be established during the Pre-Interim Period and its decisions shall be by consensus.
3.3 Taking into account the provisions elsewhere in this Agreement, the NPC shall be constituted as follows:
a)The President of the Republic and President of the GOSS as Co-chairs and permanent members;
b)Four (4) permanent members representing the National Government;
c)Four (4) permanent members representing the GOSS; and
d)Not more than three (3) representatives of an oil producing State/Region in which petroleum development is being considered, non-permanent
members.
3.4 The NPC shall have the following functions:
3.4.1 Formulate public policies and guidelines in relation to the development and management of the petroleum sector consistent with paragraph 3.1.1.
3.4.2 Monitor and assess the implementation of those policies to ensure that they work in the best interests of the people of Sudan.
3.4.3 Develop strategies and programs for the petroleum sector.
3.4.4 Negotiate and approve all oil contracts for the exploration and development of oil in the Sudan, and ensure they are consistent with the NPC’s principles, policies and guidelines.
3.4.5 Develop its internal regulations and procedures.
3.5 In performing the functions referred to in paragraph 3.4 above, the NPC shall take into account relevant considerations, including the following:
3.5.1 The extent to which the contract provides benefits to local communities affected by the development.
3.5.2 The extent to which the views of the state/region and the affected groups are incorporated in the proposed contracts.
3.5.3 If the NPC decides to approve the contract, persons holding rights in land who are aggrieved by the decision shall seek relief through arbitration or in a court of law.
3.5.4 If the non-permanent members of the NPC representing the oil producing State/Region collectively disagree with the decision of the NPC to approve the contract related to their State/Region, the National
Minister of Petroleum shall not sign the contract and shall refer the matter to the Council of States/Regions. If the Council of States/Regions rejects the objection by two-thirds majority, the National Minister of Petroleum shall sign the contract. If the Council
of States/Regions does not reject the objection by two-thirds majority within 24 sitting days of receiving it, the Council of States/Regions shall remit the objection within that period and by two-thirds majority to a mechanism established by the Council to arbitrate on the objection.
The arbitration decision shall be made within six calendar months of referral to arbitration. The arbit! ration decision shall be binding.
3.5.5. If the NPC approves the contract the National Minister of Petroleum shall sign the contract on behalf of the Government of the Sudan.
3.5.6 In performing functions 3.4.1, 3.4.2, 3.4.3, and 3.4.5 of paragraph 3.4, the NPC shall include only its permanent members.
3.5.7 In performing function 3.4.4 of paragraph 3.4, the NPC shall include its permanent members and representatives of oil producing State/Region in which contracts for the exploration and development of
the petroleum are being negotiated and considered for approval.
4.0 EXISTING OIL CONTRACTS

4.1 The SPLM shall appoint a limited number of representatives to have access to all existing oil contracts. The representatives shall have the right to engage technical experts. All those who have access to the contracts will sign confidentiality agreements.
4.2 Contracts shall not be subject to re-negotiation.
4.3 If contracts are deemed to have fundamental social and environmental problems the Government of Sudan will implement necessary remedial measures.
4.4 The Parties agree that “existing oil contracts” mean contracts signed before the date of signature of the comprehensive Peace Agreement.
4.5 Persons whose rights have been violated by oil contracts are entitled to compensation. On the establishment of these violations through due legal process the Parties to the oil contracts shall be liable to compensate the affected persons to the extent of the damage caused.

5.0 GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR SHARING OIL REVENUE

5.1 The Parties agree that the basis for an agreed and definitive framework for the sharing of the wealth emanating from oil resources of Southern Sudan shall include the following:

5.1.1 The framework for sharing wealth from the extraction of natural resources should balance the needs for national development and reconstruction of Southern Sudan.

5.2 The Parties agree that a formula for sharing the revenue from oil resources shall be as set forth in this Agreement.

5.3 For the purposes of this Agreement ‘Net revenue from oil’ shall be the sum of the net revenue (i) from exports of government oil and (ii) from deliveries of government oil to the refineries. Exports shall be valued at the actual Free on Board (FOB) export prices less the charges to deliver the oil to any export destination including pipeline and management charges. Oil delivered to the refinery shallbe valued at the average FO! B export prices during the last calendar month in which there was an export sale less the charges that would have been incurred to deliver the oil to any export destination including pipeline and
management charges.

5.4 An Oil Revenue Stabilization Account shall be established from government oil net revenue derived from actual export sales above an agreed benchmark price. The benchmark price will be established
annually as part of the national budget reflecting changing economic circumstances.

5.5 The Parties agree that at least two percent (2%) of oil revenue shall be allocated to the oil producing states/regions in proportion to output produced in such states/regions

5.6 After the payment to the Oil Revenue Stabilization Account and to the oil producing states/regions, fifty percent (50%) of net oil revenue derived from oil producing wells in Southern Sudan shall be allocated to the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) as of the beginning of the Pre-Interim Period and the remaining fifty percent (50%) to the National
Government and States in Northern Sudan.

5.7 A Future Generation Fund shall be established once national oil production reaches two (2) million barrels per day. This production criterion may, as part of the National Government’s normal budget process, be reduced down to one (1) million barrels per day.

5.8 The Parties agree that all funds/special accounts referred to in this Agreement and future accounts shall be on-budget operations.

6 SHARING OF NON-OIL REVENUE

6.1 The National Government shall be entitled to legislate, raise and collect the below-listed taxes and to collect revenue from these sources:

6.1.1 National Personal Income Tax;

6.1.2 Corporate or Business Profit Tax;

6.1.3 Customs Duties and import taxes; and

6.1.4 Sea-ports and Airports Revenue;

6.1.5 Service charges;

6.1.6 Oil revenues as set out herein;

6.1.7 National Government Enterprises and projects;

6.1.8 VAT or GST or other retail taxes on goods and services;

6.1.9 Excise Tax;

6.1.10 Any other tax as agreed upon in these negotiations;

6.1.11 Loans, including borrowing from the Central Bank and the public.

6.2 The Government of Southern Sudan shall be entitled to revenue from the following sources and to raise and collect the below-listed taxes:

6.2.1 The National revenue allocation to the Government of Southern Sudan and States/Regions from the National Revenue Fund as set forth in
section 7.0 of this Agreement;

6.2.2 Revenue from any of the sources listed as state/region revenue
sources referred to in paragraph 6.3 herein;

6.2.3 The Southern Sudan Reconstruction and Development Fund (SSRDF);

6.2.4 Oil revenues as is set out in this Agreement;

6.2.5 Southern Sudan Government Taxes, which do not encroach on the exclusive National Government taxing powers or which are contemplated in the Power Sharing Protocol;
6.2.6 Service charges of the Government of Southern Sudan;

6.2.7 Go. of Southern Sudan enterprises and projects;
6.2.8 Grants in Aid and Foreign Aid;
6.2.9 Taxes and levies on small and medium business;
6.2.10 Excise taxes on goods within the region deemed to be luxury consumables;
6.2.11 Southern Sudan Personal Income Tax;
6.2.12 Any other taxes as may be agreed to from time to time;
6.2.13 Loans and Borrowing in accordance with the Monetary Policy, Banking, Currency and Borrowing sections of this Agreement.
6.3 The states/regions shall be entitled to raise and collect the below-listed taxes and revenue from the below listed sources:
6.3.1 State/Regional Land and property tax and royalties;
6.3.2 Service charges for state/regional services;
6.3.3 Licences;
6.3.4 State/Regional Personal Income Tax;
6.3.5 Levies on Tourism;
6.3.6 State/Regional share of oil Revenues as is set out in paragraphs 5.5 and 5.6 of this Agreement;
6.3.7 State/Regional Government projects and state/regional nature parks;
6.3.8 Stamp duties;
6.3.9 Agricultural Taxes;
6.3.10 Grants in Aid and Foreign Aid through the National Government and the GOSS;
6.3.11 Excise taxes;
6.3.12 Border Trade charges or levies in accordance with National Legislation;
6.3.13 Other state/region taxes which do not encroach on national or Southern Sudan Government taxes;
6.3.14 Any other tax as may be agreed to from time to time; and

6.3.15 Loans and borrowing in accordance with the Monetary Policy, Banking, Currency and Borrowing sections of this Agreement.

7 EQUALIZATION AND ALLOCATION TO THE NATIONAL, SOUTHERN SUDAN AND STATE/REGIONAL LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT IN RESPECT OF REVENUE COLLECTED NATIONALLY
7.1. All revenues collected nationally for or by the National Government shall be pooled in a National Revenue Fund (NRF) administered by the National Treasury. Such Fund shall embrace all accounts and sub-funds into which monies due to the Government are collected, reported or deposited.
7.2 All the revenues and expenditures of the Govt. will be on-budget operations and made public.
7.3 Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 5.6, 7.1 and 13.1, the National Government shall allocate fifty percent (50%) of the national non-oil revenue collected in Southern Sudan, as provided for herein
under paragraph 6.1 above, to the GOSS to partially meet the development cost and other activities during the Interim Period. The Parties agree to review this arrangement, at mid-term of the Interim Period, with the view of the National Government allocating additional resources to the GoSS.
7.4 As a result of the allocation arrangements in paragraph 7.3 above, the Parties agree to appeal to the international and donor community to help the GoSS by providing post-conflict reconstruction assistance especially at the beginning of the transition.

7.5 The states/regions and the GoSS shall retain and dispose of such other income raised and collected under their own taxing powers.

8. FISCAL AND FINANCIAL ALLOCATION AND MONITORING COMMISSION (FFAMC)

8.1 To ensure transparency and fairness both in regard to the allocation of nationally collected funds to the states/regions and the Government of Southern Sudan, a Fiscal and Financial Allocation and Monitoring
Commission shall be established. This body shall be comprised of experts nominated by the various states/regions, the Go. of Southern Sudan and the National Government. Decision making arrangements of the FFAMC shall be as agreed to by the Parties.
8.2 The FFAMC shall undertake the following duties and responsibilities:
8.2.1 Monitor and ensure that equalization grants from the National Revenue Fund are promptly transferred to respective levels of government;
8.2.2 Ensure appropriate utilization and sharing of financial resources;

8.2.3 Ensure that resources allocated to war affected areas are transferred in accordance with agreed upon formulae; and

8.2.4 Ensure transparency and fairness in the allocation of funds to the GOSS and states/regions according to established ratios or percentages stipulated in this Agreement.
8.3. The FFAMC shall be composed of representatives from the National Government and the GOSS and States/Regions as follows:
a) Three Representatives of the National Government;
Three Representatives of the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS);
c) All Finance Ministers in all States/Regions of Sudan
8.4 The Chairperson of the FFAMC shall be appointed by the Presidency.
8.5 The FFAMC shall work out its own rules and procedures, which shall be approved by the Presidency.

9.0 INTERSTATE COMMERCE
9.1 There shall be no legal impediment to interstate commerce or the flow of goods and services, capital, or labour between the states/regions.

10.0 GOVERNMENT LIABILITIES
10.1 Any debts/liabilities incurred by any level of government shall be the responsibility of that level of government.

11.0 DIVISION OF GOVERNMENT ASSETS
11.1 There shall be a fair and equitable division of government assets. An asset shall in the first instance be allocated to the level of government responsible for the function in respect of which the asset is related (e.g. school buildings to the level of government responsible for education). In the event of a dispute, the Parties agree that such dispute shall be referred to a committee comprising a representative of each of the Parties involved in the dispute and a mutually agreed
expert.
12.0 ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES AND FISCAL
ACCOUNTABILITY

12.1 All levels of government shall comply with generally accepted accounting standards and procedures. There shall be institutions at the
state/region, Government of Southern Sudan and National levels to ensure that funds are distributed according to the agreed government budget, and properly expended having regard to value for money.
12.2 To ensure the effective operation of such institutions, there shall be independent National and Southern Sudan Audit Chambers, which shall have responsibility for the functions referred to above. The National Audit Chamber shall set auditing standards. Appointments to the National Audit Chamber shall be made by the Presidency and confirmed by the National Assembly.
12.3 All levels of government shall hold all income and revenue received by it in public accounts and subject to public scrutiny and accountability.
13 FINANCING THE TRANSITION

13.1 The National Government shall assist, during the Pre-Interim Period to the extent that it is able, the SPLM/A in the establishment of the new transitional governments at the State/Regional level and the
Government of Southern Sudan. The Government of Southern Sudan shall meet the direct costs of establishing these levels of government, with the assistance from the international community.
13.2 Upon signature of a comprehensive Peace Agreement, the Parties shall establish a Joint National Transition Team to undertake the following:
13.2.1 Prepare budget estimates for the establishment of Governments at the National, Southern Sudan, and state/regional levels as provided for by the Peace Agreement;
13.2.2 Organize and prepare relevant documents for the donor conference, including the agenda of the conference, letters of invitations and be a secretariat to the donors’ conference;
13.2.3 Develop fund raising strategies, and assist in the identification of potential sources of funds necessary for a smooth and timely commencement of the Interim Period.

14.0 MONETARY POLICY, BANKING, CURRENCY AND BORROWING

A.MONETARY POLICY, BANKING AND CURRENCY
14.1.The Parties agree, consistent with the Machakos Protocol of 20th July 2002, to have a dual banking system in Sudan during the Interim Period. An Islamic banking system shall operate in Northern Sudan and
conventional banking system shall operate in Southern Sudan.
14.2.The Parties agree that conventional banking facilities are urgently needed in Southern Sudan. The Parties therefore agree to establish, during the Pre-Interim period, the Bank of Southern Sudan (BOSS) as a branch of Central Bank of Sudan (CBOS) consistent with paragraph 14.1 above.
14.3.The Parties agree to restructure, during the Pre-Interim Period, the CBOS so as to reflect the duality of the banking system in Sudan. The CBOS shall therefore use and develop two sets of banking
instruments, one Islamic and the other Conventional, to regulate and supervise the implementation of a single monetary policy through: (i) an Islamic financing window in Northern Sudan under a deputy governor of CBOS using Islamic financing instruments to implement the national monetary policy in Northern Sudan; and (ii) the Bank of Southern Sudan (BOSS), headed by a deputy governor of CBOS, to manage the conventional window using conventional financing instruments in implementing the same national monetary policy in Southern Sudan.
14.4. The CBOS shall be responsible for the conduct of monetary policy. All banking institutions shall be subject to the rules and regulations set by the CBOS.
14.5. The primary responsibility and mandate of the CBOS shall be ensuring price stability, maintaining stable exchange rate, sound banking system and issuance of currency. The monetary policy shall be
carried out accordingly relying primarily on market-based instruments instead of administrative allocation of credit.
14.6.The CBOS shall be fully independent in its pursuit of monetary policy.
14.7.The Governor of CBOS and his/her two deputies shall be appointed by the Presidency. The Governor of CBOS shall appoint in consultation with his/her two deputies other senior officers within the Central Bank.
14.8.The Parties agree to establish, during the Pre-Interim Period, an independent Board of Directors (BOD). Decisions of BOD on matters that may affect adversely the interest of either Party to this Agreement
shall be by consensus. The BOD shall be responsible to the Presidency on the accountability of the CBOS and shall consist of nine (9) members as follows:
a) Governor of CBOS ( Chairperson) and his/her two deputies and; Six highly qualified Sudanese to be appointed by the Presidency taking into account the agreed formula in the Power Sharing Protocol for the institutions of the National Government.
14.9 The CBOS shall adopt a program to issue a new currency as soon as is practical during the Interim Period. The design of the new currency shall reflect the cultural diversity of Sudan. Until a new currency has
been issued with the approval of the Parties on the recommendations of the CBOS, the circulating currencies in Southern Sudan shall be recognised.
14.10 The BOSS shall be responsible for chartering and supervising financial institutions in Southern Sudan.
14.11 All financial institutions shall be subject to internationally recognized regulatory and prudential standards for Islamic and conventional finance, as set by the CBOS.
14.12 All financial institutions shall be bound to implement monetary policies set by the CBOS.

B. BORROWING:
14.13. The Government of Southern Sudan and the states/regions may borrow money based on their respective credit worthiness. Neither the National Government nor the CBOS shall be required or expected to guarantee borrowing by sub-national governments.
14.14 The GOSS and all sub-national governments shall report financial and fiscal data to the relevant National Government bodies for statistical purposes.
14.15 The Government of Southern Sudan and the states/regions may borrow money from foreign sources based on their respective credit worthiness.
14.16 Foreign borrowing by all sub-national governments shall be done in a manner that does not undermine national macroeconomic policies and
shall be consistent with the objective of maintaining external financial viability. All sub-national governments’ foreign borrowing transactions shall conform to the CBOS specifications.

15 RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT FUNDS

A.Southern Sudan Reconstruction and Development Fund (SSRDF)
15.1.There shall be established a Southern Sudan Reconstruction and Development Fund (SSRDF) to solicit, raise and collect funds from domestic and international donors and disburse such funds for the
reconstruction and rehabilitation of the infrastructure of the South, for the resettlement and reintegration of internally and externally displaced persons, and to address past imbalances in regional development and infrastructure.
15.2. A monitoring and evaluation system shall be established to ensure accountability, transparency, efficiency, equity and fairness in the utilization of resources.
15.3.The Government of Southern Sudan shall be responsible for expenditure from the fund and shall be entitled to raise additional funds by way of donation from foreign States, multilateral organizations, or other bodies for the purposes of the reconstruction and development of the southern states/regions. The Fund shall be transparently administered and professionally managed subject to an oversight committee appointed by the Government of Southern Sudan but having on it a representative of the National Ministry of Finance and of the National Audit Chamber.
B.National Reconstruction and Development Fund (NRDF)
15.4. There shall be established by the Treasury, a National Reconstruction and Development Fund (NRDF) having the mission of developing the war affected areas and least developed areas outside
Southern Sudan and a steering committee with appropriate representation from such areas. A member of the Southern Sudan Ministry of Finance shall be a member of the Steering Committee. A report on the income, expenditure and the projects supported by the fund shall be placed before the National Assembly and the Council of States/Regions, which shall exercise oversight over the Fund.

C. Multi-Donor Trust Funds
15.5.The Parties recognize the need to establish, during the Pre-Interim Period, two Multi-Donor Trust Funds (MDTFs), one for the National Government and one for the GOSS to support urgent recurrent and investment budget costs under clearly stated criteria of eligible financing components. The Trust Funds shall be operational for the Pre-Interim Period, and shall thereafter be transformed into (i) one MDTF dedicated to the Southern Sudan Reconstruction and Development Fund (the “SRRDF”); and (ii) one MDTF dedicated to the National Recon! struction and Development Fund (the “NRDF”).
15.6.The MDTFs shall commence immediately to support, among other things, priority areas of capacity building and institutional strengthening and quick start/impact programs identified by the Parties.

15.7.Both funds shall support urgent recurrent and investment budget costs under clearly stated criteria of eligible financing components, and both shall have the right to solicit, raise and collect funds from foreign donors.
15.8. All trust funds shall report the flow of funds to the CBOS.
15.9.To ensure proper accountability for funds disbursed through the MDTFs the Parties shall cause audits to be performed on funds used within six (6) months of the close of the recipient’s financial year.
15.10. During the Pre-Interim as well as the Interim Period, funds may be channeled directly to finance activities beneficial to the National Government or the GOSS as the case may be.
15.11. During the Pre-Interim Period, the flow of foreign funds shall be through special accounts established in the Bank of Sudan for areas outside Southern Sudan and for Southern Sudan in a commercial bank in Southern Sudan until the Bank of Southern Sudan is established and operational. For the Interim Period: (i) the flow of foreign funds for
the National Fund will go through the CBOS; and (ii) for the Southern Fund, the foreign funds will be disbursed through a special account at
the Bank of Southern Sudan designated for the Government of Southern Sudan; or through arrangements as specified in the MDTF.

Junub (South Sudan) Independence alone is not enough

By Butrus Ajak:

QUOTE: “If the money is eaten by a few, all the rest will go hungry, and a hungry citizen is an angry citizen” Pres. Kiir at Governors Forum, Juba.

JULY 29/2012, SSN; As we prepare to embrace and pay homage to war fallen mates, heroes and heroines, it’s worth noting Junub (South Sudan)  independence alone isn’t enough. There is much to get done. It is obvious the above quotation is congruent with what is actually playing out on the ground. We’ll get to this in a moment.

When South got independence on 9th July 2011, most of southerners if not all, were relieved. Seeing our sons and daughters in helm of power, as custodians of our own affairs was something big. Nothing was like it. Unfortunately, the then happiness is quickly pummelled and dashed off by a tsunami of corruption and a tradition of paying less attention to issues of urgency. For instance lack of anti-craft rockets, which would have prevented massacres in Bentiu and Panthou during NCP aerial bombardment.

Exasperatingly, the SPLM comrades whom I thought will bring hope to the hopeless, address the issues of national building and mend the broken hearts, turned into something no one had ever expected. It is a compunction they will take to their graves.

They took up arms to fix the so-called deformed system in Khartoum, where we were left out of the loop, where we were marginalised, where we were denied basic infrastructure, where we were denied health service, where there was lack of self-expression and consumption of national resources by few amongst many other things. Why taking up the habit you determined to overhaul?

Thank goodness we have a state, but a state where the common citizens are denied and deprived of their rightful rights surely is doomed to fail and become a no man’s state.

Why nearly killing Deng Athuai and terrorising many other citizens you brought freedom for them?  It shows beyond doubt that liberation is yet to happen. My people still haven’t noticed what it is to be a citizen in one’s own country. A right denied them for so long, and the SPLM seems to even denying it the furthest.

You have started on a wrong footing and it will cost the party profoundly. If election is held today, the party will lose miserably.

The independence many of us yearned for all these years has just proven not enough. The system is convoluted with widespread grand corruption consuming the whole nation. Needless to say, it is initiated by the ruling party, the SPLM individuals. The SPLM has ruined its reputation nationally and internationally.

Why bringing freedom and robbing the nation of its meagre resources? Where do you leave our citizens who look up to you here? Unless some miracles happen down the track the SPLM party popularity is tarnished and is going down the drain.

Surely the SPLM/A managed to break the country into two, but falls short of delivering an equitable service to the people of South Sudan. They are ruling the nation as if they are leaving tomorrow. I have always been a steep supporter of the SPLM/A party given the determination it showed back in the days of revolution struggle, but I am extremely disappointed and betrayed when its splendid corruption hits the World news.

4 billion US dollars got smuggled by the few ruling individuals??? I was shocked and couldn’t just believe it. Instead of seizing the opportunity and utilizing $4 billion to build the national scheme so as to meet southerners dire needs, annoyingly, few pocketed it all, leaving the nation rotting in an abject poverty. Is this how we were liberated? I hope not.

As if it wasn’t enough, the burglars didn’t stop there, our men and women who dare to ask the whereabouts of the money are hunted down and tortured severely. Is this how liberators behave? Absolutely not.

These are unusual liberators.  Our common men and women must be allowed to feel at home. They must have right to question the government which governs them without intimidation. To worsen the case, the president has been contradicting himself on how he approaches the smugglers lately. This leaves me with lingering doubts about my president presumption of innocence.

He got to stand up for the nation, speak loud and clear who were these men and women who took the chunk of dollars. There is nothing to fear, my president. You have more than 8 Million people behind you; the 75 comrades who purloined and siphoned the nation’s money into individual accounts have inflicted shame and insult to the SPLM/A principles.

They are no more honourable, they are thugs who deserve their names yelled out. You either be with them, or with us. I suggest they must get laid off in the government positions forthwith.

Outrageously, I had a lengthy conversation with a friend of mine in South Sudan who told me a lot of people went back home when independence came. However, they have started going back to refugee camps citing lack of health services, insecurity, exclusion and lack of schools for their children.

For how long will our people be refugees? It is breathtaking thinking you have a home and it turns out those leading the nation are hungry and angry wolves in sheep’s clothing.

Finally, my president you have to space yourself from the corrupt officials by making sure they are brought to justice and made to vomit what does not belong to them. As your quote goes “If the money is  eaten by a few, all the rest will go hungry, and a hungry citizen is an angry citizen”. It is in fact the case now, citizens are frustrated and soon will erupt and spiral out of control, unless you act and act now to save your fame.

Secondly, those who nearly murdered Deng Athuai need to be identified immediately or else, we, in the civil society will always remain knowing your government apparatus did it.

Lastly, the SPLA soldiers who killed Mayol Kuch, the South Sudan-American citizen need to face the law and get contained so they don’t kill another person.

Butrus Ajak is a concerned South Sudan citizen, Australia 

Disclaimer: The views expressed above are solely those of the author(s) and do not represent those of the website.

South Sudanese nationalism in post-independence era

By Jacob K. Lupai: South Sudanese did not struggle for a nation of their own but were forced to do so in conditions beyond their control. This assertion may not go down well with those who believed that from day one South Sudanese aspirations were totally a nation of their own. Arguably if that was the case South Sudanese would have to exert every effort in nation building. This is because South Sudanese are of diverse tribes, languages, cultures, states and outlook that may easily polarize them. They may be people of one race but this is not enough to instill nationalism as more often loyalty seems to be to one’s tribe or clan rather than to nation building for prosperity to all. There is therefore not yet such a thing as South Sudanese nationalism but it can be cultivated.

Southern Sudanese in pre-independence era

We may need to know more in-depth about Southern Sudan from historians. However, in brief the history of Southern Sudan has been about slavery and domination, and resistance of the people to be freemen in the land of their birth. The modern history of Southern Sudan is therefore a history of struggle for freedom, equality and justice. The struggle was against Northern Sudan with its notorious Arab component that was terrorizing the people of Southern Sudan. The struggle was also against foreign rule and occupation of Southern Sudan by the Turks, Mahdists and the British. People of Southern Sudan had a long history of struggle for freedom but as people of separate tribes without coordination in their struggle until lately. The Arabs of Northern Sudan exploited and plundered resources in Southern Sudan with impunity. However, this was not received submissively. Despite poor weaponry the people of Southern Sudan put up heroic resistance against northern Arab slave traders. Heroism was the characteristic of Southern Sudan in the struggle throughout the pre-independence era.

Juba Conference of 1947

As though to pacify Southern Sudan for submission and exploitation a hasty conference was convened in Juba by the British colonial administration. The main objective of what became known as the Juba Conference of 1947 was to gain the support of the unsuspecting people of Southern Sudan for the realization of one united independent Sudan. Northern Sudan agitated for the conference to be convened. The conference, obviously serving the interest of Northern Sudan, urgently wanted Southern Sudan to agree immediately on the unification of Southern and Northern Sudan.

The British colonial administration erroneously concluded that Southern Sudan was inextricably bound for future development to the Middle East, Arabia and Northern Sudan. In its erroneous conclusion and naivety the British colonial administration merely hoped that Southern Sudan would be equipped to take its place in future as socially and economically the equal of Northern Sudan in the Sudan of future. It was to take Southern Sudan 64 (1947-2011) costly years to correct the British colonial administration erroneous conclusion and naivety about the unity of Sudan. It was of interest that Britain was among the first to recognize the independence of Southern Sudan as the Republic of South Sudan on the day independence was attained.

In the Juba Conference of 1947 southern participants made an eloquent argument against a hasty unity with Northern Sudan. However, one northern participant was so persuasive that southern participants swallowed the bait for unity without perceiving what would become of Southern Sudan, which was once a hunting ground for slaves, in a united Sudan. However, at any rate the decision on unity of Sudan had already been taken by the British colonial administration in favour of Northern Sudan.

Torit uprising of 1955

The erroneous conclusion and naivety of the British colonial administration that Southern Sudan would be socially and economically the equal of Northern Sudan in the Sudan of future was confirmed when the British left. Also, the persuasion of the northern participants in the Juba Conference of 1947 that southerners would be treated as equals to their northern counterparts was nothing but a deception. When Sudanisation of the civil and public service was made, out of 800 posts Sudanised less than I per cent of the posts went to southerners. How could the British colonial administration and the northern participants in the Juba Conference of 1947 explain this gross marginalization of the people of Southern Sudan? On their part southerners saw this as the substitution of hostile Arab colonialism for a limited and benevolent British colonial rule.

The hostility of southerners for the northern domination surfaced violently when southern soldiers in the Equatoria Corp based at Torit mutinied in 1955 marking the first armed uprising for fair treatment in modern history of Southern Sudan. The cause of the mutiny was clearly dissatisfaction when southerners saw that the Arabs were going to install themselves as new colonial masters in Southern Sudan. What southerners saw was the complete transfer of the colonial structures intact from Britain to the northern Sudanese to colonise Southern Sudan. Southerners were left with no influence on the future of Southern Sudan. A choice had to be made either submission or resistance. The latter was chosen.

Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972

The uprising at Torit in 1955 marked the start of a protracted armed struggle against domination by Northern Sudan. The armed struggle intensified when in 1958 a military coup took place where the military regime enthusiastically embarked on a vigorous programme of Arabisation and Islamisation which led to increased repression in Southern Sudan. This in turn made occasional skirmishes to escalate into a full-fledged civil war. Southerners saw no peaceful solution in sight except an intensified protracted armed struggle for freedom, equality and justice. However, in 1969 another military coup took place but this time the second military regime took a different approach, that of resolving the problem through a negotiated settlement. In 1972 a peace agreement was signed in the Ethiopian capital and the agreement came to be known as the Addis Ababa Agreement.

The Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972 granted Southern Sudan a local autonomy. With the agreement in place economic development and the establishment of political and administrative institutions became a priority in Southern Sudan. Arguably one of the most important results of the Addis Ababa Agreement was the establishment of Southern Sudan as an autonomous region with its parliament and a high executive council. However, manipulation of southern politics and interference from Northern Sudan caused the regional government to lose effectiveness. Leniency in dealing with corruption and rampant tribalism contributed to the negative perception of the regional government. Eventually the Addis Ababa Agreement was abrogated arguably because of the ugliest face of tribalism taken advantage of by Northern Sudan.

Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005

The abrogation of the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972 was a blessing in disguise. The liberation struggle in Southern Sudan gathered unprecedented momentum that Southern Sudan was ultimately to become independent in its own right. After a 22-year war a comprehensive peace agreement (CPA) was reached in 2005 that, unlike the Addis Ababa Agreement, granted Southern Sudan the right to self-determination with an interim period of 6 years after which a referendum would take place for Southern Sudan to choose either to remain united with Northern Sudan or to secede and become an independent country.

The experience of Juba Conference of 1947 was quite enough for people to have learned about the unity of Sudan. This was also reinforced by a message from none other than Dr John Garang de Mabior, the charismatic leader of the second revolutionary armed struggle, who said, “I and those who joined me in the bush and fought for more than twenty years have brought to you CPA on a golden plate. Our mission is accomplished. It is now your turn, especially those who did not have a chance to experience bush life. When time comes to vote at referendum, it is your golden choice to determine your fate. Would you like to vote to be second class citizen in your own country? It is absolutely your choice”.

Who would really be a fool to vote for unity of Sudan that was racially and religiously discriminative? However, some southerners who ignored how their brethren were treated in a united Sudan shamefully voted for unity of Sudan. Fortunately they were a very tiny minority that the southerners who voted for secession and independence had sweet dreams the day the one result of the referendum was announced. The cherished result was a massive 98.43 per cent for secession and independence of Southern Sudan.

Meaning of independence

The more than 98 per cent of people of all tribes in Southern Sudan did not vote for independence for fun. The overwhelming vote for independence precisely meant people earnestly wanted freedom from human rights violations and services for a decent standard of living. In short people wanted a life different from the one before independence. Southern Sudanese did not need a lecture on problems with Northern Sudan in order to vote for secession and independence. They were already self-taught and experienced firsthand Arab’s arrogance of treating southerners as second class citizens. The experience gained in living with northerners, especially the Arabs, should have made southerners experts in nation building. However, southerners seem to be extremely slow learners and practitioners in putting something for the common good into practice in promoting unity.

South Sudanese nationalism

After attaining independence are South Sudanese nationalistic? Some may answer in the affirmative that indeed South Sudanese are nationalistic for they couldn’t have overwhelmingly voted for secession and independence. On the other hand it can be argued that South Sudanese are not nationalistic but tribalistic. They voted for secession and independence because of the equal suffering endured under the heavy handed Arab colonialism that was utterly dehumanizing and unbearable. After removing the Arab mean colonial actions there is very little that binds South Sudanese together. Unless some visionary revolutionaries produce concepts that are practically unifying, it is difficult to see how South Sudan will not be disunited.

Victims of crime do not get justice as their loved ones are murdered in cold blood. The constitution is violated with impunity, for example, when land grabbers violate and commit criminal offense by depriving legitimate land owners of their property. Worse still land grabbers beat up and threaten to kill legitimate owners of the grabbed property. The law seems to be hardly enforced. In all this tribalism appears to play a part. There is no way one can conclude with absolute certainty that South Sudanese are nationalistic. The predominant culture seems to be that of greed and tribalism with lip service as part of a careful public relations exercise. Nationalism if any is abstractly remote from the reality on the ground.

Conclusion

In conclusion, South Sudanese nationalism in post independence era is still abstract and remote. The overwhelming vote for secession and independence was an expression of aggregate rejection of Arab colonialism. There is hardly any evidence that nationalism played a part. Rampant corruption, insecurity, tribalism and nepotism, and tribal conflicts seem to confirm this. Nationalists put the country first with equitable access to resources and services but not self-enrichment and tribal appointment of officials. However, nationalism can be cultivated and sustained, and the sooner nationalism is cultivated the better for the unity of South Sudan. It is to avoid all the negatives that may contribute to disunity. JULY 21/2012, SSN.

The author can be reached at jklupai@googlemail.cpm

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Disclaimer: The views expressed above are solely those of the author(s) and do not represent those of the website.

The author can be reached at jklupai@googlemail.com

Disclaimer: The views expressed above are solely those of the author(s) and do not represent those of the website.

The first anniversary of independence under a chaotic regime of tribal gangs

BY: ELHag Paul, JUBA AUG. 16/2012, SSN; Like a spoilt little brat sniffing glue, it neither listens nor learns from its mistakes.  It just carries on doing all the wrong things antagonizing every body; it has unknowingly slipped into a state of trance.  Now with its first birthday, it expects everyone to celebrate it and praise its imaged and drummed up achievements that never have been.  Well, the celebration itself tells a different story.  If South Sudan does not learn from the messages of this yet again shambolic celebration, then the future does not bode well for it.

As people were gearing themselves for celebration of the first anniversary of independence they were hoping that they would be spared the daily horrific news of crime.  That was not to be.  They had to live with the reality of Oyee poor governance even during festive periods.  The Oyee ruling party has completely failed to protect its citizens.  Every morning people wake up to hear disturbing news of looting, murders and abductions that take place during night time in Juba.  On 4th July 2012, the criminals decided to celebrate the independence of South Sudan by abducting non other than the leader of the Civil Society organisation, Mr Deng Athuai Mawiir.  He was deemed to be a loud mouth and perhaps this is what led to his rough treatment.  His brutal chastisement in Oyee style was a signal to democrats and free thinking South Sudanese to note that the government of the “cow boy hated” Kiir is a totalitarian regime composed of fragmented gangs and it won’t tolerate any criticism. 
The news of Mawiir’s abduction came as a shock to everybody who keeps abreast with developments in the country.  If the leader of Civil Society is not safe, who else is?  The chilling message that the abduction of Mawiir sends silently to the general population, not only disables them but terrorizes them to the core.  Certainly, this is what the criminals intended and this they had delivered with clinical precision.  The abduction is one act which amounts to depriving a citizen of their freedom of movement.  In effect, it is unlawful imprisonment.  Then there was the suffocation with a plastic bag in the car which amounts to literally attempted murder followed by beatings and torturous acts until the victim fell unconscious.  What was all this for?  What did Mawiir do to deserve this kind of barbarity during a festive period?  The questions posed to Mawiir by his assailants such as ‘Is that your father’s money?’ indicate that his call for eradication of corruption must be the reason why he was singled out.  Taking this to be the case, does Mawiir not have the right to express his view?  Why violate his person?  Why was he not openly arrested and charged according to the law if he committed a crime so that he could be tried in a court of law according to the constitution?  It is clear now that we are not to be in any doubt as to who the abductors are?  They must be those guys in black Toyota V8s without number plates cruising around in the streets of Juba.
What is the significance of this sad incident?  Certainly it can be unpacked in many ways.  But, without doubt it is a serious crime perpetuated by those in position of power whose motive is clear.  They want to keep the loot of over $4 billion at all cost.  In order to keep the loot, they must silence the people and to silence the people they must terrorise them.  This is the modus operandi of all totalitarian regimes.  Hence, the abuse meted on Mawiir is a warning to all to forget about the issue of corruption or else the consequence can be dire.  Fighting corruption is a dangerous business as John Githongo the anti corruption tsar of Kenya found out to his detriment.  Githongo had to flee to the UK to save his life from powerful quarters in Kenya.  Paradoxically, he is now advisor to non other than Don Salvatore, the lord of corruption in RSS himself.
 
While the literature explicitly with examples from West Africa to Russia acknowledges that fighting corruption is dangerous, this should not deter us from confronting the criminals in Juba to recover the people’s resources.  Terror is the business of cowards who hope to hide behind it.  Terrorists know that they can not win support of the people through talking thus they resort to violence.  The abductors of Mawiir belong to this class.  They know that they unlawfully stole people’s resources and they are trying to terrorise the people.  This is not acceptable and it must be confronted by people’s power.  When the people come together and stand firm nothing can stop them.  People’s power has smashed the one time thought iron fist leaders like Causescou of Romania, Amin of Uganda, Gaddaffi of Libya, Mubarak of Egypt and the list can go back to the days of Aristotle.  
 
These so called strong men, when things come to head, they and their henchmen who always are their tribes mate start running about like ‘rats’ and hiding in culverts but when as now they are yet exploiting tribalism and the divisions they sowed in society, they are audacious in their cowardly acts such as in the abuse of Mawiir.
 
The other significance of Mawiir’s abduction showcases the absence of security in RSS and the rule of gangs.  It is no secret that all the generals in the SPLM/A have their own body guards whom they recruited personally and are paid for by the government through them.  These body guards who normally are tribe mates pay their allegiance directly to these generals.  To make sense of this, just walk around Juba and have a look at the houses of the ministers and generals.  The first thing one sees are numerous huts (tukuls) occupied by soldiers and their families at the backyard of the residences of these generals.  These are the tribal bodyguards as well as members of the SPLA.  This contradictory security arrangement negates the role of the state as the protector of its officials and people. 
 
In all non failed states, government employees are protected by the members of the law enforcement agencies who are recruited from all over the country based on fitness and merit.  These bodies prepare their daily, weekly, monthly and yearly rotas to ensure that the senior government officials are well protected by the state.  Senior officials do not rely on their kin and kith for security but on professional protection service from state organs.  In RSS, it is the other way round.  Bodyguards are tribes mate recruited by the tribal lords solely on grounds of tribe.  No fitness and merit is considered and they are answerable to their own tribal lords, or the generals.  The law enforcement agencies are packed with members of the ruling tribe – the largest chunk does not even know a word of Arabic or English.  If they happen to see something suspicious they either shoot or arrest and begin beating the suspect without questions asked and if the suspect is unlucky he/she could lose their life.  A good example to enlighten the reader is the case of the Kenyan school teacher Miss Tabitha Musangi employee of Dr John Garang International School.  While the flag was being lowered on 13th May 2012, the unfortunate lady in a car happened to be passing near Dr John Garang mausoleum.  The body guard of the mausoleum thought they broke the law and he instantly without halting the car and asking questions responded by shooting at the passing car killing the teacher and wounding the driver.  http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y635vawHBt4 This is the consequences of having a failed tribal government with illiterate and brutal tribal forces.
With this point in mind and looking at the structure of SPLM/A described above, what emerges is a very complex system of clanism, predominately dominated by one tribe interwoven into the wider structure of government of South Sudan.  It is this amorphous structure that disables the machinery of the state in South Sudan from functioning as it should.  What matters in this structure is the tribal interest of those holding the levers of power. Anybody questioning this system regardless of tribe, no matter who he/she is, will find themselves in hot soup by any of these gangs just like Mawiir.  Though, Mawiir is a Jieng from Warrap, the president’s hub, he is seen as a threat to the wider interest of the Jieng people as a whole and therefore he must be dealt with accordingly. 
 
The most surprising thing is that the Jieng who support this backward and primitive style of governance are so loud in labeling anybody who disagrees with their tribalism as a tribalist.  Read the various papers and websites specialising in RSS issues and you would not miss this pertinent point.  The practitioners of tribalism are loud in throwing the tribal label at any one in order to distract the masses from their vicious tribalism and to entrench their hegemony.  It is interesting that this kind of behaviour was exactly practised by the Arabs against the African tribes in the then Sudan.  Recall the failed coup attempts carried out by people of African origin like the coup of Hassan Hussein in 1974.  The Arabs called it a racist coup while forgetting that they the Arabs were the masters of racism.  So, what we have in RSS now is the mirror of this nasty behaviour.  It is a case of the abuser blaming his victims for their predicament which he is responsible for – a classic example of abuse of state power by demagogues a psychological pathos resulting from oppression.
 
While in the short term the rulers can massively benefit from this mismanagement of state affairs eventually it is self defeating because essentially this negative behaviour fragments the society.  The abused and disadvantaged groups (general masses) consciously will dissociate from the state as the vital links of social trust that bind the people to the state are eroded or broken.  RSS will not mean anything to the average person on the street.  The people will be alien to their own government and country and this is when serious situations of unquantifiable destruction and loss like what happened in Libya and what is presently taking place in Syria begin to happen.  RSS does not need this.  We can stop this now by working together towards a healthy society.  So, for a start, let us begin to talk honestly about the vices taking place in our country to appreciate the magnitude of the problem.  If a Bari is doing wrong, he/she must be told and if a Jieng is doing wrong, likewise he/she must be told.  Then let us isolate and challenge those practising tribalism and corruption as a way of rebuilding social trust among ourselves to regain our collective worth.  This is the only way forward, otherwise the future looks bleak under Oyee as it is driving us towards an inevitable internal conflict.
Back to the issue of Mawiir. His abduction could have been committed by anyone, but the fact the victim was asked why he talked about corruption raises questions as to the motives and characters of the assailants.   We know who would not want the corruption problem to be dealt with – Don Kiir and his acolytes.  Do not take Don Kiir’s façade of his letters to the 75 thieves seriously.  He is a liar.  Remember on 23rd September 2011 he lied to the UN General Assembly on this very issue of corruption.  And again it appears he may have lied to a president of a friendly country which ended with an apology from him in written.  Lastly, he personally confessed to lying during the Independence Day in 2011 by saying “anihna ma akazib bitana da” meaning us and our lies.  Secondly, the government has not denounced this barbaric act in the strongest terms possible.  Thirdly, no mention of what would be done to deter such acts of violence. Is it any wonder why RSS is a failed state?  The sad thing is that Mawiir’s torture symbolizes the closure of the first anniversary of independence under a chaotic regime of tribal gangs.
 
The international community correctly sensing what type of government in South Sudan they are dealing with has become cautious.  They are gradually distancing themselves.  As they do this, RSS becomes more and more of a pariah state.  The evidence to this can be deduced from the way the international community ignored the invitations extended to them by GoSS to attend the first anniversary of South Sudan independence.  Of all the invitees, only president Museveni of Uganda turned up.  The rest including Kenya which benefits massively from South Sudan did not show up.  To appear polite, these dissatisfied countries and international organisations dispatched very junior or low ranking officials to represent them in the event.  In diplomatic speak that was tantamount to a snub and a withdrawal of confidence in the rulers of new country.  As you can see the damage is already done. 
 
On the Independence Day itself, the president’s speech turned out to be a recycled version of his speech delivered on Independence Day in 2011.  It was all full of lofty ideals but empty in tangible substance as the “cow boy hatted” president failed to live up to his words in his first year of rule.  He promised democracy but delivered Dinkocracy.  He promised eradication of corruption but delivered millioniarisation of Oyee apparatchiks.  He promised lean government but delivered a bloated government.  He promised law and order but delivered lawlessness and insecurity throughout the country.  He promised equality but delivered tribalism.  He promised policies of good neighbourliness but delivered conflicts.  He promised good governance but delivered mismanagement.  He promised government of the people but delivered a government run by foreigners and miscreants.  Name anything and the opposite holds true.   
 
Because of Oyee’s spectacular failures in governance, they have managed to squander the good will of the international community towards RSS.  In just one year they turned the entire world against our country.  If this is allowed to continue, all of us will sink with Oyee.  The cracks under the boat created by Oyee misgovernance need to be sealed quickly before they widen and water begins to gush into the boat.  So president Kiir should use the realities of the poor balance sheet of RSS’ first year of business to speak to all the opposition political parties, armed groups, civil societies and religious leaders in order to hold a convention of the people of South Sudan.  This is the only way RSS can be salvaged.[Truth hurts but it is also liberating]
Elhag Paul, RSS;  elhagpaul@aol.com

Disclaimer: The views expressed above are solely those of the author(s) and do not represent those of the website.

Kiir’s $ 4 Billion stolen by 75 officials in South Sudan: Waiting for answer and clarity

BY  Dr. Leonard  Madu, Nashville, TN, USA

SEPT. 02/2012, SSN; On May 3, 2012, President Salva Kiir Mayardit sent a letter to 75 former and current government officials asking them to return the sum of $4 billion that they are alleged to have stolen. The letter also states that partial payments are also welcome. He also promised amnesty and confidentiality to those who return the stolen funds. If the President’s allegations are true, its impact on the economic well being of South Sudan cannot be minimized.

A brief look at the current condition in South Sudan would help drive the point home. Last year’s budget (2011/2012) was $10.2 billion. This year’s budget (2012/2013) is $6.2 billion. A budget shortfall of of about $4 billion. 98% of South Sudan’s income comes from oil, but since January this year no oil has been sold as a result of the dispute with Sudan.

So no money is coming in and inflation is about 80%.  Almost all development projects have been halted by the government, leaving international organizations to fill the void.

The healthcare and educational system are in disarray. Juba University has been closed for some time now and the few schools that have been built, have no equipments and trained teachers are not readily available. At 27%, South Sudan has the lowest literacy rate in the world, even worse than Afghanistan.

70% of children aged between 6-17 have never set foot in a classroom, and the completion rate is about 10%. Enrollment has doubled since 2005, but there are serious questions as to whether any of these anxious kids are learning at all. Currently, 6% of the budget is geared towards education.

In the healthcare sector, the situation is even grimmer. According to the United Nations Development (UNDP), and the United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF), the country has only 120 physicians and 100 registered nurses for a population of about 9 million. Neighboring Kenya has about 14 physicians per 100,000.

Although infant mortality rates have been lowered, maternal mortality rates remain the highest in the world. Currently it is about 2,000 deaths per 100,000 live births. Most of the physicians say they have to operate with cell phone flash lights because of electricity shortage. The good news is that the government says it has authorized the building of 100 more rural clinics and recruited about 512 foreign physicians.  It has also started a crash program to train more nurses.

The UNDP says that about half of the population are food insecure, and the World Food Program (WFP) expects to feed about 2.7 million people this year. The conflicts in South Kordofan and the Blue Nile State are exacerbating the refugee problem and adding more pressure on food sources. This has caused most international organizations to switch from developmental programs to humanitarian assistance.

South Sudan has the potential to be the bread basket of the region, but currently the government imports 70% of its food and only 5% of the land is cultivated.

Though the government is doing its best to improve the lives of its people, looting of government funds would not help this process.

The $4 billion allegedly stolen could have taken care of  all these problems easily. But there are a lot of questions surrounding this allegation made by President Salva Kiir.

Addressing a rally 3 weeks ago in Rumbek, Vice President Riek Macher poked holes into the allegations of the President. He stated that it was a smear campaign and a political witch hunt against the SPLM, which has been accused  of massive corruption by international agencies.

Macher was quoted as saying at the rally “four billion is too much to be taken by 75 officials”.  Vice President Macher is my good friend, but I hate to bust his bubble on this one.

Yes, 75 officials are capable of stealing more than $4 billion if they have unfettered access to the funds. Three examples will suffice.

1- At an inquest after the death of President Abacha in Nigeria, Wada Nas, then National Security Adviser stated that he went to the Central Bank and withdrew $1 billion with only a piece of paper from Abacha. No questions asked and no account rendered.

2- A former Governor, James Ibori, stole almost a billion dollars by himself. The Nigerian courts acquitted him, but the British courts got hold of him and sent him, his wife and girl friend to prison where they are languishing now.

3- In 1998/99, the prestigious Economist of London reported that the first half a billion dollars recovered from the late Abacha  was stolen and shared by President Abubakar and few members of his Armed Forces Ruling Council. Interestingly, President Abubakar never denied the report (I still have a copy of that report). So, 75 Wada Nases and Iboris are capable of  stealing more than $4 billion.

However, the question is -who is telling the truth?. The President or the Vice President? Some South Sudanese believe the President is telling the truth, but some believe there is a hidden ethnic agenda behind the accusations. If President Mayardit has evidence that these officials actually stole these funds, why can’t he turn their names over to the courts for prosecution?

On the other hand if he feels the judiciary cannot handle it because it is still a weak institution, then appoint a special prosecutor to carry out a thorough investigation and make the report public. He obviously has their addresses, so it would not be difficult to find them.

It is  laughable and disturbing for a President to send letters to people asking them to return stolen money.

On July 4, The Civic Society leader, Deng Athuai was picked up from his Nile Beach hotel in Juba and severely beaten for trying to uncover the names of the 75 officials mentioned by President Mayardit.

And in Washington, Senator Richard Leahy (D VT), author of the “anti-kleptocracy” law has said that he does not believe the State Department is doing enough to find the names of those who are responsible for the missing funds.

Millions of South Sudanese and people like me who participated in the struggle for the liberation and emancipation of South Sudan, are waiting for answers and clarity.

DR. Leonard Madu is President of the African Caribbean Institute and the African African Chamber of Commerce, Nashville, Tennessee. He is also a Fox Television analyst on foreign affairs. globalafrik@yahoo.com; 615-399-7955

Disclaimer: The views expressed above are solely those of the author(s) and do not represent those of the website.

Betrayal of a nation’s expectation: Why South Sudan is screwed up?

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